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85 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Vitaliy Filippov 5c0bf7c293 Add detailed security feature documentation 2026-07-08 01:02:30 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 2e03568225 Implement vitastor-cli cpubench for AES and xxhash3 benchmarks 2026-07-08 00:19:55 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 7dabef4851 Add security parameter documentation 2026-07-05 18:51:26 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 29c3841eaa Allow to make-etcd --antietcd-only 2026-07-05 18:51:23 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 45204da444 Rename server_cert to api_cert 2026-07-05 15:44:59 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov c18ddbf255 Remove antietcd_ca parameter from mon/antietcd_adapter - it is client_ca 2026-07-05 15:36:20 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 76410df0e8 Do not require explicit peer_ca for antietcd 2026-07-05 15:19:03 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 6a0f3a38d0 Do not enable use_perms by default - make it more explicit for users 2026-07-05 15:19:03 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 265e99ccd0 Support TLS certificate generation in make-etcd 2026-07-05 15:19:03 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov aa71a1968f Rename use_auth to use_perms 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 5382f1c7bb Fix use_auth usage 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov a5dbf74123 Add support for full AES-GCM including double encryption of AES-XTS :D 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 784fd7d233 Also allow clients to load /inode/stats/ for their inodes 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 13b7c0e73d Load all /config/ 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov d747ec8c41 Fix modify owner/groups 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov cabe5d1543 Skip non-existing pools 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 38da624930 Use osd & mon certs instead of usernames 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov e0ff8a014f Remove mon and osd user types 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 8721f21874 Also check for "Received garbage" during test 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 9eb858fb5f Add a CI test with RDMA 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 9f084f48f6 Add request size validation to prevent OOMDoS 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov c998325448 Implement OSD-side authorization for operations 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov a243ff6459 Remove tls_ from option names 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 47b3294666 Remove TLS support (superseded by direct GCM) 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 3afed2473e Implement TLS 1.3-like handshake manually 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov fdeacdcf30 Extract openssl-related code, wire ssl implementation back 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov d7ddd7752c Coalesce entries in send_out_buf 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 2b2c7d5e39 Support isa-l_crypto for AES-XTS too 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov e26478c2e7 Fix xts+rdma encrypt errors 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov c7b9d30fd3 Fix "use-after-realloc" warning 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 5803655840 Support isa-l_crypto for AES-GCM 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 61ce26ba29 Remove WITH_OPENSSL from all files except http_client, always require OpenSSL 2026-07-05 14:58:24 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 32e651ec96 Use pools for GCM contexts 2026-07-05 14:58:23 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov dbed0e94cb Try to run tests with AES-GCM 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 8b39a268b9 Implement direct AES-256-GCM with a static key for benchmark 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov d40ba7c5ce Make sure to send all TLS data before continuing 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 985257f2d7 Parse standard TLS record headers 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov a4f3383f21 Omit msgr_tls_record_hdr_t for non-tls data 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov b2d828ec84 Allow 2 and 4 byte per block chain_info (allow more than 255 snapshots with encryption) 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov b2a74de715 Implement OSD TLS support 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 430761ad2e Allow to skip checksums for headers 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 38a1f6937d Implement protocol-level checksums (xxhash3) 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 8b46914999 Include xxhash3 x86dispatch 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 1b81e60187 Do not use scrap_buffer in the client (it would block protocol checksum support) 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 526c597cd0 Support TLS CN authentication and per-image permissions in vitastor-cli serve 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 7a97783ead Add VitastorAuthFilter 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov b4425d8e65 Implement vitastor-cli ls-user, modify-user, remove-user commands 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 1afda35bd3 Add image owner/owner_group/reader_group support (for antietcd VitastorAuthFilter) 2026-07-05 14:58:09 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 0953f5ebdd Support inline (string PEM) certificates and pkeys 2026-07-05 14:10:11 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 1b03615e50 Show encryption keys (only IDs) in the listing 2026-07-05 14:10:11 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 8f208c53df Support storing image encryption keys in Vault 2026-07-05 14:10:11 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov c0d2dabe66 Prefer local etcd addresses and correctly cycle over them even when they need resolving
Seems slightly overcomplicated...
2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 6da4aaf176 Support DNS resolving via libc-ares 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 5b6a6fce9a Batch handle_immediate_ops more 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 79fb2def57 Add vitastor-cli create & modify --enc-key parameter 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 7f5c24144b Support reading from snapshots encrypted with different keys 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 3cf876fafa Support decryption with multiple keys 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 771aa83282 Allow to return chain_info in response to reads 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 03404ac95d Add basic AES-XTS client-side encryption support 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov decf314238 Rework msgr send/receive to allow encryption support 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov ab1849ff07 Move fromhexstr() to str_util 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 33b18c7229 Add openapi description 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 4a2efb29ec Slightly fix API return and input types 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 00a432193a Implement vitastor-cli serve command to serve simple HTTP API 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov d83eb599a0 Implement HTTP server support O_o 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov c1c9b1975d Rename http_response_t to http_message_t 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov ba0d9ad9f2 Extract common HTTP context 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 4feabc4ab6 Support xxhash 32-bit checksums (data_csum_type=xxh3_32) 2026-07-05 14:10:10 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 1a14301c50 Detect block checksums using csum_block_size, not data_csum_type 2026-07-05 14:09:57 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 5dc52a7c06 Add client certificate support 2026-07-05 14:09:57 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 4d45b27696 Do not re-initialize TLS context every connection 2026-07-05 14:09:57 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 5995c4a00f Add https support to antietcd 2026-07-05 14:09:57 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 906388adaa Implement etcd SSL support via OpenSSL
Maybe I should remove all of this and use libwebsockets :)
2026-07-05 14:09:57 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 5dbc679e16 Fix padded block checksums - v2 2026-07-05 14:09:57 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov d48864a6be Fix unaligned pointer warnings 2026-07-04 21:40:29 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 462482d319 Fix zero-padded big_write checksum verification in the new store 2026-07-04 21:37:22 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 5ef9d78461 Release 3.0.15
- QEMU virtual disk migration with enabled iothread is finally fixed correctly.
- Fixed operation of Proxmox VMs with swTPM without enabling NBD for all disks.
- Debian packages are now again built with stable Antietcd released instead of
  the unstable master branch.
- Antietcd cluster mode previously broken in that master branch is fixed. The
  symptom was Antietcd being unable to elect the leader in a cluster.
- Fixed monitor startup with embedded Antietcd when using IPv6.
- Fixed space statistics calculation for FS and S3 pools in the new storage ([PR #127](https://github.com/vitalif/vitastor/pull/127)).
2026-06-28 11:29:38 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 1b20010a69 Install npm packages in debian/rules 2026-06-28 11:29:27 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov d750d00c6f Fix SWTPM in Proxmox 2026-06-27 16:04:51 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 66cb564e2c Fix background jobs in etcd_fail test 2026-06-27 15:42:53 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov f782decbd6 Update antietcd to 1.3.1 2026-06-27 15:42:42 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 717582c4ba Use release builds of antietcd&tinyraft in debian packages (not master branch) 2026-06-27 10:27:15 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov cd62c0755f Fix IPv6 antietcd configuration 2026-06-27 00:16:03 +03:00
c6f5ab7d79 fix pool stats with no_inode_stats (#127)
Co-authored-by: zhu.chengzhen <zhu.chengzhen@jingjiamicro.com>
2026-06-24 12:41:56 +03:00
Vitaliy Filippov 09607ddcbe Actual fix for live migration with iothread 2026-06-23 00:07:34 +03:00
180 changed files with 21162 additions and 1375 deletions
+162
View File
@@ -234,6 +234,60 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_etcd_fail_https:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 10
run: ETCD_SCHEME=https /root/vitastor/tests/test_etcd_fail.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_etcd_fail_https_antietcd:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 10
run: ETCD_SCHEME=https ANTIETCD=1 /root/vitastor/tests/test_etcd_fail.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_snapshot_https:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: ETCD_SCHEME=https /root/vitastor/tests/test_snapshot.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_interrupted_rebalance:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -720,6 +774,42 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_snapshot_chain_encrypted:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: ENCRYPTED=1 /root/vitastor/tests/test_snapshot_chain.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_snapshot_chain_enc_gcm:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: TEST_NAME=enc_gcm ENCRYPTED=1 VITASTOR_CFG=',"proto_checksums":"gcm"' /root/vitastor/tests/test_snapshot_chain.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_old_snapshot_chain:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -1278,6 +1368,24 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_heal_ec_rdma:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 10
run: TEST_NAME=ec_rdma RDMA=1 SCHEME=ec /root/vitastor/tests/test_heal.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_checksum:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -1296,6 +1404,24 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_checksum_xxhash:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: TEST_NAME=xxhash OSD_ARGS="--data_csum_type xxh3_32" /root/vitastor/tests/test_checksum.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_old_checksum:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
@@ -2160,3 +2286,39 @@ jobs:
echo ""
done
test_write_encrypted:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: /root/vitastor/tests/test_write_encrypted.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
test_write_encrypted_ec:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
container: ${{env.TEST_IMAGE}}:${{github.sha}}
steps:
- name: Run test
id: test
timeout-minutes: 3
run: SCHEME=ec /root/vitastor/tests/test_write_encrypted.sh
- name: Print logs
if: always() && steps.test.outcome == 'failure'
run: |
for i in /root/vitastor/testdata/*.log /root/vitastor/testdata/*.txt; do
echo "-------- $i --------"
cat $i
echo ""
done
+8
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@ for my $line (<>)
{
$test_name .= '_antietcd';
}
elsif ($1 eq 'ETCD_SCHEME' && $2 eq 'https')
{
$test_name .= '_https';
}
elsif ($1 eq 'ENCRYPTED')
{
$test_name .= '_encrypted';
}
elsif ($1 eq 'OLD')
{
$test_name =~ s/^test_/test_old_/s;
+1
View File
@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@
package-lock.json
fio
qemu
node_modules
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 2.8...3.30)
project(vitastor)
set(VITASTOR_VERSION "3.0.14")
set(VITASTOR_VERSION "3.0.15")
include(CTest)
+1
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ Vitastor поддерживает QEMU-драйвер, протоколы UBLK,
- [Дисковые параметры OSD](docs/config/layout-osd.ru.md)
- [Прочие параметры OSD](docs/config/osd.ru.md)
- [Параметры мониторов](docs/config/monitor.ru.md)
- [Безопасность](docs/config/security.ru.md)
- [Настройки пулов](docs/config/pool.ru.md)
- [Метаданные образов в etcd](docs/config/inode.ru.md)
- Использование
+1
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ Read more details in the documentation. You can start from here: [Quick Start](d
- [OSD Disk Layout](docs/config/layout-osd.en.md)
- [OSD Runtime Parameters](docs/config/osd.en.md)
- [Monitor](docs/config/monitor.en.md)
- [Security](docs/config/security.en.md)
- [Pool configuration](docs/config/pool.en.md)
- [Image metadata in etcd](docs/config/inode.en.md)
- Usage
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
VITASTOR_VERSION ?= v3.0.14
VITASTOR_VERSION ?= v3.0.15
all: build push
+1 -1
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ spec:
capabilities:
add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
image: vitalif/vitastor-csi:v3.0.14
image: vitalif/vitastor-csi:v3.0.15
args:
- "--node=$(NODE_ID)"
- "--endpoint=$(CSI_ENDPOINT)"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ spec:
privileged: true
capabilities:
add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]
image: vitalif/vitastor-csi:v3.0.14
image: vitalif/vitastor-csi:v3.0.15
args:
- "--node=$(NODE_ID)"
- "--endpoint=$(CSI_ENDPOINT)"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ package vitastor
const (
vitastorCSIDriverName = "csi.vitastor.io"
vitastorCSIDriverVersion = "3.0.14"
vitastorCSIDriverVersion = "3.0.15"
)
// Config struct fills the parameters of request or user input
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
vitastor (3.0.14-1) unstable; urgency=medium
vitastor (3.0.15-1) unstable; urgency=medium
* Bugfixes
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Section: admin
Priority: optional
Maintainer: Vitaliy Filippov <vitalif@yourcmc.ru>
Build-Depends: debhelper, g++ (>= 8), libstdc++6 (>= 8),
linux-libc-dev, libgoogle-perftools-dev, libjerasure-dev, libgf-complete-dev,
linux-libc-dev, libgoogle-perftools-dev, libjerasure-dev, libgf-complete-dev, libc-ares-dev,
libibverbs-dev, librdmacm-dev, libisal-dev, cmake, pkg-config, libnl-3-dev, libnl-genl-3-dev,
node-bindings <!nocheck>, node-gyp, node-nan
Standards-Version: 4.5.0
+1
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ override_dh_install:
cp -v node-binding/package.json node-binding/index.js node-binding/addon.cc node-binding/addon.h node-binding/client.cc node-binding/client.h debian/tmp/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/nodejs/vitastor
cp -v node-binding/build/Release/addon.node debian/tmp/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/nodejs/vitastor/build/Release
dh_install
cd debian/vitastor-mon/usr/lib/vitastor/mon && npm install --production
override_dh_installdeb:
cat debian/fio_version >> debian/vitastor-fio.substvars
-6
View File
@@ -37,12 +37,6 @@ rm -rf a b
echo "dep:fio=$FIO" > debian/fio_version
cd /root/vitastor/packages/vitastor-$REL/vitastor-$VER
mkdir mon/node_modules
cd mon/node_modules
curl -s https://git.yourcmc.ru/vitalif/antietcd/archive/master.tar.gz | tar -zx
curl -s https://git.yourcmc.ru/vitalif/tinyraft/archive/master.tar.gz | tar -zx
cd /root/vitastor/packages/vitastor-$REL
if [[ ( "$REL" = "trixie" || "$REL" = "resolute" ) && -e ../vitastor-bookworm/vitastor_$VER.orig.tar.xz ]]; then
# Fucking shit, archives differ between bookworm (xz 5.4.1) and trixie (xz 5.8.1)
+6 -8
View File
@@ -12,20 +12,18 @@ ARG REL=
WORKDIR /root
RUN set -e -x; \
if [ "$REL" = "buster" ]; then \
perl -i -pe 's/deb.debian.org/archive.debian.org/' /etc/apt/sources.list; \
apt-get update; \
apt-get -y install wget; \
wget https://vitastor.io/debian/pubkey.gpg -O /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/vitastor.gpg; \
echo "deb https://vitastor.io/debian $REL main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list; \
fi; \
perl -i -pe 's/deb.debian.org/archive.debian.org/' /etc/apt/sources.list; \
apt-get update; \
apt-get -y install wget; \
wget https://vitastor.io/debian/pubkey.gpg -O /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/vitastor.gpg; \
echo "deb https://vitastor.io/debian $REL main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list; \
grep '^deb ' /etc/apt/sources.list | perl -pe 's/^deb/deb-src/' >> /etc/apt/sources.list; \
perl -i -pe 's/Types: deb$/Types: deb deb-src/' /etc/apt/sources.list.d/*.sources || true; \
echo 'APT::Install-Recommends false;' >> /etc/apt/apt.conf; \
echo 'APT::Install-Suggests false;' >> /etc/apt/apt.conf
RUN apt-get update && \
apt-get -y install fio libgoogle-perftools-dev devscripts libjerasure-dev cmake \
apt-get -y install fio libgoogle-perftools-dev devscripts libjerasure-dev cmake libc-ares-dev libisal-crypto-dev \
libibverbs-dev librdmacm-dev libisal-dev libnl-3-dev libnl-genl-3-dev curl nodejs npm node-nan node-bindings && \
apt-get -y build-dep fio && \
apt-get --download-only source fio
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
VITASTOR_VERSION ?= v3.0.14
VITASTOR_VERSION ?= v3.0.15
all: build push
@@ -12,12 +12,7 @@ EnvironmentFile=/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf
SyslogIdentifier=etcd
ExecStart=bash -c 'docker run --rm -i -v /var/lib/vitastor/etcd:/data \
--log-driver none --network host $CONTAINER_OPTIONS --name vitastor-etcd \
$ETCD_IMAGE /usr/local/bin/etcd --name "$ETCD_NAME" --data-dir /data \
--snapshot-count 10000 --advertise-client-urls http://$ETCD_IP:2379 --listen-client-urls http://$ETCD_IP:2379 \
--initial-advertise-peer-urls http://$ETCD_IP:2380 --listen-peer-urls http://$ETCD_IP:2380 \
--initial-cluster-token vitastor-etcd-1 --initial-cluster "$ETCD_INITIAL_CLUSTER" \
--initial-cluster-state new --max-txn-ops=100000 --max-request-bytes=104857600 \
--auto-compaction-retention=10 --auto-compaction-mode=revision'
$ETCD_IMAGE /usr/local/bin/etcd --data-dir /data
ExecStop=docker stop vitastor-etcd
Restart=always
StartLimitInterval=0
+1 -1
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#
# Desired Vitastor version
VITASTOR_VERSION=v3.0.14
VITASTOR_VERSION=v3.0.15
# Additional arguments for all containers
# For example, you may want to specify a custom logging driver here
-3
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@@ -1,4 +1 @@
ETCD_IMAGE=quay.io/coreos/etcd:v3.5.18
ETCD_NAME=""
ETCD_IP=""
ETCD_INITIAL_CLUSTER=""
+1
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@@ -38,3 +38,4 @@ In the future, additional configuration methods may be added:
- [OSD Disk Layout](config/layout-osd.en.md)
- [OSD Runtime Parameters](config/osd.en.md)
- [Monitor](config/monitor.en.md)
- [Security Parameters](config/security.en.md)
+1
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@@ -41,3 +41,4 @@
- [Дисковые параметры OSD](config/layout-osd.ru.md)
- [Прочие параметры OSD](config/osd.ru.md)
- [Параметры мониторов](config/monitor.ru.md)
- [Параметры безопасности](config/security.ru.md)
+8 -2
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@@ -198,8 +198,14 @@ put a modified value into etcd key /vitastor/config/global.
- Type: string
- Default: none
Data checksum type to use. May be "crc32c" or "none". Set to "crc32c" to
enable data checksums.
Data and metadata checksum type to use. May be "crc32c", "xxh3_32" or "none".
Select crc32c or xxh3_32 and set csum_block_size to enable data checksums.
Both crc32c and xxh3_32 are almost equally fast, xxh3_32 is safer. xxh3_32 is
the xxhash3 algorithm truncated from 64 to 32 bits (which is still a good hash).
Note that enabled data checksums either increase memory usage or reduce
performance. Check details in [csum_block_size](#csum_block_size) description.
## csum_block_size
+6 -2
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@@ -209,8 +209,12 @@ journal_block_size и meta_block_size. Однако на данный момен
- Тип: строка
- Значение по умолчанию: none
Тип используемых OSD контрольных сумм данных. Может быть "crc32c" или "none".
Установите в "crc32c", чтобы включить расчёт и проверку контрольных сумм данных.
Тип используемых OSD контрольных сумм данных и метаданных. Может быть "crc32c",
"xxh3_32" или "none". Выберите crc32c или xxh3_32 и установите csum_block_size,
чтобы включить контрольные суммы данных.
И crc32c, и xxh3_32 примерно одинаково быстры, xxh3_32 надёжней. xxh3_32 - это
алгоритм xxhash3, обрезанный с 64 до 32 бит (это всё равно хороший хеш).
Следует понимать, что контрольные суммы в зависимости от размера блока их
расчёта либо увеличивают потребление памяти, либо снижают производительность.
+3
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@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ or antietcd_data_dir options). All other antietcd parameters
cluster, cluster_key, persist_filter, stale_read can also be set in
Vitastor configuration with `antietcd_` prefix.
See also: [antietcd_cert](security.en.md#antietcd_cert),
[antietcd_key](security.en.md#antietcd_key) and [etcd_proxy](security.en.md#etcd_proxyurls).
You can dump/load data to or from antietcd using Antietcd `anticli` tool:
```
+3
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@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ antietcd_data_file или antietcd_data_dir). Все остальные пара
node_id, cluster, cluster_key, persist_filter, stale_read также можно задавать
в конфигурации Vitastor с префиксом `antietcd_`.
Смотрите также настройки [antietcd_cert](security.ru.md#antietcd_cert),
[antietcd_key](security.ru.md#antietcd_key) и [etcd_proxy](security.ru.md#etcd_proxyurls).
Вы можете выгружать/загружать данные в или из antietcd с помощью его инструмента
`anticli`:
+306
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@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
[Documentation](../../README.md#documentation) → [Configuration](../config.en.md) → Security Parameters
-----
[Читать на русском](security.ru.md)
# Security Parameters
These parameters affect your Vitastor installation security and apply to OSDs, monitors and clients.
Most of them can be set in /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf and in etcd, but don't support online modification.
All certificate and private key parameters mentioned may contain a path to a PEM file or just
a PEM string with certificate or a private key. In the latter case, the string must begin with
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" or "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----".
- [use_perms](#use_perms)
- [cert](#cert)
- [pkey](#pkey)
- [etcd_ca](#etcd_ca)
- [client_ca](#client_ca)
- [osd_ca](#osd_ca)
- [mon_ca](#mon_ca)
- [antietcd_cert](#antietcd_cert)
- [antietcd_key](#antietcd_key)
- [etcd_proxy.urls](#etcd_proxyurls)
- [etcd_proxy.cert](#etcd_proxycert)
- [etcd_proxy.key](#etcd_proxykey)
- [etcd_proxy.ca](#etcd_proxyca)
- [osd_cert](#osd_cert)
- [osd_pkey](#osd_pkey)
- [api_cert](#api_cert)
- [api_pkey](#api_pkey)
- [etcd_client_cert](#etcd_client_cert)
- [etcd_client_key](#etcd_client_key)
- [osd_etcd_client_cert](#osd_etcd_client_cert)
- [osd_etcd_client_key](#osd_etcd_client_key)
- [mon_etcd_client_cert](#mon_etcd_client_cert)
- [mon_etcd_client_key](#mon_etcd_client_key)
- [proto_checksums](#proto_checksums)
- [force_proto_checksums](#force_proto_checksums)
- [max_cipher_pool_size](#max_cipher_pool_size)
- [vault_url](#vault_url)
- [vault_secret_api_path](#vault_secret_api_path)
- [vault_client_cert](#vault_client_cert)
- [vault_client_key](#vault_client_key)
- [vault_ca](#vault_ca)
- [vault_timeout_ms](#vault_timeout_ms)
- [vault_error_timeout_sec](#vault_error_timeout_sec)
- [vault_refresh_leeway_sec](#vault_refresh_leeway_sec)
## use_perms
- Type: boolean
- Default: false
Enable client permissions in a Vitastor cluster, including Antietcd built into the Monitor.
Requires configured encryption. Also note that separate Antietcd requires separate configuration
to use permissions (see [security documentation](../intro/security.en.md) for details).
## cert
- Type: string
Client certificate of the current Vitastor user. Required for Vitastor protocol encryption.
Must be signed with [client_ca](#client_ca). Also used as the client certificate for etcd/Antietcd
connections by default.
## pkey
- Type: string
Private key of the current Vitastor user.
## etcd_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify etcd server certificate. Or just the etcd server's
certificate itself - it's fine to use it for etcd_ca.
## client_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor client certificates.
Mandatory for Vitastor protocol encryption.
## osd_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor OSD certificates. Also mandatory for Vitastor protocol
encryption. Must be different from client_ca. May be equal to osd_cert - different OSDs
don't require separate certificates at the moment because their permissions don't differ.
## mon_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor Monitor certificates. Used only for separate Antietcd,
not required when a monitor built-in Antietcd is used. May be equal to mon_client_etcd_cert.
## antietcd_cert
- Type: string
Server TLS certificate for Antietcd built into the Monitor.
## antietcd_key
- Type: string
Private key for antietcd_cert.
## etcd_proxy.urls
- Type: string or array of strings
etcd URLs for Antietcd etcd proxy mode.
See [Mon as Etcd proxy](../intro/security.en.md#mon-as-etcd-proxy) for details.
## etcd_proxy.cert
- Type: string
Client certificate for Antietcd connections to etcd in proxy mode.
## etcd_proxy.key
- Type: string
Private key for etcd_proxy.cert.
## etcd_proxy.ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify etcd server certificate when connecting to it from Antietcd.
## osd_cert
- Type: string
Vitastor OSD server certificate. Required for Vitastor protocol encryption. May be equal
to [osd_ca](#osd_ca) - all OSDs share the same permission set for now. Also used as the client
certificate for connections from OSD to etcd/Antietcd by default.
## osd_pkey
- Type: string
Private key for osd_cert.
## api_cert
- Type: string
Server TLS certificate for [vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.en.md#serve) API server.
## api_pkey
- Type: string
Private key for api_cert.
## etcd_client_cert
- Type: string
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor clients to etcd/Antietcd if you don't want
to use the common client certificate [cert](#cert).
## etcd_client_key
- Type: string
Private key for etcd_client_cert.
## osd_etcd_client_cert
- Type: string
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor OSDs to etcd/Antietcd if you don't want
to use the common OSD certificate [osd_cert](#osd_cert).
## osd_etcd_client_key
- Type: string
Private key for osd_etcd_client_cert.
## mon_etcd_client_cert
- Type: string
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor Monitors to etcd/Antietcd - required
if you don't use the built-in Antietcd. In case you use it Monitor has direct access to Antietcd data
and doesn't require any connection.
## mon_etcd_client_key
- Type: string
Private key for mon_etcd_client_cert.
## proto_checksums
- Type: string
- Default: payload
One of "full", "payload", "gcm", "none":
- "full" means calculate and verify transport level checksums from the full message data
including the header - recommended for unencrypted setups.
- "payload" enables checksums only for the actual read/write data, but skips them for message
headers - recommended for encrypted setups because headers are already protected by AES-GCM.
- "gcm" disables checksums and enables AES-GCM encryption of the whole messages including headers
and data - AES-GCM already includes MAC which is actually a stronger checksum. This option is
slower and is only recommended for untrusted networks.
- "none" disables transport level checksums at all.
## force_proto_checksums
- Type: string
To allow older clients to connect to a Vitastor cluster with enabled checksums, Vitastor OSDs
allow clients to downgrade their proto_checksums by default. force_proto_checksums sets the
minimum security level allowed for connecting clients. When encryption is disabled, default
force_proto_checksums is none and clients without checksums are allowed. With enabled
encryption, force_proto_checksums becomes "payload" by default to block unauthenticated data
on the transport level.
## max_cipher_pool_size
- Type: integer
- Default: 256
Maximum number of OpenSSL cipher contexts cached in OSD memory, counted separately
for each cipher and for encryption/decryption. Probably doesn't require modification.
## vault_url
- Type: string
Vault base URL.
Vitastor clients support AES-256-XTS image data encryption with different per-image keys.
Encryption is performed by the client, OSDs don't have access to decrypted data.
Encryption keys may be stored in etcd or, for the increased security level, in an external
[HashiCorp Vault](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/) or [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/)
instance.
Vitastor clients use [v1 k/v secrets engine](https://openbao.org/api-docs/secret/kv/kv-v1/)
and [TLS authentication engine](https://openbao.org/api-docs/auth/cert/) in Vault.
In that case, only key IDs are stored in etcd.
## vault_secret_api_path
- Type: string
- Default: /v1/secret/
Vault v1 secret API mount path to use.
## vault_client_cert
- Type: string
Client TLS certificate to use for Vault connections if you don't want to use the common Vitastor
client certificate [cert](#cert) which is also used for Vault connections by default.
## vault_client_key
- Type: string
Private key for the vault_client_cert certificate.
## vault_ca
- Type: string
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vault server certificate. May be path to a file,
directory or just a PEM string with certificate.
## vault_timeout_ms
- Type: integer
- Default: 5000
Timeout for Vault requests in milliseconds.
## vault_error_timeout_sec
- Type: integer
- Default: 60
Time (in seconds) to wait before retrying after receiving an error from Vault.
## vault_refresh_leeway_sec
- Type: integer
- Default: 60
Extra time (in seconds) before real Vault token lease_timeout to refresh it, just
in case of system clock drift.
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@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
[Документация](../../README-ru.md#документация) → [Конфигурация](../config.ru.md) → Параметры безопасности
-----
[Read in English](security.en.md)
# Параметры безопасности
Данные параметры затрагивают безопасность инсталляций Vitastor и используются
OSD, мониторами и клиентами.
Большая их часть может задаваться в /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf и в etcd, но не
поддерживает онлайн-изменение.
Все параметры сертификатов и закрытых ключей могут быть путём к файлу или просто
строкой с сертификатом в формате PEM. В последнем случае строка должна начинаться с
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" или "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----".
- [use_perms](#use_perms)
- [cert](#cert)
- [pkey](#pkey)
- [etcd_ca](#etcd_ca)
- [client_ca](#client_ca)
- [osd_ca](#osd_ca)
- [mon_ca](#mon_ca)
- [antietcd_cert](#antietcd_cert)
- [antietcd_key](#antietcd_key)
- [etcd_proxy.urls](#etcd_proxyurls)
- [etcd_proxy.cert](#etcd_proxycert)
- [etcd_proxy.key](#etcd_proxykey)
- [etcd_proxy.ca](#etcd_proxyca)
- [osd_cert](#osd_cert)
- [osd_pkey](#osd_pkey)
- [api_cert](#api_cert)
- [api_pkey](#api_pkey)
- [etcd_client_cert](#etcd_client_cert)
- [etcd_client_key](#etcd_client_key)
- [osd_etcd_client_cert](#osd_etcd_client_cert)
- [osd_etcd_client_key](#osd_etcd_client_key)
- [mon_etcd_client_cert](#mon_etcd_client_cert)
- [mon_etcd_client_key](#mon_etcd_client_key)
- [proto_checksums](#proto_checksums)
- [force_proto_checksums](#force_proto_checksums)
- [max_cipher_pool_size](#max_cipher_pool_size)
- [vault_url](#vault_url)
- [vault_secret_api_path](#vault_secret_api_path)
- [vault_client_cert](#vault_client_cert)
- [vault_client_key](#vault_client_key)
- [vault_ca](#vault_ca)
- [vault_timeout_ms](#vault_timeout_ms)
- [vault_error_timeout_sec](#vault_error_timeout_sec)
- [vault_refresh_leeway_sec](#vault_refresh_leeway_sec)
## use_perms
- Тип: булево (да/нет)
- Значение по умолчанию: false
Включает клиентские привилегии в кластере Vitastor, в том числе во встроенном в мониторе Antietcd.
Требует настроенного шифрования протокола. Также обратите внимание, что отдельно установленный Antietcd
требует отдельной настройки привилегий (подробности смотрите в [документации безопасности](../intro/security.ru.md)).
## cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский сертификат текущего пользователя Vitastor. Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor.
Должен быть подписан [client_ca](#client_ca). Также по умолчанию используется как клиентский
сертификат для подключения к etcd/Antietcd и Vault.
## pkey
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ текущего пользователя Vitastor.
## etcd_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный корневой TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера etcd.
Либо же просто сам сертификат сервера etcd - его можно использовать как etcd_ca.
## client_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов клиентов Vitastor.
Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor.
## osd_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов OSD Vitastor. Также обязателен
для шифрования протокола Vitastor. Должен отличаться от client_ca. Может быть равен
osd_cert - разные OSD не требуют разных сертификатов, потому что на данный момент
привилегии разных OSD никак не отличаются.
## mon_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов мониторов Vitastor. Используется
только отдельно установленным Antietcd, не требуется при использовании встроенного в монитор
Antietcd. Может быть равен mon_client_etcd_cert.
## antietcd_cert
- Тип: строка
Серверный TLS-сертификат для Antietcd, встроенного в монитор.
## antietcd_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата antietcd_cert.
## etcd_proxy.urls
- Тип: строка или массив строк
Адреса etcd для режима Antietcd etcd-прокси.
Смотрите подробности в разделе [Mon в роли Etcd proxy](../intro/security.ru.md#mon-в-роли-etcd-proxy).
## etcd_proxy.cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский сертификат для подключений от Antietcd к etcd в режиме прокси.
## etcd_proxy.key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата etcd_proxy.cert.
## etcd_proxy.ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера etcd при подключениях от Antietcd.
## osd_cert
- Тип: строка
Сертификат сервера Vitastor OSD. Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor. Может быть равен
[osd_ca](#osd_ca) - все OSD на данный момент имеют одинаковые привилегии. Также по умолчанию
используется как клиентский сертификат для подключения от OSD к etcd/Antietcd.
## osd_pkey
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата osd_cert.
## api_cert
- Тип: строка
Серверный TLS-сертификат для API-сервера [vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.ru.md#serve).
## api_pkey
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата api_cert.
## etcd_client_cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от клиентов Vitastor к etcd/Antietcd, если вы не хотите
использовать общий клиентский сертификат [cert](#cert).
## etcd_client_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата etcd_client_cert.
## osd_etcd_client_cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от Vitastor OSD к etcd/Antietcd, если вы не хотите
использовать общий сертификат OSD [osd_cert](#osd_cert).
## osd_etcd_client_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата osd_etcd_client_cert.
## mon_etcd_client_cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от мониторов Vitastor к etcd/Antietcd - требуется, если
вы не используете встроенный в монитор Antietcd. Если вы используете его, то монитор и так имеет
прямой доступ к данным Antietcd и не требует никаких соединений.
## mon_etcd_client_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата mon_etcd_client_cert.
## proto_checksums
- Тип: строка
- Значение по умолчанию: payload
Одно из значений "full", "payload", "gcm" и "none":
- "full" означает расчёт и проверку контрольных сумм на транспортном уровне от полных сообщений,
включая их заголовки и данные - рекомендуется для кластеров без шифрования.
- "payload" включает контрольные суммы только для данных сообщений, но пропускает заголовки -
такая настройка рекомендуется для кластеров с включённым шифрованием, потому что в них заголовки
и так защищены шифрованием AES-GCM.
- "gcm" отключает контрольные суммы и включает шифрование полных сообщений включая заголовки и
данные - AES-GCM уже включает в себя MAC, который по сути является криптостойкой контрольной
суммой. Такая настройка медленнее и рекомендуется только для недоверенных сетей.
- "none" полностью отключает контрольные суммы на транспортном уровне.
## force_proto_checksums
- Тип: строка
Чтобы старые клиенты Vitastor могли подключаться к кластеру с включёнными контрольными
суммами, Vitastor OSD по умолчанию разрешают клиентам отключать контрольные суммы
данных (proto_checksums). Настройка force_proto_checksums задаёт минимальный уровень
безопасности, разрешённый для подключающихся клиентов. Когда шифрование отключено,
force_proto_checksums по умолчанию равно none и подключения клиентов без контрольных
сумм разрешаются. При включённом шифровании значение по умолчанию force_proto_checksums
становится "payload", чтобы блокировать подключения с неаутентифицированными данными.
## max_cipher_pool_size
- Тип: целое число
- Значение по умолчанию: 256
Максимальное количество кэшируемых в памяти OSD контекстов шифра OpenSSL, учитываемое
отдельно для каждого шифра и для шифрования и расшифровки. Вряд ли требует изменения.
## vault_url
- Тип: строка
Базовый адрес Vault.
Клиенты Vitastor поддерживают AES-256-XTS шифрование данных образов с отдельными ключами на
каждый образ. Данные шифруются клиентами, OSD не имеют доступа к незашифрованным данным.
Ключи шифрования могут храниться в etcd или, для повышенного уровня безопасности, во внешнем
[HashiCorp Vault](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/) или [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/).
Клиенты Vitastor используют [движок секретов v1](https://openbao.org/api-docs/secret/kv/kv-v1/)
и [TLS-аутентификацию](https://openbao.org/api-docs/auth/cert/) в Vault.
В этом случае, только ID ключей хранятся в etcd.
## vault_secret_api_path
- Тип: строка
- Значение по умолчанию: /v1/secret/
Путь к API секретов v1 для использования клиентами.
## vault_client_cert
- Тип: строка
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений к Vault на тот случай, если вы не хотите использовать
общий сертификат клиента Vitastor [cert](#cert), используемый для подключений к Vault по умолчанию.
## vault_client_key
- Тип: строка
Закрытый ключ для сертификата vault_client_cert.
## vault_ca
- Тип: строка
Доверенный корневой TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера Vault.
Может быть путём к файлу, директории или просто строкой с сертификатом в
формате PEM.
## vault_timeout_ms
- Тип: целое число
- Значение по умолчанию: 5000
Максимально время выполнения Vault-запросов в миллисекундах.
## vault_error_timeout_sec
- Тип: целое число
- Значение по умолчанию: 60
Время (в секундах) для ожидания перед повторной попыткой при получении ошибки от Vault.
## vault_refresh_leeway_sec
- Тип: целое число
- Значение по умолчанию: 60
Зазор времени (в секундах), чтобы обновлять токены Vault чуть раньше их реального
lease_timeout, на случай "ухода" системных часов.
+2
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@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
{{../../config/monitor.en.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/security.en.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/pool.en.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/inode.en.md|indent=2}}
+2
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@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
{{../../config/monitor.ru.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/security.ru.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/pool.ru.md|indent=2}}
{{../../config/inode.ru.md|indent=2}}
+14 -4
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@@ -233,11 +233,21 @@
type: string
default: none
info: |
Data checksum type to use. May be "crc32c" or "none". Set to "crc32c" to
enable data checksums.
Data and metadata checksum type to use. May be "crc32c", "xxh3_32" or "none".
Select crc32c or xxh3_32 and set csum_block_size to enable data checksums.
Both crc32c and xxh3_32 are almost equally fast, xxh3_32 is safer. xxh3_32 is
the xxhash3 algorithm truncated from 64 to 32 bits (which is still a good hash).
Note that enabled data checksums either increase memory usage or reduce
performance. Check details in [csum_block_size](#csum_block_size) description.
info_ru: |
Тип используемых OSD контрольных сумм данных. Может быть "crc32c" или "none".
Установите в "crc32c", чтобы включить расчёт и проверку контрольных сумм данных.
Тип используемых OSD контрольных сумм данных и метаданных. Может быть "crc32c",
"xxh3_32" или "none". Выберите crc32c или xxh3_32 и установите csum_block_size,
чтобы включить контрольные суммы данных.
И crc32c, и xxh3_32 примерно одинаково быстры, xxh3_32 надёжней. xxh3_32 - это
алгоритм xxhash3, обрезанный с 64 до 32 бит (это всё равно хороший хеш).
Следует понимать, что контрольные суммы в зависимости от размера блока их
расчёта либо увеличивают потребление памяти, либо снижают производительность.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ for (const file of params_files)
let out = '\n';
for (const c of cfg)
{
out += `\n- [${c.name}](#${c.name})`;
out += `\n- [${c.name}](#${c.name.replace(/\./g, '')})`;
}
for (const c of cfg)
{
+6
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@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
cluster, cluster_key, persist_filter, stale_read can also be set in
Vitastor configuration with `antietcd_` prefix.
See also: [antietcd_cert](security.en.md#antietcd_cert),
[antietcd_key](security.en.md#antietcd_key) and [etcd_proxy](security.en.md#etcd_proxyurls).
You can dump/load data to or from antietcd using Antietcd `anticli` tool:
```
@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@
node_id, cluster, cluster_key, persist_filter, stale_read также можно задавать
в конфигурации Vitastor с префиксом `antietcd_`.
Смотрите также настройки [antietcd_cert](security.ru.md#antietcd_cert),
[antietcd_key](security.ru.md#antietcd_key) и [etcd_proxy](security.ru.md#etcd_proxyurls).
Вы можете выгружать/загружать данные в или из antietcd с помощью его инструмента
`anticli`:
+5
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
{
"dependencies": {
"yaml": "^2.8.2"
}
}
+9
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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
# Security Parameters
These parameters affect your Vitastor installation security and apply to OSDs, monitors and clients.
Most of them can be set in /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf and in etcd, but don't support online modification.
All certificate and private key parameters mentioned may contain a path to a PEM file or just
a PEM string with certificate or a private key. In the latter case, the string must begin with
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" or "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----".
+11
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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# Параметры безопасности
Данные параметры затрагивают безопасность инсталляций Vitastor и используются
OSD, мониторами и клиентами.
Большая их часть может задаваться в /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf и в etcd, но не
поддерживает онлайн-изменение.
Все параметры сертификатов и закрытых ключей могут быть путём к файлу или просто
строкой с сертификатом в формате PEM. В последнем случае строка должна начинаться с
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" или "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----".
+276
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@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
- name: use_perms
type: bool
default: false
info: |
Enable client permissions in a Vitastor cluster, including Antietcd built into the Monitor.
Requires configured encryption. Also note that separate Antietcd requires separate configuration
to use permissions (see [security documentation](../intro/security.en.md) for details).
info_ru: |
Включает клиентские привилегии в кластере Vitastor, в том числе во встроенном в мониторе Antietcd.
Требует настроенного шифрования протокола. Также обратите внимание, что отдельно установленный Antietcd
требует отдельной настройки привилегий (подробности смотрите в [документации безопасности](../intro/security.ru.md)).
- name: cert
type: string
info: |
Client certificate of the current Vitastor user. Required for Vitastor protocol encryption.
Must be signed with [client_ca](#client_ca). Also used as the client certificate for etcd/Antietcd
connections by default.
info_ru: |
Клиентский сертификат текущего пользователя Vitastor. Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor.
Должен быть подписан [client_ca](#client_ca). Также по умолчанию используется как клиентский
сертификат для подключения к etcd/Antietcd и Vault.
- name: pkey
type: string
info: Private key of the current Vitastor user.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ текущего пользователя Vitastor.
- name: etcd_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify etcd server certificate. Or just the etcd server's
certificate itself - it's fine to use it for etcd_ca.
info_ru: |
Доверенный корневой TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера etcd.
Либо же просто сам сертификат сервера etcd - его можно использовать как etcd_ca.
- name: client_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor client certificates.
Mandatory for Vitastor protocol encryption.
info_ru: |
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов клиентов Vitastor.
Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor.
- name: osd_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor OSD certificates. Also mandatory for Vitastor protocol
encryption. Must be different from client_ca. May be equal to osd_cert - different OSDs
don't require separate certificates at the moment because their permissions don't differ.
info_ru: |
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов OSD Vitastor. Также обязателен
для шифрования протокола Vitastor. Должен отличаться от client_ca. Может быть равен
osd_cert - разные OSD не требуют разных сертификатов, потому что на данный момент
привилегии разных OSD никак не отличаются.
- name: mon_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vitastor Monitor certificates. Used only for separate Antietcd,
not required when a monitor built-in Antietcd is used. May be equal to mon_client_etcd_cert.
info_ru: |
Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификатов мониторов Vitastor. Используется
только отдельно установленным Antietcd, не требуется при использовании встроенного в монитор
Antietcd. Может быть равен mon_client_etcd_cert.
- name: antietcd_cert
type: string
info: Server TLS certificate for Antietcd built into the Monitor.
info_ru: Серверный TLS-сертификат для Antietcd, встроенного в монитор.
- name: antietcd_key
type: string
info: Private key for antietcd_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата antietcd_cert.
- name: etcd_proxy.urls
type: string or array of strings
type_ru: строка или массив строк
info: |
etcd URLs for Antietcd etcd proxy mode.
See [Mon as Etcd proxy](../intro/security.en.md#mon-as-etcd-proxy) for details.
info_ru: |
Адреса etcd для режима Antietcd etcd-прокси.
Смотрите подробности в разделе [Mon в роли Etcd proxy](../intro/security.ru.md#mon-в-роли-etcd-proxy).
- name: etcd_proxy.cert
type: string
info: Client certificate for Antietcd connections to etcd in proxy mode.
info_ru: Клиентский сертификат для подключений от Antietcd к etcd в режиме прокси.
- name: etcd_proxy.key
type: string
info: Private key for etcd_proxy.cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата etcd_proxy.cert.
- name: etcd_proxy.ca
type: string
info: Trusted TLS CA to verify etcd server certificate when connecting to it from Antietcd.
info_ru: Доверенный TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера etcd при подключениях от Antietcd.
- name: osd_cert
type: string
info: |
Vitastor OSD server certificate. Required for Vitastor protocol encryption. May be equal
to [osd_ca](#osd_ca) - all OSDs share the same permission set for now. Also used as the client
certificate for connections from OSD to etcd/Antietcd by default.
info_ru: |
Сертификат сервера Vitastor OSD. Требуется для шифрования протокола Vitastor. Может быть равен
[osd_ca](#osd_ca) - все OSD на данный момент имеют одинаковые привилегии. Также по умолчанию
используется как клиентский сертификат для подключения от OSD к etcd/Antietcd.
- name: osd_pkey
type: string
info: Private key for osd_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата osd_cert.
- name: api_cert
type: string
info: Server TLS certificate for [vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.en.md#serve) API server.
info_ru: Серверный TLS-сертификат для API-сервера [vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.ru.md#serve).
- name: api_pkey
type: string
info: Private key for api_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата api_cert.
- name: etcd_client_cert
type: string
info: |
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor clients to etcd/Antietcd if you don't want
to use the common client certificate [cert](#cert).
info_ru: |
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от клиентов Vitastor к etcd/Antietcd, если вы не хотите
использовать общий клиентский сертификат [cert](#cert).
- name: etcd_client_key
type: string
info: Private key for etcd_client_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата etcd_client_cert.
- name: osd_etcd_client_cert
type: string
info: |
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor OSDs to etcd/Antietcd if you don't want
to use the common OSD certificate [osd_cert](#osd_cert).
info_ru: |
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от Vitastor OSD к etcd/Antietcd, если вы не хотите
использовать общий сертификат OSD [osd_cert](#osd_cert).
- name: osd_etcd_client_key
type: string
info: Private key for osd_etcd_client_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата osd_etcd_client_cert.
- name: mon_etcd_client_cert
type: string
info: |
Client TLS certificate to use for connections from Vitastor Monitors to etcd/Antietcd - required
if you don't use the built-in Antietcd. In case you use it Monitor has direct access to Antietcd data
and doesn't require any connection.
info_ru: |
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений от мониторов Vitastor к etcd/Antietcd - требуется, если
вы не используете встроенный в монитор Antietcd. Если вы используете его, то монитор и так имеет
прямой доступ к данным Antietcd и не требует никаких соединений.
- name: mon_etcd_client_key
type: string
info: Private key for mon_etcd_client_cert.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата mon_etcd_client_cert.
- name: proto_checksums
type: string
default: payload
info: |
One of "full", "payload", "gcm", "none":
- "full" means calculate and verify transport level checksums from the full message data
including the header - recommended for unencrypted setups.
- "payload" enables checksums only for the actual read/write data, but skips them for message
headers - recommended for encrypted setups because headers are already protected by AES-GCM.
- "gcm" disables checksums and enables AES-GCM encryption of the whole messages including headers
and data - AES-GCM already includes MAC which is actually a stronger checksum. This option is
slower and is only recommended for untrusted networks.
- "none" disables transport level checksums at all.
info_ru: |
Одно из значений "full", "payload", "gcm" и "none":
- "full" означает расчёт и проверку контрольных сумм на транспортном уровне от полных сообщений,
включая их заголовки и данные - рекомендуется для кластеров без шифрования.
- "payload" включает контрольные суммы только для данных сообщений, но пропускает заголовки -
такая настройка рекомендуется для кластеров с включённым шифрованием, потому что в них заголовки
и так защищены шифрованием AES-GCM.
- "gcm" отключает контрольные суммы и включает шифрование полных сообщений включая заголовки и
данные - AES-GCM уже включает в себя MAC, который по сути является криптостойкой контрольной
суммой. Такая настройка медленнее и рекомендуется только для недоверенных сетей.
- "none" полностью отключает контрольные суммы на транспортном уровне.
- name: force_proto_checksums
type: string
info: |
To allow older clients to connect to a Vitastor cluster with enabled checksums, Vitastor OSDs
allow clients to downgrade their proto_checksums by default. force_proto_checksums sets the
minimum security level allowed for connecting clients. When encryption is disabled, default
force_proto_checksums is none and clients without checksums are allowed. With enabled
encryption, force_proto_checksums becomes "payload" by default to block unauthenticated data
on the transport level.
info_ru: |
Чтобы старые клиенты Vitastor могли подключаться к кластеру с включёнными контрольными
суммами, Vitastor OSD по умолчанию разрешают клиентам отключать контрольные суммы
данных (proto_checksums). Настройка force_proto_checksums задаёт минимальный уровень
безопасности, разрешённый для подключающихся клиентов. Когда шифрование отключено,
force_proto_checksums по умолчанию равно none и подключения клиентов без контрольных
сумм разрешаются. При включённом шифровании значение по умолчанию force_proto_checksums
становится "payload", чтобы блокировать подключения с неаутентифицированными данными.
- name: max_cipher_pool_size
type: int
default: 256
info: |
Maximum number of OpenSSL cipher contexts cached in OSD memory, counted separately
for each cipher and for encryption/decryption. Probably doesn't require modification.
info_ru: |
Максимальное количество кэшируемых в памяти OSD контекстов шифра OpenSSL, учитываемое
отдельно для каждого шифра и для шифрования и расшифровки. Вряд ли требует изменения.
- name: vault_url
type: string
info: |
Vault base URL.
Vitastor clients support AES-256-XTS image data encryption with different per-image keys.
Encryption is performed by the client, OSDs don't have access to decrypted data.
Encryption keys may be stored in etcd or, for the increased security level, in an external
[HashiCorp Vault](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/) or [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/)
instance.
Vitastor clients use [v1 k/v secrets engine](https://openbao.org/api-docs/secret/kv/kv-v1/)
and [TLS authentication engine](https://openbao.org/api-docs/auth/cert/) in Vault.
In that case, only key IDs are stored in etcd.
info_ru: |
Базовый адрес Vault.
Клиенты Vitastor поддерживают AES-256-XTS шифрование данных образов с отдельными ключами на
каждый образ. Данные шифруются клиентами, OSD не имеют доступа к незашифрованным данным.
Ключи шифрования могут храниться в etcd или, для повышенного уровня безопасности, во внешнем
[HashiCorp Vault](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/) или [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/).
Клиенты Vitastor используют [движок секретов v1](https://openbao.org/api-docs/secret/kv/kv-v1/)
и [TLS-аутентификацию](https://openbao.org/api-docs/auth/cert/) в Vault.
В этом случае, только ID ключей хранятся в etcd.
- name: vault_secret_api_path
type: string
default: /v1/secret/
info: Vault v1 secret API mount path to use.
info_ru: Путь к API секретов v1 для использования клиентами.
- name: vault_client_cert
type: string
info: |
Client TLS certificate to use for Vault connections if you don't want to use the common Vitastor
client certificate [cert](#cert) which is also used for Vault connections by default.
info_ru: |
Клиентский TLS сертификат для подключений к Vault на тот случай, если вы не хотите использовать
общий сертификат клиента Vitastor [cert](#cert), используемый для подключений к Vault по умолчанию.
- name: vault_client_key
type: string
info: Private key for the vault_client_cert certificate.
info_ru: Закрытый ключ для сертификата vault_client_cert.
- name: vault_ca
type: string
info: |
Trusted TLS CA to verify Vault server certificate. May be path to a file,
directory or just a PEM string with certificate.
info_ru: |
Доверенный корневой TLS-сертификат для проверки сертификата сервера Vault.
Может быть путём к файлу, директории или просто строкой с сертификатом в
формате PEM.
- name: vault_timeout_ms
type: int
default: 5000
info: Timeout for Vault requests in milliseconds.
info_ru: Максимально время выполнения Vault-запросов в миллисекундах.
- name: vault_error_timeout_sec
type: int
default: 60
info: |
Time (in seconds) to wait before retrying after receiving an error from Vault.
info_ru: |
Время (в секундах) для ожидания перед повторной попыткой при получении ошибки от Vault.
- name: vault_refresh_leeway_sec
type: int
default: 60
info: |
Extra time (in seconds) before real Vault token lease_timeout to refresh it, just
in case of system clock drift.
info_ru: |
Зазор времени (в секундах), чтобы обновлять токены Vault чуть раньше их реального
lease_timeout, на случай "ухода" системных часов.
+2 -2
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@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ at Vitastor Kubernetes operator: https://github.com/Antilles7227/vitastor-operat
The instruction is very simple.
1. Download a Docker image of the desired version: \
`docker pull vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.14`
`docker pull vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.15`
2. Install scripts to the host system: \
`docker run --rm -it -v /etc:/host-etc -v /usr/bin:/host-bin vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.14 install.sh`
`docker run --rm -it -v /etc:/host-etc -v /usr/bin:/host-bin vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.15 install.sh`
3. Reload udev rules: \
`udevadm control --reload-rules`
4. Enable the vitastor-host service: \
+2 -2
View File
@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ Vitastor можно установить в Docker/Podman. При этом etcd,
Инструкция по установке максимально простая.
1. Скачайте Docker-образ желаемой версии: \
`docker pull vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.14`
`docker pull vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.15`
2. Установите скрипты в хост-систему командой: \
`docker run --rm -it -v /etc:/host-etc -v /usr/bin:/host-bin vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.14 install.sh`
`docker run --rm -it -v /etc:/host-etc -v /usr/bin:/host-bin vitalif/vitastor:v3.0.15 install.sh`
3. Перезагрузите правила udev: \
`udevadm control --reload-rules`
4. Включите сервис vitastor-host: \
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
- gcc and g++ 8 or newer, clang 10 or newer, or other compiler with C++11 plus
designated initializers support from C++20
- CMake
- jerasure headers and libraries
- jerasure, c-ares headers and libraries
- ISA-L, libibverbs, librdmacm, libnl3 headers and libraries (optional)
## Basic instructions
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
- gcc и g++ >= 8, либо clang >= 10, либо другой компилятор с поддержкой C++11 плюс
назначенных инициализаторов (designated initializers) из C++20
- CMake
- Заголовки и библиотеки jerasure
- Заголовки и библиотеки jerasure, c-ares
- Опционально - заголовки и библиотеки ISA-L, libibverbs, librdmacm, libnl3
## Базовая инструкция
+2
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@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
- [Built-in Prometheus metric exporter](../config/monitor.en.md#enable_prometheus)
- [NFS RDMA support](../usage/nfs.en.md#rdma) (probably also usable for GPUDirect)
- [S3](../installation/s3.en.md)
- [TLS support for etcd connections](../config/security.en.md)
- [AES-256-XTS image encryption](../usage/cli.en.md#create) and [Vault support](../config/security.en.md#vault_url) for key storage
## Plugins and tools
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@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
- [Встроенный Prometheus-экспортер метрик](../config/monitor.ru.md#enable_prometheus)
- [Поддержка NFS RDMA](../usage/nfs.ru.md#rdma) (вероятно, также подходящая для GPUDirect)
- [S3](../installation/s3.ru.md)
- [Поддержка TLS-соединений с etcd](../config/security.ru.md)
- [AES-256-XTS шифрование данных](../usage/cli.ru.md#create) и [поддержка Vault](../config/security.ru.md#vault_url) для хранения ключей
## Драйверы и инструменты
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## Configure monitors
On the monitor hosts:
- Put identical etcd_address into `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`. Example:
- Create minimal configuration in `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`:
```
{
"etcd_address": ["10.200.1.10:2379","10.200.1.11:2379","10.200.1.12:2379"]
"etcd_address": ["http://10.200.1.10:2379","http://10.200.1.11:2379","http://10.200.1.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.200.1.0/24",
"use_perms": false
}
```
- Note that you can enable encryption by using `https://` and `use_perms` option.
[Details](security.en.md#quick-setup) about encryption setup with make-etcd.
- Create systemd units for etcd by running: `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd`
Or, if you installed Vitastor in Docker, run `systemctl start vitastor-host; docker exec vitastor make-etcd`.
- Start etcd and monitors: `systemctl enable --now vitastor-etcd vitastor-mon`
+7 -9
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@@ -41,25 +41,23 @@
## Настройте мониторы
На хостах, выделенных под мониторы:
- Пропишите одинаковые etcd_address в `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`. Например:
- Создайте минимальную конфигурацию в `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`:
```
{
"etcd_address": ["10.200.1.10:2379","10.200.1.11:2379","10.200.1.12:2379"]
"etcd_address": ["http://10.200.1.10:2379","http://10.200.1.11:2379","http://10.200.1.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.200.1.0/24",
"use_perms": false
}
```
- Обратите внимание, что с помощью схемы `https://` и опции `use_perms` можно включить шифрование.
[Подробно](security.ru.md#быстрая-настройка) о настройке шифрования через make-etcd.
- Инициализируйте сервисы etcd, запустив `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd`.\
Либо, если вы установили Vitastor в Docker, запустите `systemctl start vitastor-host; docker exec vitastor make-etcd`.
- Запустите etcd и мониторы: `systemctl enable --now vitastor-etcd vitastor-mon`
## Настройте OSD
- Пропишите etcd_address и [osd_network](../config/network.ru.md#osd_network) в `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`. Например:
```
{
"etcd_address": ["10.200.1.10:2379","10.200.1.11:2379","10.200.1.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.200.1.0/24"
}
```
- Создайте/скопируйте с узлов с мониторами файл конфигурации `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`.
- Инициализуйте OSD:
- Только SSD или только HDD: `vitastor-disk prepare /dev/sdXXX [/dev/sdYYY ...]`.
Если вы используете десктопные SSD без конденсаторов, добавьте опцию `--disable_data_fsync off`,
+657
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@@ -0,0 +1,657 @@
[Documentation](../../README.md#documentation) → Introduction → Security in Vitastor
-----
[Читать на русском](security.ru.md)
# Security in Vitastor
- [Overview](#overview)
- [Quick setup](#quick-setup)
- Principles of operation
- [etcd transport encryption (TLS)](#etcd-transport-encryption-tls)
- [OSD transport encryption (AES-GCM)](#osd-transport-encryption-aes-gcm)
- [End-to-end image data encryption (AES-XTS)](#end-to-end-image-data-encryption-aes-xts)
- [Certificate-based authentication](#certificate-based-authentication)
- [Users and access rights](#users-and-access-rights)
- [etcd privileges](#etcd-privileges)
- Manual setup
- [Configuring OSD transport encryption](#configuring-osd-transport-encryption)
- etcd/Antietcd setup options
- [Mon with embedded Antietcd](#mon-with-embedded-antietcd)
- [Mon as an Etcd proxy](#mon-as-an-etcd-proxy)
- [Mon with a separate Antietcd Proxy](#mon-with-a-separate-antietcd-proxy)
- [Standalone Antietcd without etcd](#standalone-antietcd-without-etcd)
- [Vault/OpenBao setup](#vaultopenbao-setup)
- [Vault setup example](#vault-setup-example)
- Lists of allowed operations
- [etcd data access rights](#etcd-data-access-rights)
- [OSD data access rights](#osd-data-access-rights)
- [API access rights](#api-access-rights)
- [Encryption performance](#encryption-performance)
## Overview
Starting from version 3.1.0, Vitastor provides full data protection:
control plane protection (etcd), data plane protection (OSDs), and end-to-end data encryption.
- Control plane protection:
- etcd transport encryption (TLS)
- Authentication via client TLS (X.509) certificates
- Access control of clients to etcd data
- Data plane protection:
- Full AES-GCM encryption of OSD transport (similar to TLS, but faster)
- Alternatively, AES-GCM encryption of just operation headers with data checksums using a secret "salt"
- Authentication via client TLS (X.509) certificates
- Access control of clients on the OSD side
- End-to-end encryption:
- Data is encrypted using AES-XTS on the client side, the Vitastor cluster has no access to plaintext data
- AES-XTS keys can be stored in etcd or in an external Vault/OpenBao
All features are optional and disabled in the simplest configuration. By default, only
transport-level data checksums ([proto_checksums](../config/security.en.md#proto_checksums)=payload)
are enabled for clients that support them (>= 3.1.0). For older clients, connections
without data checksums are allowed by default ([force_proto_checksums](../config/security.en.md#force_proto_checksums) is empty).
For a quick setup, jump to the [Quick setup](#quick-setup) section.
Descriptions of all security-related parameters can be found [here](../config/security.en.md).
## Quick setup
For a quick setup, use the `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd` script:
1. Log in to the node where the first monitor and etcd will be located.
2. Create `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf` with minimal parameters: etcd_address,
osd_network and, if you want to enable privileges, use_perms (note `https://`
in etcd addresses):
```
{
"etcd_address": ["https://10.0.0.10:2379","https://10.0.0.11:2379","https://10.0.0.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.0.0.0/24",
"use_perms": true
}
```
3. Run `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd` without parameters or with the `--antietcd-only`
parameter if you want to initialize the cluster with Antietcd only, without etcd.
4. The script will generate all necessary certificates and offer to copy them to the other
monitor nodes (agree!).
5. Log in to all other monitor nodes and repeat the `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd` call there.
6. If you also have nodes with OSDs only (without monitors), run the following command to
copy only the required configuration to these nodes:
```
/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd --copy-to-osd osdnode1,osdnode2,...
```
After that, you can proceed with OSD initialization.
If you want to understand the setup in more detail, read the [Principles of operation](#principles-of-operation)
and [Manual setup](#manual-setup) sections below.
## Principles of operation
### etcd transport encryption (TLS)
Possible setups:
- Without encryption (http)
- With encryption (https)
- With encryption and client certificate authentication. Either the same certificate
used for authentication on the OSD side (`cert`+`pkey` / `osd_cert`+`osd_pkey`)
is used, or a separately specified certificate (`etcd_client_cert`+`etcd_client_key`).
### OSD transport encryption (AES-GCM)
Possible setups:
- Unencrypted transport without checksums: `proto_checksums=none`.
- Unencrypted transport with data checksums: `proto_checksums=payload` (may be omitted,
this is the default value). It's allowed to disable checksums on the client side, or
use an older client that does not support checksums. If you want to block connections
from clients without checksums, use the option `force_proto_checksums=payload`.
- Header-only encryption with data checksums: activated when the options
`cert`, `pkey`, `osd_ca` are set on the client side and `osd_cert`, `osd_pkey`, `osd_ca`, `client_ca`
on the OSD side, with `proto_checksums=payload`. In this mode, disabling checksums on the client
side is forbidden by default, i.e. `force_proto_checksums=payload` is used.
- Full transport encryption of all traffic: same as the previous option, but with `proto_checksums=gcm`.
In this case, clients are by default allowed to downgrade to checksums only, but this
can also be forbidden via `force_proto_checksums=gcm`. This is the slowest setup and
it's only recommended for insecure (public) networks. In particular, full traffic
encryption together with end-to-end AES-XTS image encryption encrypts data twice.
Encryption uses the AES-256-GCM algorithm and a custom simplified key exchange protocol,
fully analogous to TLS 1.3 ECDHE.
### End-to-end image data encryption (AES-XTS)
The Vitastor client supports encrypting each image's data with its own key. In this case,
data is encrypted by the client before sending it to OSDs and OSDs can't see it in plain.
The encryption key can be changed when cloning/creating image snapshots. For example,
you can make a base VM image (say, Debian Linux) unencrypted, but have encrypted client VM
images inheriting from it.
Image encryption keys can be stored in etcd or in an external Vault. In the latter case,
etcd only stores key IDs and Vitastor cluster can't decrypt the data at all. To use
Vault, create an image with the `--enc_key vault:ID` option, specify vault_url and vault_ca
options in the configuration, create accounts for all clients in Vault, and grant them access
to the required v1 secrets.
Once again, if AES-XTS is used together with full traffic encryption (`proto_checksums=gcm`),
image data is encrypted twice — first with AES-XTS, and then with AES-GCM. Use it only if
you are completely paranoid :-).
### Certificate-based authentication
When encryption is enabled, Vitastor clients, OSDs, and monitors authenticate via certificates
for both etcd (Antietcd) and OSD connections.
Separate certificates must be used for OSDs and monitors — either self-signed, or signed
by separate CAs (`osd_ca` and `mon_ca`). All OSDs can use the same certificate, and all
monitors can also use the same certificate, since the privileges of different OSDs or
different monitors do not differ (theoretically, one could differentiate OSD certificates
by pool, but there has been no need for this so far).
Also, a monitor certificate may not be needed at all if Antietcd is embedded into the monitor
itself. In this case, the monitor already has access to all etcd data directly in memory.
### Users and access rights
When transport encryption is disabled, Vitastor operates without access control, i.e.,
any cluster client has full access to both the management layer and the data layer. This
option is suitable for dedicated trusted storage networks.
When OSD transport encryption is enabled (at least for headers), you can enable access
rights by turning on the `use_perms=true` option. When this option is enabled, each user
can perform only the operations that they are permitted, and even OSDs and monitors are
also forbidden from performing "unnecessary" operations.
Each user (or administrator) must have their own certificate signed by a common root
certificate for clients (`client_ca`), with a Common Name equal to the user name.
Privilege settings are stored in etcd. OSDs and monitors don't need user accounts;
they authenticate via separate certificates.
User privileges are stored in etcd data under the keys `/vitastor/config/user/<name>`.
The following is defined per user in this key:
- Type:
- Client (`type=client` or omitted) — can only read and modify explicitly permitted images.
- Administrator (`type=admin`) — can read and modify all images, and also administer the
cluster: view overall statistics and status, create and delete OSDs, etc.
- List of group names the user is a member of.
Images have the following properties:
- Owner (owner) — the user name that is allowed to both read and modify the image
- Owner group (owner_group) — the owner group name
- Reader group (reader_group) — the name of the group of users allowed to read the image
And there is also a property on the pool:
- Creator group (creator_group) — the name of the group of users allowed to create images in the pool
For the list of allowed operations on image data on the OSD side, see the
[OSD data access rights](#osd-data-access-rights) section.
### etcd privileges
etcd privileges are implemented through Antietcd in all modes of operation.
Built-in etcd privileges are not supported due to numerous inconveniences:
- Certificate-based authentication does not work at all in etcd's REST interface,
- Privileges are stored separately from k/v data and cannot participate in transactions,
- Only the administrator (root) can change privileges,
- There is no support for filtering range read responses by privileges.
If etcd is used, Antietcd acts as a filtering proxy and can be embedded in the Vitastor
monitor or run separately. In this case, etcd must allow incoming connections only from
Antietcd, and all other components must connect to Antietcd.
If Antietcd runs as a part of the Vitastor monitor, it is sufficient to enable the option
`use_perms=true` and set the required certificates. If Antietcd is run separately, privileges
have to be enabled separately using Antietcd options. For more details on the setup, see
the [etcd/Antietcd setup options](#etcdantietcd-setup-options) section.
For the list of allowed operations with etcd data, see the
[etcd data access rights](#etcd-data-access-rights) section.
## Manual setup
### Configuring OSD transport encryption
You need 2 certificates: one for OSDs and one for signing all client certificates.
For OSDs, you can use a self-signed certificate (osd_ca.crt) or a separate certificate (osd.crt)
signed by a trusted osd_ca.crt certificate. For clients, you must use separate certificates
signed by a common trusted (client_ca.crt).
Add to the Vitastor configuration on OSD servers:
- use_perms: true
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- osd_cert: osd_ca.crt
- osd_pkey: osd_ca.key
On the client side:
- use_perms: true
- cert: client.crt
- pkey: client.key
### etcd/Antietcd setup options
The following configuration options are available:
#### Mon with embedded Antietcd
The simplest option. You need 1 certificate for Antietcd (antietcd.crt), plus root
certificates for OSDs and clients.
Vitastor settings (`/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`):
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (addresses of your monitors with port 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: true
- antietcd_cert: antietcd.crt
- antietcd_key: antietcd.key
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
#### Mon as an Etcd proxy
If you want to enable privileges, but stay on etcd, you can use etcd proxy mode.
You will need 2 separate certificates: one for etcd (etcd.crt) and one for antietcd (antietcd.crt).
The etcd client port must be different from the standard 2379 — for example, you can pick 2381.
OSD and client certificates are also needed.
Vitastor settings:
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (addresses of your monitors with port 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: true
- etcd_proxy:
```
{
"urls": [ "http://mon1:2381", ... ], // addresses of your etcd with port 2381
"cert": "antietcd.crt",
"key": "antietcd.key",
"ca": "etcd.crt"
}
```
- antietcd_cert: antietcd.crt
- antietcd_key: antietcd.key
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
etcd command-line options:
```
--advertise-client-urls=https://<ADDRESS>:2381 --listen-client-urls=https://<ADDRESS>:2381 \
--client-cert-auth --cert-file=etcd.crt --key-file=etcd.key --trusted-ca-file=antietcd.crt \
--peer-client-cert-auth --peer-cert-file=etcd.crt --peer-key-file=etcd.key --peer-trusted-ca-file=etcd.crt
```
#### Mon with a separate Antietcd Proxy
If in addition to the previous option you want to offload Antietcd from the Vitastor monitor's
tasks, you can run it separately.
Similar to the previous option, 2 certificates are needed: one for etcd and one for antietcd,
plus separate certificates for clients, OSDs, and monitors will be needed.
Vitastor settings:
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (addresses of your monitors with port 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: false
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_cert: mon_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_key: mon_ca.key
Antietcd command-line options:
```
--port 2379 \
--client_cert_auth 1 --auth_filter vitastor_auth_filter.js --etcd_proxy url1,url2,... \
--cert antietcd.crt --key antietcd.key --ca client_ca.crt --osd_ca osd_ca.crt --mon_ca mon_ca.crt \
--etcd_cert antietcd.crt --etcd_key antietcd.key --etcd_ca etcd.crt
```
etcd command-line options (same as in the previous option):
```
--advertise-client-urls=https://<ADDRESS>:2381 --listen-client-urls=https://<ADDRESS>:2381 \
--client-cert-auth --cert-file=etcd.crt --key-file=etcd.key --trusted-ca-file=antietcd.crt \
--peer-client-cert-auth --peer-cert-file=etcd.crt --peer-key-file=etcd.key --peer-trusted-ca-file=etcd.crt
```
#### Standalone Antietcd without etcd
Same as the previous option, but etcd and its certificate are not needed:
Vitastor settings (same as in the previous option):
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (addresses of your monitors with port 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: false
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_cert: mon_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_key: mon_ca.key
Antietcd command-line options:
```
--port 2379 \
--client_cert_auth 1 --auth_filter vitastor_auth_filter.js \
--persist_filter vitastor_persist_filter.js \
--cert antietcd.crt --key antietcd.key --ca client_ca.crt --osd_ca osd_ca.crt --mon_ca mon_ca.crt
```
### Vault/OpenBao setup
To use Vault, each client that needs to get image keys from Vault needs a Vault account.
Vitastor only supports client certificate-based authentication, so all client certificates
(`cert`+`pkey`) must be registered in Vault, and they must be granted access to the
corresponding secrets (v1 secrets API is supported).
The required format of a Vault secret is a single `key` field as a hexadecimal string.
The AES-256-XTS algorithm is used, so the key length is 64 bytes, i.e., the string must
consist of 128 hexadecimal digits.
To connect to Vault, set the following settings in Vitastor.conf:
- `vault_url` — Vault address (e.g., `https://vault:8200`)
- `vault_ca` — Vault's own certificate
After that, if you create an image (`vitastor-cli create`) with the option `--enc_key vault:<ID>`,
Vitastor clients will first contact Vault to obtain a token at `/v1/auth/cert/login`,
and then request the actual secret from Vault at `/v1/secret/<ID>`.
#### Vault setup example
Step-by-step instructions for setting up a test Vault using OpenBao as an example:
1. If TLS is not yet configured, generate a self-signed TLS certificate for Vault:
```
openssl req -days 3650 -x509 -addext basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:1 --addext subjectAltName=DNS:vault \
-new -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout /etc/openbao/vault.key -out /etc/openbao/vault.crt
```
Configure it in `/etc/openbao/openbao.hcl`:
```
listener "tcp" {
address = "0.0.0.0:8200"
tls_cert_file = "/etc/openbao/vault.crt"
tls_key_file = "/etc/openbao/vault.key"
}
```
And restart OpenBao (`systemctl restart openbao`).
2. Copy Vault's TLS certificate for Vitastor:
```
cp /etc/openbao/vault.crt /etc/vitastor/vault.crt
```
Transfer it to all client nodes and specify it in `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`:
```
{
...
"vault_url": "http://vault:8200",
"vault_ca": "/etc/vitastor/vault.crt"
}
```
3. Check Vault status:
```
bao status -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
4. Initialize Vault in test mode from 1 node (with 1 key share):
```
bao operator init -n 1 -t 1 -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
5. Unseal Vault:
```
bao operator unseal -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
6. Enable certificate-based authentication:
```
bao auth enable -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 cert
```
7. Enable v1 secrets:
```
bao secrets enable -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 -path=secret kv-v1
```
8. Create a test secret:
```
bao kv put -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 secret/vitastor/testimg3 key=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
```
9. Generate a signed certificate for a Vitastor user (on a machine where you have `client_ca.crt` and `client_ca.key`):
```
openssl req -subj '/CN=testimg3' -nodes -new -keyout testimg3.key -out testimg3.csr
openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -CA client_ca.crt -CAkey client_ca.key -CAcreateserial -in testimg3.csr -out testimg3.crt
rm testimg3.csr
```
10. Create a user in Vault and grant it access to the secret:
```
cat >testimg3.policy <<EOF
path "/secret/vitastor/testimg3" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
EOF
bao policy write -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 testimg3 testimg3.policy
bao write -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 auth/cert/certs/testimg3 \
certificate=@testimg3.crt display_name=testimg3 token_ttl=24h token_policies=testimg3
```
11. Test access to the secret:
```
curl --cacert /etc/vitastor/vault.crt --cert testimg3.crt --key testimg3.key \
--json '{}' https://vault:8200/v1/auth/cert/login
```
A token will be printed, substitute it into the following request:
```
curl --cacert /etc/vitastor/vault.crt --cert testimg3.crt --key testimg3.key \
-H 'X-Vault-Token: <RECEIVED TOKEN>' https://vault:8200/v1/secret/vitastor/testimg3
```
12. Create an image in Vitastor with the given secret (as an administrator or someone who
has the right to create images in your pool):
```
vitastor-cli create -s 100G --enc_key vault:vitastor/testimg3 --owner testimg3 testimg3
```
13. Test access to the image as user testimg3:
```
vitastor-cli --cert testimg3.crt --pkey testimg3.key dd if=/dev/urandom oimg=testimg3 bs=1M count=100
```
## Lists of allowed operations
### etcd data access rights
Below, all key names are given without the common prefix `/vitastor`.
Allowed operations with keys in Antietcd for clients (`type=client`):
- Read-only:
- Always allowed:
- `/config/global`
- `/config/node_placement`
- `/config/pools`
- `/pg/config`
- `/osd/state/*`
- `/pg/state/*`
- `/index/maxid/*`
- For images [readable by the user](#users-and-access-rights):
- `/config/inode/*`
- `/index/image/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- Read and write:
- For pools in which the user can create images:
- `/index/maxid/*`
- For images owned by the user:
- `/config/inode/*`
- `/index/image/*`
Allowed operations with keys in Antietcd for administrators (`type=admin`):
- Read:
- `/stats`
- `/mon/*`
- `/pg/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- `/pool/stats/*`
- Read and write:
- `/config/*`
- `/osd/*`
- `/index/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
Allowed operations with keys in etcd for OSDs:
- Read:
- `/pg/config`
- `/config/*`
- Read and write:
- `/osd/*`
- `/pg/state/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
Allowed operations with keys in etcd for monitors:
- Read:
- `/config/*`
- `/osd/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- Read and write:
- `/pg/config`
- `/stats`
- `/history/last_clean_pgs`
- `/mon/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- `/pool/stats/*`
### OSD data access rights
When the `use_perms` option and encryption are enabled, OSDs authenticate clients via
certificates and allow each client only what is allowed by the access control model.
Client operations:
- READ — allowed for images the user has read access to.
- WRITE, DELETE, SCRUB — allowed for images the user has write access to.
- SYNC — the operation is not tied to an image and is always allowed.
- DESCRIBE — the operation is allowed only for administrators (used by the commands
`vitastor-cli describe` and `fix`).
- PING — the operation is always allowed.
- SHOW_CONFIG — the operation is always allowed, however, if the client presents
itself as an OSD in it, then it is verified that it uses a certificate signed by `osd_ca`.
- SEC_LIST (listing) — allowed for other OSDs and administrators with any parameters,
and for regular clients only allowed for requests limited to an image the user has
read access to.
Cluster operations — allowed only for other OSDs:
- SEC_READ
- SEC_WRITE
- SEC_WRITE_STABLE
- SEC_SYNC
- SEC_STABILIZE
- SEC_ROLLBACK
- SEC_DELETE
- SEC_READ_BMP
- SEC_LOCK
### API access rights
[vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.en.md#serve) also supports client authentication
via certificates. Only certificates signed by `client_ca` are accepted. A separate
certificate `server_cert` with the key `server_pkey` is used as the server certificate.
For `vitastor-cli serve` to work correctly, it itself must use a certificate
(`cert`+`pkey`) of a user with administrator rights (`type=admin`) to access Vitastor.
Regular clients, when accessing the API, are only allowed API operations on images
available to them either for reading (for reads) or for writing (for modification).
All other API calls are allowed only for administrators.
List of allowed API operations:
Clients (users with `type=client`) are allowed the following operations:
- image/list — for images the user can read.
- image/create — for pools in which the user is allowed to create images, or for
creating snapshots of images owned by the user.
- image/delete, image/flatten, image/modify — for images owned by the user.
All other operations are allowed only for administrators (`type=admin`).
## Encryption performance
You may wonder — how fast is all this wonderful encryption?
The answer is — it depends heavily on the CPU. On modern processors (with AVX512 with VAES
support) it is very fast — AES encryption speed can reach 10-20 GB/s and above. This
primarily concerns the CPU of client machines, because end-to-end encryption is performed
entirely on the client, and client uses its signle thread for transport encryption too,
while there are many OSDs on the server side, and it is easier to add resources there.
On older processors, the speed is noticeably worse — for example, on a Xeon E5 v4 it is
only 3 GB/s.
You can evaluate the performance of your processors using the `vitastor-cli cpubench` command.
Example output (💪 AMD EPYC 9575F):
```
$ vitastor-cli cpubench
Vitastor transport encryption benchmark (AES-256-GCM, AES-256-XTS and xxhash3)
Warmup...
No transport encryption, data checksums enabled, e2e unencrypted image
xxhash3 1 M block... 209000 iterations in 2001 ms = 104447.78 MB/s
xxhash3 4 K block... 37000000 iterations in 2022 ms = 71479.35 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 1 M block... 210000 iterations in 2015 ms = 104218.36 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 4 K block... 26000000 iterations in 2073 ms = 48993.01 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 1 M block... 54000 iterations in 2000 ms = 27000.00 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 4 K block... 11700000 iterations in 2014 ms = 22692.71 MB/s
No transport encryption, no checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS encrypt 1 M block... 50000 iterations in 2039 ms = 24521.82 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt 4 K block... 12600000 iterations in 2009 ms = 24499.13 MB/s
No transport encryption, e2e encrypted image, data checksums enabled
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 40000 iterations in 2013 ms = 19870.84 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 10200000 iterations in 2011 ms = 19812.90 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 40000 iterations in 2014 ms = 19860.97 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 8700000 iterations in 2011 ms = 16899.24 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 1 M block... 26000 iterations in 2062 ms = 12609.12 MB/s
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 4 K block... 6300000 iterations in 2006 ms = 12267.88 MB/s
```
And here is Xeon E5-2680v4:
```
$ vitastor-cli cpubench
Vitastor transport encryption benchmark (AES-256-GCM, AES-256-XTS and xxhash3)
Warmup...
No transport encryption, data checksums enabled, e2e unencrypted image
xxhash3 1 M block... 62000 iterations in 2021 ms = 30677.88 MB/s
xxhash3 4 K block... 12400000 iterations in 2006 ms = 24146.31 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 1 M block... 62000 iterations in 2027 ms = 30587.07 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 4 K block... 6800000 iterations in 2011 ms = 13208.60 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 1 M block... 7000 iterations in 2317 ms = 3021.15 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 4 K block... 1500000 iterations in 2102 ms = 2787.52 MB/s
No transport encryption, no checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS encrypt 1 M block... 7000 iterations in 2317 ms = 3021.15 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt 4 K block... 1600000 iterations in 2088 ms = 2993.30 MB/s
No transport encryption, e2e encrypted image, data checksums enabled
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 6000 iterations in 2188 ms = 2742.23 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 1400000 iterations in 2053 ms = 2663.78 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 6000 iterations in 2190 ms = 2739.73 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 1300000 iterations in 2101 ms = 2417.00 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 1 M block... 4000 iterations in 2666 ms = 1500.38 MB/s
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 4 K block... 800000 iterations in 2113 ms = 1478.94 MB/s
```
+662
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@@ -0,0 +1,662 @@
[Документация](../../README-ru.md#документация) → Введение → Безопасность в Vitastor
-----
[Read in English](security.en.md)
# Безопасность в Vitastor
- [Обзор](#обзор)
- [Быстрая настройка](#быстрая-настройка)
- Принципы работы
- [Шифрование соединений с etcd (TLS)](#шифрование-соединений-с-etcd-tls)
- [Шифрование соединений с OSD (AES-GCM)](#шифрование-соединений-с-osd-aes-gcm)
- [Сквозное шифрование данных образов (AES-XTS)](#сквозное-шифрование-данных-образов-aes-xts)
- [Аутентификация по сертификатам](#аутентификация-по-сертификатам)
- [Пользователи и права доступа](#пользователи-и-права-доступа)
- [Привилегии etcd](#привилегии-etcd)
- Ручная настройка
- [Настройка шифрования соединений OSD](#настройка-шифрования-соединений-osd)
- Варианты настройки etcd/Antietcd
- [Mon со встроенным Antietcd](#mon-со-встроенным-antietcd)
- [Mon в роли Etcd proxy](#mon-в-роли-etcd-proxy)
- [Mon с отдельным Antietcd Proxy](#mon-с-отдельным-antietcd-proxy)
- [Отдельный Antietcd без etcd](#отдельный-antietcd-без-etcd)
- [Настройка Vault/OpenBao](#настройка-vaultopenbao)
- [Пример настройки Vault](#пример-настройки-vault)
- Списки разрешённых операций
- [Права доступа к данным etcd](#права-доступа-к-данным-etcd)
- [Права доступа к данным OSD](#права-доступа-к-данным-osd)
- [Права доступа к API](#права-доступа-к-api)
- [Производительность шифрования](#производительность-шифрования)
## Обзор
Начиная с версии 3.1.0, Vitastor предоставляет полную защиту данных: защиту слоя
управления (etcd), защиту слоя данных (OSD) и сквозное шифрование данных.
- Защита слоя управления:
- Шифрование соединений с etcd (TLS)
- Аутентификация по клиентским TLS (X.509) сертификатам
- Разграничение прав доступа клиентов к данным etcd
- Защита слоя данных:
- Либо полное AES-GCM шифрование соединений с OSD (аналогично TLS, но быстрее)
- Либо шифрование AES-GCM только заголовков команд с контрольными суммами данных с секретной "солью"
- Аутентификация по клиентским TLS (X.509) сертификатам
- Разграничение прав доступа клиентов на стороне OSD
- Сквозное шифрование:
- Данные шифруются AES-XTS на стороне клиента, кластер Vitastor не имеет доступа к открытым данным
- Ключи AES-XTS могут храниться в etcd или во внешнем Vault/OpenBao
Все функции опциональны и в простейшем варианте настройки выключены. По умолчанию включены
только контрольные суммы данных на транспортном уровне ([proto_checksums](../config/security.ru.md#proto_checksums)=payload) для
поддерживающих их клиентов (>= 3.1.0). Для более старых клиентов по умолчанию разрешены
соединения без контрольных сумм данных ([force_proto_checksums](../config/security.ru.md#force_proto_checksums) пусто).
Для быстрой настройки перейдите к разделу [Быстрая настройка](#быстрая-настройка).
Описания всех параметров, связанных с безопасностью, читайте [здесь](../config/security.ru.md).
## Быстрая настройка
Для быстрой настройки используйте скрипт `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd`:
1. Зайдите на узел, на котором будет располагаться первый монитор и etcd.
2. Создайте там минимальный `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf` с параметрами etcd_address,
osd_network и, если хотите включить привилегии - use_perms (обратите внимание на `https://`
в адресах etcd):
```
{
"etcd_address": ["https://10.0.0.10:2379","https://10.0.0.11:2379","https://10.0.0.12:2379"],
"osd_network": "10.0.0.0/24",
"use_perms": true
}
```
3. Запустите `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd` без параметров или с параметром `--antietcd-only`,
если хотите инициализировать кластер только с Antietcd без etcd.
4. Скрипт сгенерирует все необходимые сертификаты и предложит скопировать их на остальные узлы
мониторов (соглашайтесь!).
5. Зайдите на все остальные узлы мониторов и повторите там вызов `/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd`.
6. Если у вас будут узлы только с OSD без мониторов, выполните следующую команду, чтобы скопировать
только нужную конфигурацию на эти узлы:
```
/usr/lib/vitastor/mon/make-etcd --copy-to-osd osdnode1,osdnode2,...
```
После этого можете переходить к инициализации OSD.
Если хотите разобраться в настройке подробнее, читайте далее разделы [Принципы работы](#принципы-работы)
и [Ручная настройка](#ручная-настройка).
## Принципы работы
### Шифрование соединений с etcd (TLS)
Варианты настройки:
- Без шифрования (http)
- С шифрованием (https)
- С шифрованием и аутентификацией по клиентским сертификатам. Используется либо тот
же сертификат, что используется для аутентификации на стороне OSD (`cert`+`pkey` / `osd_cert`+`osd_pkey`),
либо отдельно указанный сертификат (`etcd_client_cert`+`etcd_client_key`)
### Шифрование соединений с OSD (AES-GCM)
Варианты настройки:
- Без шифрования и без контрольных сумм: `proto_checksums=none`.
- Без шифрования, с контрольными суммами данных: `proto_checksums=payload` (можно не указывать,
т.к. это значение по умолчанию). При этом контрольные суммы можно отключить на стороне
клиента либо использовать более старые версии клиента, не поддерживающие контрольные суммы.
Если нужно запретить подключение клиентов без контрольных сумм, можно использовать опцию
`force_proto_checksums=payload`.
- С шифрованием заголовков и контрольными суммами данных: активируется при установленных опциях
`cert`, `pkey`, `osd_ca` на стороне клиента и `osd_cert`, `osd_pkey`, `osd_ca`, `client_ca`
на стороне OSD, при `proto_checksums=payload`. При этом по умолчанию запрещается
отключение контрольных сумм на уровне клиента, то есть используется `force_proto_checksums=payload`.
- С полным шифрованием всего трафика: аналогично прошлому варианту, но с `proto_checksums=gcm`.
Клиенту при этом по умолчанию разрешается понизить уровень защиты до контрольных сумм, но
это тоже можно запретить через `force_proto_checksums=gcm`. Данный вариант самый медленный и
рекомендуется только для небезопасных (публичных) сетей. В том числе потому, что при использовании
и полного шифрования трафика, и сквозного шифрования образов AES-XTS, данные шифруются дважды.
Для шифрования используется алгоритм AES-256-GCM и собственный упрощённый протокол согласования
ключей, полностью аналогичный TLS 1.3 ECDHE.
### Сквозное шифрование данных образов (AES-XTS)
Клиент Vitastor поддерживает шифрование данных каждого образа своим ключом. В этом случае на OSD
уходят уже зашифрованные данные и сами OSD не видят исходные данные клиента. При этом ключ можно
менять при клонировании/создании снимков образов. Например, можно сделать базовый образ ВМ
(условный Debian Linux) нешифрованным, но наследовать от него шифрованные образы клиентских ВМ.
Ключи шифрования образов могут храниться либо в etcd, либо во внешнем Vault. Во втором случае
в etcd хранятся только ID ключей, а Vitastor вообще не имеет доступа к данным образов. Для
использования Vault нужно создать образ с опцией `--enc_key vault:ID`, в конфигурации указать
опции vault_url, и vault_ca, создать всем клиентам учётные записи в Vault и дать им доступ
к требуемым секретам v1.
Ещё раз повторимся, что если AES-XTS используется с полным шифрованием трафика (`proto_checksums=gcm`),
то данные образов шифруются дважды - сначала AES-XTS, а потом AES-GCM. Можете использовать,
только если вы совсем параноик :-).
### Аутентификация по сертификатам
При включённом шифровании клиенты, OSD и мониторы Vitastor аутентифицируются по сертификатам
как при соединениях с etcd (Antietcd), так и с OSD.
Для OSD и мониторов должны использоваться отдельные сертификаты - либо самоподписанные, либо
подписанные отдельными CA (`osd_ca` и `mon_ca`). При этом все OSD могут использовать один и
тот же сертификат и все мониторы тоже могут использовать один и тот же сертификат, так как
привилегии разных OSD или разных мониторов ничем не отличаются (теоретически можно было бы
сделать разграничение сертификатов OSD по пулам, но пока что такой необходимости не было).
Также сертификат монитора может быть вообще не нужен, если Antietcd встраивается в сам монитор.
В этом случае монитор и так имеет доступ ко всем данным etcd прямо в памяти.
### Пользователи и права доступа
При отключённом шифровании трафика Vitastor работает без разграничения прав доступа, то есть,
любой клиент кластера имеет полный доступ как к слою управлению, так и к слою данных. Такой
вариант подходит для выделенных доверенных сетей хранения.
При включённом шифровании трафика OSD (хотя бы заголовков) есть возможность задействовать
права доступа, включив опцию `use_perms=true`. При включённой опции каждый пользователь может
выполнять только те операции, которые ему разрешены, и даже OSD и мониторам также запрещены
"лишние" операции.
Каждый пользователь (или администратор) должен иметь свой сертификат, подписанный общим
корневым сертификатом для клиентов (`client_ca`), с Common Name, равным имени пользователя.
Настройки привилегий же хранятся в etcd. Для OSD и мониторов учётные записи не нужны,
они аутентифицируются по отдельным сертификатам.
Привилегии пользователей хранятся в данных etcd в ключах `/vitastor/config/user/<имя>`.
В этом ключе для каждого пользователя задаётся:
- Тип:
- Клиент (`type=client` или не указано) - может читать и модифицировать только явным образом
разрешённые образы.
- Администратор (`type=admin`) - может читать и модифицировать все образы, а также администрировать
кластер: смотреть общую статистику и состояние, создавать и удалять OSD и так далее.
- Список имён групп, членом которых пользователь является.
У образов есть следующие свойства:
- Владелец (owner) - имя пользователя, которому разрешено и читать, и менять образ
- Группа владельцев (owner_group) - имя группы владельцев
- Группа читателей (reader_group) - имя группы пользователей, которым разрешено читать образ
И также есть свойство у пула:
- Группа создателей (creator_group) - имя группы пользователей, которым разрешено создавать образы в пуле
Перечень разрешённых операций с данными образов на стороне OSD смотрите в разделе
[Права доступа к данным OSD](#права-доступа-к-данным-osd).
### Привилегии etcd
Привилегии etcd реализуются через Antietcd во всех режимах работы.
Встроенные привилегии etcd не поддерживаются по причине их многочисленных неудобств:
- Аутентификация по сертификатам вообще не работает в REST интерфейсе etcd,
- Привилегии хранятся отдельно от k/v данных и не могут участвовать в транзакциях,
- Менять привилегии может только администратор (root),
- Нет поддержки фильтрации диапазонных ответов чтения по привилегиям.
Если используется etcd, то Antietcd выступает в роли фильтрующего прокси, при этом он
может быть встроен в монитор Vitastor или запущен отдельно. В этом случае etcd должен
разрешать входящие подключения только от Antietcd, а все остальные компоненты должны
соединяться с Antietcd.
Если Antietcd запускается в составе монитора Vitastor, то достаточно включить опцию
`use_perms=true` и задать нужные сертификаты. Если Antietcd запускается отдельно, то
привилегии нужно включать отдельно опциями Antietcd. Подробнее о настройке смотрите
раздел [Варианты настройки etcd/Antietcd](#варианты-настройки-etcdantietcd).
Перечень разрешённых операций с данными etcd смотрите в разделе
[Права доступа к данным etcd](#права-доступа-к-данным-etcd).
## Ручная настройка
### Настройка шифрования соединений OSD
Вам нужно 2 сертификата: один для OSD и один для подписи сертификатов всех клиентов.
Для OSD можно использовать самоподписанный сертификат (osd_ca.crt) или отдельный сертификат (osd.crt),
подписанный доверенным сертификатом osd_ca.crt. Для клиентов нужно использовать отдельные
сертификаты, подписанные общим доверенным (client_ca.crt).
В конфигурацию Vitastor на серверах OSD нужно добавить:
- use_perms: true
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- osd_cert: osd_ca.crt
- osd_pkey: osd_ca.key
На стороне клиентов:
- use_perms: true
- cert: client.crt
- pkey: client.key
### Варианты настройки etcd/Antietcd
Доступны следующие варианты настройки:
#### Mon со встроенным Antietcd
Самый простой вариант. Вам нужен 1 сертификат для Antietcd (antietcd.crt), плюс
корневые сертификаты для OSD и клиентов.
Настройки Vitastor (`/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`):
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (адреса ваших мониторов с портом 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: true
- antietcd_cert: antietcd.crt
- antietcd_key: antietcd.key
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
#### Mon в роли Etcd proxy
Если вы хотите включить привилегии, но остаться на etcd, можно задействовать режим etcd proxy.
Вам понадобится 2 отдельных сертификата: один для etcd (etcd.crt) и один для antietcd (antietcd.crt).
Клиентский порт etcd должен отличаться от стандартного 2379, например, можно выбрать 2381.
Также нужны сертификаты OSD и клиентов.
Настройки Vitastor:
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (адреса ваших мониторов с портом 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: true
- etcd_proxy:
```
{
"urls": [ "http://mon1:2381", ... ], // адреса ваших etcd с портом 2381
"cert": "antietcd.crt",
"key": "antietcd.key",
"ca": "etcd.crt"
}
```
- antietcd_cert: antietcd.crt
- antietcd_key: antietcd.key
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
Опции командной строки etcd:
```
--advertise-client-urls=https://<АДРЕС>:2381 --listen-client-urls=https://<АДРЕС>:2381 \
--client-cert-auth --cert-file=etcd.crt --key-file=etcd.key --trusted-ca-file=antietcd.crt \
--peer-client-cert-auth --peer-cert-file=etcd.crt --peer-key-file=etcd.key --peer-trusted-ca-file=etcd.crt
```
#### Mon с отдельным Antietcd Proxy
Если в дополнение к предыдущему варианту вы хотите разгрузить Antietcd от задач монитора Vitastor,
можно запустить его отдельно.
Аналогично предыдущему варианту нужно 2 сертификата: один для etcd и один для antietcd, плюс понадобятся
отдельные сертификаты для клиентов, OSD и монитора.
Настройки Vitastor:
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (адреса ваших мониторов с портом 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: false
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_cert: mon_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_key: mon_ca.key
Опции командной строки Antietcd:
```
--port 2379 \
--client_cert_auth 1 --auth_filter vitastor_auth_filter.js --etcd_proxy url1,url2,... \
--cert antietcd.crt --key antietcd.key --ca client_ca.crt --osd_ca osd_ca.crt --mon_ca mon_ca.crt \
--etcd_cert antietcd.crt --etcd_key antietcd.key --etcd_ca etcd.crt
```
Опции командной строки etcd (не отличаются от предыдущего варианта):
```
--advertise-client-urls=https://<АДРЕС>:2381 --listen-client-urls=https://<АДРЕС>:2381 \
--client-cert-auth --cert-file=etcd.crt --key-file=etcd.key --trusted-ca-file=antietcd.crt \
--peer-client-cert-auth --peer-cert-file=etcd.crt --peer-key-file=etcd.key --peer-trusted-ca-file=etcd.crt
```
#### Отдельный Antietcd без etcd
Аналогично предыдущему варианту, но etcd и его сертификат не нужны:
Настройки Vitastor (не отличаются от предыдущего варианта):
- etcd_address: [ "http://mon1:2379", ... ] (адреса ваших мониторов с портом 2379)
- use_perms: true
- use_antietcd: false
- etcd_ca: antietcd.crt
- osd_ca: osd_ca.crt
- client_ca: client_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_cert: mon_ca.crt
- mon_etcd_client_key: mon_ca.key
Опции командной строки Antietcd:
```
--port 2379 \
--client_cert_auth 1 --auth_filter vitastor_auth_filter.js \
--persist_filter vitastor_persist_filter.js \
--cert antietcd.crt --key antietcd.key --ca client_ca.crt --osd_ca osd_ca.crt --mon_ca mon_ca.crt
```
### Настройка Vault/OpenBao
Для использования Vault каждому клиенту, который будет получать из Vault ключи
образов, нужна учётная запись в Vault. Vitastor поддерживает только аутентификацию
по клиентским сертификатам, так что все сертификаты клиентов (`cert`+`pkey`) должны
быть зарегистрированы в Vault и им должен быть дан доступ к соответствующим секретам
(поддерживается API секретов v1).
Требуемый формат секрета Vault - одно поле `key` в формате шестнадцатеричной строки.
Используется алгоритм AES-256-XTS, так что длина ключа - 64 байта, то есть строка
должна состоять из 128 шестнадцатеричных цифр.
Для подключения Vault включите следующие настройки в Vitastor.conf:
- `vault_url` - адрес Vault (например, `https://vault:8200`)
- `vault_ca` - сертификат самого Vault
После этого, если создать образ (`vitastor-cli create`) с опцией `--enc_key vault:<ID>`,
то для получения ключа клиенты Vitastor сначала обратятся к Vault для получения токена
по адресу `/v1/auth/cert/login`, а потом запросят из Vault сам секрет по адресу `/v1/secret/<ID>`.
#### Пример настройки Vault
Пошаговая инструкция для настройки тестового Vault на примере OpenBao:
1. Если ещё не настроен TLS, генерируем самоподписанный TLS сертификат для Vault:
```
openssl req -days 3650 -x509 -addext basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:1 --addext subjectAltName=DNS:vault \
-new -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout /etc/openbao/vault.key -out /etc/openbao/vault.crt
```
Настраиваем его в `/etc/openbao/openbao.hcl`:
```
listener "tcp" {
address = "0.0.0.0:8200"
tls_cert_file = "/etc/openbao/vault.crt"
tls_key_file = "/etc/openbao/vault.key"
}
```
И перезапускаем OpenBao (`systemctl restart openbao`).
2. Копируем TLS сертификат Vault для Vitastor:
```
cp /etc/openbao/vault.crt /etc/vitastor/vault.crt
```
Переносим его на все клиентские ноды и прописываем в `/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf`:
```
{
...
"vault_url": "http://vault:8200",
"vault_ca": "/etc/vitastor/vault.crt"
}
```
3. Проверяем статус Vault:
```
bao status -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
4. Инициализируем Vault в тестовом режиме из 1 ноды (с 1 частью ключа):
```
bao operator init -n 1 -t 1 -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
5. Разблокируем Vault:
```
bao operator unseal -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200
```
6. Включаем аутентификацию по сертификатам:
```
bao auth enable -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 cert
```
7. Включаем секреты v1:
```
bao secrets enable -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 -path=secret kv-v1
```
8. Создаём тестовый секрет:
```
bao kv put -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 secret/vitastor/testimg3 key=$(openssl rand -hex 64)
```
9. Генерируем подписанный сертификат для пользователя Vitastor (там, где у вас есть `client_ca.crt` и `client_ca.key`):
```
openssl req -subj '/CN=testimg3' -nodes -new -keyout testimg3.key -out testimg3.csr
openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -CA client_ca.crt -CAkey client_ca.key -CAcreateserial -in testimg3.csr -out testimg3.crt
rm testimg3.csr
```
10. Создаём пользователя в Vault и даём ему доступ к секрету:
```
cat >testimg3.policy <<EOF
path "/secret/vitastor/testimg3" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
EOF
bao policy write -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 testimg3 testimg3.policy
bao write -ca-cert /etc/openbao/vault.crt -address=https://vault:8200 auth/cert/certs/testimg3 \
certificate=@testimg3.crt display_name=testimg3 token_ttl=24h token_policies=testimg3
```
11. Тестируем доступ к секрету:
```
curl --cacert /etc/vitastor/vault.crt --cert testimg3.crt --key testimg3.key \
--json '{}' https://vault:8200/v1/auth/cert/login
```
Будет выведен токен, подставляем его в следующий запрос:
```
curl --cacert /etc/vitastor/vault.crt --cert testimg3.crt --key testimg3.key \
-H 'X-Vault-Token: <ПОЛУЧЕННЫЙ ТОКЕН>' https://vault:8200/v1/secret/vitastor/testimg3
```
12. Создаём образ в Vitastor с заданным секретом (от имени администратора или того, кто имеет
право создавать образы в вашем пуле):
```
vitastor-cli create -s 100G --enc_key vault:vitastor/testimg3 --owner testimg3 testimg3
```
13. Тестируем доступ к образу от имени пользователя testimg3:
```
vitastor-cli --cert testimg3.crt --pkey testimg3.key dd if=/dev/urandom oimg=testimg3 bs=1M count=100
```
## Списки разрешённых операций
### Права доступа к данным etcd
Ниже все названия ключей приведены без общего префикса `/vitastor`.
Разрешённые операции с ключами в Antietcd для клиентов (`type=client`):
- Только чтение:
- Разрешено всегда:
- `/config/global`
- `/config/node_placement`
- `/config/pools`
- `/pg/config`
- `/osd/state/*`
- `/pg/state/*`
- `/index/maxid/*`
- Для образов, которые [может читать пользователь](#пользователи-и-права-доступа):
- `/config/inode/*`
- `/index/image/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- Чтение и запись:
- Для пулов, в которых может создавать образы пользователь:
- `/index/maxid/*`
- Для образов, которыми владеет пользователь:
- `/config/inode/*`
- `/index/image/*`
Разрешённые операции с ключами в Antietcd для администраторов (`type=admin`):
- Чтение:
- `/stats`
- `/mon/*`
- `/pg/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- `/pool/stats/*`
- Чтение и запись:
- `/config/*`
- `/osd/*`
- `/index/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
Разрешённые операции с ключами в etcd для OSD:
- Чтение:
- `/pg/config`
- `/config/*`
- Чтение и запись:
- `/osd/*`
- `/pg/state/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
Разрешённые операции с ключами в etcd для мониторов:
- Чтение:
- `/config/*`
- `/osd/*`
- `/pgstats/*`
- Чтение и запись:
- `/pg/config`
- `/stats`
- `/history/last_clean_pgs`
- `/mon/*`
- `/pg/history/*`
- `/inode/stats/*`
- `/pool/stats/*`
### Права доступа к данным OSD
При включённой опции `use_perms` и шифровании OSD аутентифицирует клиентов по сертификатам
и разрешает каждому клиенту только то, что ему разрешено согласно модели прав доступа.
Клиентские операции:
- READ - разрешено для образов, доступных пользователю на чтение.
- WRITE, DELETE, SCRUB - разрешены для образов, доступных пользователю на запись.
- SYNC - операция не связана с образом и разрешена всегда.
- DESCRIBE - операция разрешена только для администраторов (используются командами
`vitastor-cli describe` и `fix`).
- PING - операция разрешена всегда.
- SHOW_CONFIG - операция разрешена всегда, однако если в ней клиент представляется
как OSD, то проверяется, что он использует сертификат, подписанный `osd_ca`.
- SEC_LIST (листинг) - разрешена другим OSD и администраторам с любыми параметрами,
а обычным клиентам разрешена только для запросов, ограниченных образом, доступным
пользователю на чтение.
Кластерные операции - разрешаются только другим OSD:
- SEC_READ
- SEC_WRITE
- SEC_WRITE_STABLE
- SEC_SYNC
- SEC_STABILIZE
- SEC_ROLLBACK
- SEC_DELETE
- SEC_READ_BMP
- SEC_LOCK
### Права доступа к API
[vitastor-cli serve](../usage/cli.ru.md#serve) также поддерживает клиентскую
аутентификацию по сертификатам. Принимаются только сертификаты, подписанные
`client_ca`. В качестве серверного сертификата используется отдельный сертификат
`server_cert` с ключом `server_pkey`.
При этом для корректной работы `vitastor-cli serve` он сам должен использовать
для доступа в Vitastor сертификат (`cert`+`pkey`) пользователя с правами
администратора (`type=admin`).
Обычным клиентам при доступе к API разрешаются только API-операции с образами,
доступными им либо на чтение (для чтения), либо на запись (для модификации).
Все остальные API-вызовы разрешаются только для администраторов.
Список разрешённых операций API:
Клиентам (пользователям с `type=client`) разрешаются операции:
- image/list - для образов, которые пользователь может читать.
- image/create - для пулов, в которых пользователю разрешено создавать образы, либо
для создания снимков образов, которыми пользователь владеет.
- image/delete, image/flatten, image/modify - для образов, которыми пользователь владеет.
Все остальные операции разрешаются только администраторам (`type=admin`).
## Производительность шифрования
У вас может возникнуть вопрос - а как быстро всё это прекрасное шифрование работает?
Ответ - сильно зависит от процессора. На современных процессорах (при наличии AVX512 с VAES)
очень быстро - скорость шифрования AES может составлять 10-20 Гбайт/с и выше. В первую очередь
подразумевается CPU клиентских машин, потому что сквозное шифрование выполняется целиком на
клиенте, а транспортное хоть также и затрагивает OSD, но у клиента поток один, а OSD на стороне
сервера много и добавить там ресурсов легче.
На более старых процессорах скорость заметно хуже, например, на Xeon E5 v4 она составляет
буквально 3 Гбайт/с.
Вы можете оценить производительность своих процессоров с помощью команды `vitastor-cli cpubench`.
Пример вывода (💪 AMD EPYC 9575F):
```
$ vitastor-cli cpubench
Vitastor transport encryption benchmark (AES-256-GCM, AES-256-XTS and xxhash3)
Warmup...
No transport encryption, data checksums enabled, e2e unencrypted image
xxhash3 1 M block... 209000 iterations in 2001 ms = 104447.78 MB/s
xxhash3 4 K block... 37000000 iterations in 2022 ms = 71479.35 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 1 M block... 210000 iterations in 2015 ms = 104218.36 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 4 K block... 26000000 iterations in 2073 ms = 48993.01 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 1 M block... 54000 iterations in 2000 ms = 27000.00 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 4 K block... 11700000 iterations in 2014 ms = 22692.71 MB/s
No transport encryption, no checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS encrypt 1 M block... 50000 iterations in 2039 ms = 24521.82 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt 4 K block... 12600000 iterations in 2009 ms = 24499.13 MB/s
No transport encryption, e2e encrypted image, data checksums enabled
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 40000 iterations in 2013 ms = 19870.84 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 10200000 iterations in 2011 ms = 19812.90 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 40000 iterations in 2014 ms = 19860.97 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 8700000 iterations in 2011 ms = 16899.24 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 1 M block... 26000 iterations in 2062 ms = 12609.12 MB/s
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 4 K block... 6300000 iterations in 2006 ms = 12267.88 MB/s
```
А вот Xeon E5-2680v4:
```
$ vitastor-cli cpubench
Vitastor transport encryption benchmark (AES-256-GCM, AES-256-XTS and xxhash3)
Warmup...
No transport encryption, data checksums enabled, e2e unencrypted image
xxhash3 1 M block... 62000 iterations in 2021 ms = 30677.88 MB/s
xxhash3 4 K block... 12400000 iterations in 2006 ms = 24146.31 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 1 M block... 62000 iterations in 2027 ms = 30587.07 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + xxhash3 4 K block... 6800000 iterations in 2011 ms = 13208.60 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e unencrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 1 M block... 7000 iterations in 2317 ms = 3021.15 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header and 4 K block... 1500000 iterations in 2102 ms = 2787.52 MB/s
No transport encryption, no checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS encrypt 1 M block... 7000 iterations in 2317 ms = 3021.15 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt 4 K block... 1600000 iterations in 2088 ms = 2993.30 MB/s
No transport encryption, e2e encrypted image, data checksums enabled
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 6000 iterations in 2188 ms = 2742.23 MB/s
AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 1400000 iterations in 2053 ms = 2663.78 MB/s
Header encryption with payload checksums, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 1 M block... 6000 iterations in 2190 ms = 2739.73 MB/s
AES-256-GCM encrypt header + AES-256-XTS encrypt + xxhash3 4 K block... 1300000 iterations in 2101 ms = 2417.00 MB/s
Full transport encryption, e2e encrypted image
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 1 M block... 4000 iterations in 2666 ms = 1500.38 MB/s
AES-256-XTS + AES-256-GCM encrypt 4 K block... 800000 iterations in 2113 ms = 1478.94 MB/s
```
+21 -7
View File
@@ -125,18 +125,31 @@ bench-kaveri kaveri 10 G 10 G 0 B/s 0 0 0 us 0 B/s 0
## create
`vitastor-cli create -s|--size <size> [-p|--pool <id|name>] [--parent <parent_name>[@<snapshot>]] <name>`
`vitastor-cli create -s|--size SIZE [OPTIONS] <name>`
Create an image. You may use K/M/G/T suffixes for `<size>`. If `--parent` is specified,
a copy-on-write image clone is created. Parent must be a snapshot (readonly image).
Pool must be specified if there is more than one pool.
Create an image. Options:
* `-s|--size SIZE` - New image size in bytes or with a K/M/G/T unit suffix.
* `-p|--pool POOL` - Specify pool for the new image (may be omitted if there is only 1 pool).
* `--parent PARENT` - Create a copy-on-write image clone based on PARENT (or PARENT@SNAPSHOT).
If parent is not a snapshot, it must be a read-only image.
* `--enc-key random` - Generate a new random AES-256-XTS encryption key for the new image.
* `--enc-key HEX` - Set a specified AES-256-XTS key (64 bytes in hex) for the new image.
* `--enc-key vault:ID` - Use an encryption key from an external Vault secret with specified ID.
```
vitastor-cli create --snapshot <snapshot> [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>
vitastor-cli snap-create [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>@<snapshot>
vitastor-cli create --snapshot <snapshot> [OPTIONS] <image>
vitastor-cli snap-create [OPTIONS] <image>@<snapshot>
```
Create a snapshot of image `<name>` (either form can be used). May be used live if only a single writer is active.
Create a snapshot of image `<image>`. May be used live if only a single writer is active.
Options:
* `-p|--pool POOL` - Move image to pool POOL, leaving the snapshot in the old pool.
* `--enc-key random` - Change image encryption key to a new random AES-256-XTS key.
* `--enc-key KEY` - Change image encryption key to a specified key, Vault key or to an empty key.
By default, the image retains its old encryption key when taking a snapshot.
See also about [how to export snapshots](qemu.en.md#exporting-snapshots).
@@ -151,6 +164,7 @@ You should resize file system in the image, if present, before shrinking it.
* `--deleted 1|0` - Set/clear 'deleted image' flag (set automatically during unfinished deletes).
* `-f|--force` - Proceed with shrinking or setting readwrite flag even if the image has children.
* `--down-ok` - Proceed with shrinking even if some data will be left on unavailable OSDs.
* `--enc-key HEX` - Change image encryption key (allowed only with `--force`).
## dd
+22 -8
View File
@@ -127,19 +127,32 @@ bench-kaveri kaveri 10 G 10 G 0 B/s 0 0 0 us 0 B/s 0
## create
`vitastor-cli create -s|--size <size> [-p|--pool <id|name>] [--parent <parent_name>[@<snapshot>]] <name>`
`vitastor-cli create -s|--size SIZE [ОПЦИИ] <name>`
Создать образ. Для размера `<size>` можно использовать суффиксы K/M/G/T (килобайт-мегабайт-гигабайт-терабайт).
Если указана опция `--parent`, создаётся клон образа. Родитель `<parent_name>[@<snapshot>]` должен быть
снимком (или просто немодифицируемым образом). Пул обязательно указывать, если в кластере больше одного пула.
Создать образ. Опции:
* `-s|--size SIZE` - Размер нового образа в байтах или с суффиксом K/M/G/T (кило/мега/гига/терабайт).
* `-p|--pool POOL` - Создать образ в заданном пуле (можно не указывать, если пул всего один).
* `--parent PARENT` - Создать легковесный клон на основе образа `PARENT` или снимка `PARENT@SNAP`.
Если `PARENT` - не снимок, он должен быть помечен как образ только для чтения.
* `--enc-key random` - Сгенерировать случайный ключ шифрования AES-256-XTS для нового образа.
* `--enc-key HEX` - Установить заданный ключ AES-256-XTS (64 байта в hex) для нового образа.
* `--enc-key vault:ID` - Использовать ключ из внешнего секрета с заданным ID из Vault.
```
vitastor-cli create --snapshot <snapshot> [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>
vitastor-cli snap-create [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>@<snapshot>
vitastor-cli create --snapshot <snapshot> [ОПЦИИ] <image>
vitastor-cli snap-create [ОПЦИИ] <image>@<snapshot>
```
Создать снимок образа `<name>` (можно использовать любую форму команды). Снимок можно создавать без остановки
клиентов, если пишущий клиент максимум 1.
Создать снимок образа `<image>` (можно использовать любую форму команды).
Снимок можно создавать без остановки клиентов, если пишущих клиентов не больше одного.
Опции:
* `-p|--pool POOL` - Переместить образ в пул POOL, оставив снимок в старом пуле.
* `--enc-key random` - Изменить ключ шифрования образа на новый случайный ключ AES-256-XTS.
* `--enc-key KEY` - Изменить ключ шифрования образа на заданный ключ, ключ из Vault или пустой ключ.
По умолчанию шифрованные образы сохраняют старый ключ при снятии снимка.
Смотрите также информацию о том, [как экспортировать снимки](qemu.ru.md#экспорт-снимков).
@@ -156,6 +169,7 @@ vitastor-cli snap-create [-p|--pool <id|name>] <image>@<snapshot>
* `--deleted 1|0` - Установить/снять флаг "образ удалён" (устанавливается при незавершённом удалении).
* `-f|--force` - Разрешить уменьшение или перевод в чтение-запись образа, у которого есть клоны.
* `--down-ok` - Разрешить уменьшение, даже если часть данных останется неудалённой на недоступных OSD.
* `--enc-key HEX` - Изменить ключ шифрования образа (разрешено только с `--force`).
## dd
+49 -8
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
const AntiEtcd = require('antietcd');
const vitastor_auth_filter = require('./vitastor_auth_filter.js');
const vitastor_persist_filter = require('./vitastor_persist_filter.js');
const { b64, local_ips } = require('./utils.js');
@@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ class AntiEtcdAdapter
cluster = cluster ? (''+(cluster||'')).split(/,+/) : [];
cluster = Object.keys(cluster.reduce((a, url) =>
{
a[url.toLowerCase().replace(/^(https?:\/\/)/, '').replace(/\/.*$/, '')] = true;
a[url.toLowerCase().replace(/^(https?:\/\/)?(.*?)(\/.*)?$/, (m, m1, m2) => (m1||'http://')+m2)] = true;
return a;
}, {}));
const cfg_port = config.antietcd_port;
@@ -26,7 +27,18 @@ class AntiEtcdAdapter
is_local['0.0.0.0'] = true;
is_local['::'] = true;
is_local[''] = true;
const selected = cluster.map(s => s.split(':', 2)).filter(ip => is_local[ip[0]] && (!cfg_port || ip[1] == cfg_port));
// split :, 3 -> <schema>:<//ip>:<port>
const selected = [];
for (let i = 0; i < cluster.length; i++)
{
const m = /^(https?:\/\/)?(?:\[(.*)\]|([^\[\:]+))(?::(\d+))?$/.exec(cluster[i]);
if (!m)
continue;
const ip = m[3] || m[2];
const port = m[4] || 2379;
if (is_local[ip] && (!cfg_port || port == cfg_port))
selected.push({ idx: i, ip, port });
}
if (selected.length > 1)
{
console.error('More than 1 etcd_address matches local IPs, please specify port');
@@ -35,16 +47,45 @@ class AntiEtcdAdapter
else if (selected.length == 1)
{
const antietcd_config = {
ip: selected[0][0],
port: selected[0][1],
data: config.antietcd_data_file || ((config.antietcd_data_dir || '/var/lib/vitastor') + '/mon_'+selected[0][1]+'.json.gz'),
ip: selected[0].ip,
port: selected[0].port,
cert: config.antietcd_cert,
key: config.antietcd_key,
ca: config.client_ca,
data: config.antietcd_data_file || ((config.antietcd_data_dir || '/var/lib/vitastor') + '/mon_'+selected[0].port+'.json.gz'),
persist_filter: vitastor_persist_filter({ vitastor_prefix: config.etcd_prefix || '/vitastor' }),
node_id: selected[0][0]+':'+selected[0][1], // node_id = ip:port
cluster: (cluster.length == 1 ? null : cluster.reduce((a, c) => { a[c] = "http://"+c; return a; }, {})),
node_id: cluster[selected[0].idx].replace(/^(https?:\/\/)/, ''), // same as in <cluster> below
cluster: (cluster.length == 1 ? null : cluster.reduce((a, c) => { a[c.replace(/^(https?:\/\/)/, '')] = c; return a; }, {})),
cluster_key: (config.etcd_prefix || '/vitastor'),
stale_read: 1,
log_level: 1,
logs: { cluster: true },
};
if (config.etcd_proxy)
{
// Monitor may use the builtin etcd_proxy mode
if (!config.etcd_proxy.urls)
{
console.error('etcd_proxy.urls are empty');
process.exit(1);
}
antietcd_config.etcd_proxy = config.etcd_proxy.urls;
antietcd_config.etcd_cert = config.etcd_proxy.cert;
antietcd_config.etcd_key = config.etcd_proxy.key;
antietcd_config.etcd_ca = config.etcd_proxy.ca;
delete antietcd_config.data;
delete antietcd_config.persist_filter;
delete antietcd_config.cluster;
delete antietcd_config.cluster_key;
}
if (config.use_perms)
{
antietcd_config.client_cert_auth = true;
antietcd_config.auth_filter = vitastor_auth_filter;
antietcd_config.ca = config.client_ca;
antietcd_config.osd_ca = config.osd_ca;
antietcd_config.mon_ca = config.mon_ca;
}
for (const key in config)
{
if (key.substr(0, 9) === 'antietcd_')
@@ -169,7 +210,7 @@ class AntiEtcdAdapter
await new Promise(ok => setTimeout(ok, timeout-(Date.now()-prev)));
}
prev = Date.now();
const res = await this.antietcd.api(path.replace(/^\/+/, '').replace(/\/+$/, '').replace(/\/+/g, '_'), body);
const res = await this.antietcd.api(path.replace(/^\/+/, '').replace(/\/+$/, '').replace(/\/+/g, '_'), body, { user_type: 'mon' });
if (res.error)
{
console.error('Failed to query antietcd '+path+' (retry '+retry+'/'+retries+'): '+res.error);
+27 -6
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+
// License: VNPL-1.1 (see README.md for details)
const fs = require('fs');
const http = require('http');
const https = require('https');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const { b64, local_ips } = require('./utils.js');
@@ -15,11 +17,30 @@ class EtcdAdapter
this.ws = null;
this.ws_alive = false;
this.ws_keepalive_timer = null;
this.opts = {};
}
parse_config(config)
{
this.parse_etcd_addresses(config.etcd_address||config.etcd_url);
if (config.mon_etcd_client_cert || config.etcd_client_cert)
{
this.opts.cert = config.mon_etcd_client_cert || config.etcd_client_cert;
if (this.opts.cert.substr(0, 5) != '-----')
this.opts.cert = fs.readFileSync(this.opts.cert, { encoding: 'utf-8' });
}
if (config.mon_etcd_client_key || config.etcd_client_key)
{
this.opts.key = config.mon_etcd_client_key || config.etcd_client_key;
if (this.opts.key.substr(0, 5) != '-----')
this.opts.key = fs.readFileSync(this.opts.key, { encoding: 'utf-8' });
}
if (config.etcd_ca)
{
this.opts.ca = config.etcd_ca;
if (this.opts.ca.substr(0, 5) != '-----')
this.opts.ca = fs.readFileSync(this.opts.ca, { encoding: 'utf-8' });
}
}
parse_etcd_addresses(addrs)
@@ -39,7 +60,7 @@ class EtcdAdapter
for (let url of addrs)
{
let scheme = 'http';
url = url.trim().replace(/^(https?):\/\//, (m, m1) => { scheme = m1; return ''; });
url = url.trim().replace(/^(https?):\/\//i, (m, m1) => { scheme = m1.toLowerCase(); return ''; });
const slash = url.indexOf('/');
const colon = url.indexOf(':');
const is_local = is_local_ip[colon >= 0 ? url.substr(0, colon) : (slash >= 0 ? url.substr(0, slash) : url)];
@@ -130,7 +151,7 @@ class EtcdAdapter
}
ok(false);
}, this.mon.config.etcd_mon_timeout);
this.ws = new WebSocket(base+'/watch');
this.ws = new WebSocket(base+'/watch', this.opts);
this.ws_used_url = cur_addr;
const fail = () =>
{
@@ -272,7 +293,7 @@ class EtcdAdapter
{
throw new Error(MON_STOPPED);
}
const res = await POST(base+path, body, timeout);
const res = await POST(base+path, body, timeout, this.opts);
if (this.mon.stopped)
{
throw new Error(MON_STOPPED);
@@ -298,7 +319,7 @@ class EtcdAdapter
}
}
function POST(url, body, timeout)
function POST(url, body, timeout, opts)
{
return new Promise(ok =>
{
@@ -310,10 +331,10 @@ function POST(url, body, timeout)
req = null;
ok({ error: 'timeout' });
}, timeout) : null;
let req = http.request(url, { method: 'POST', headers: {
let req = (url.substr(0, 5) == 'https' ? https : http).request(url, { method: 'POST', headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': body_text.length,
} }, (res) =>
}, ...(opts||{}) }, (res) =>
{
if (!req)
{
+22 -1
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ const etcd_allow = new RegExp('^'+[
'config/pools',
'config/osd/[1-9]\\d*',
'config/pgs', // old name
'config/user/.*',
'pg/config',
'config/inode/[1-9]\\d*/[1-9]\\d*',
'osd/state/[1-9]\\d*',
@@ -45,7 +46,14 @@ const etcd_tree = {
config_path: "/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf",
etcd_prefix: "/vitastor",
// etcd connection - configurable online
etcd_address: "10.0.115.10:2379/v3",
etcd_address: "http://10.0.115.10:2379/v3",
etcd_client_cert: "",
etcd_client_key: "",
osd_etcd_client_cert: "",
osd_etcd_client_key: "",
mon_etcd_client_cert: "",
mon_etcd_client_key: "",
etcd_ca: "",
// mon
etcd_mon_ttl: 5, // min: 1
etcd_mon_timeout: 1000, // ms. min: 0
@@ -201,6 +209,8 @@ const etcd_tree = {
primary_affinity_tags?: 'nvme' | [ 'nvme', ... ],
// scrub interval
scrub_interval?: '30d',
// users allowed to create images in this pool
creator_group?: '',
},
...
}, */
@@ -217,10 +227,21 @@ const etcd_tree = {
parent_id?: <inode_t>,
readonly?: boolean,
deleted?: boolean,
enc_key?: string,
owner?: string,
owner_group?: string,
reader_group?: string,
}
}
}, */
inode: {},
/* user: {
<username>: {
type: 'osd'|'mon'|'admin'|'client',
groups: string[],
},
}, */
user: {},
},
osd: {
state: {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "vitastor-mon",
"version": "3.0.14",
"version": "3.0.15",
"description": "Vitastor SDS monitor service",
"main": "mon-main.js",
"scripts": {
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
"author": "Vitaliy Filippov",
"license": "UNLICENSED",
"dependencies": {
"antietcd": "^1.2.4",
"antietcd": "^1.3.1",
"sprintf-js": "^1.1.2",
"ws": "^7.2.5"
},
+379 -46
View File
@@ -1,38 +1,324 @@
#!/usr/bin/node
// Simple systemd unit generator for etcd
// Simple Vitastor etcd / antietcd / TLS configurator
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+
// License: MIT
// USAGE:
// 1) Put the same etcd_address into /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf on all monitor nodes
// 2) Run ./make-etcd.js. It will create the etcd service on one of specified IPs
const child_process = require('child_process');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const readline = require('readline');
run().catch(e => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });
const help_text = `Initialize a Vitastor cluster (etcd, vitastor.conf and TLS certificates)
(c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2026+ (MIT)
USAGE:
1) Create a minimal vitastor.conf with etcd_address, osd_network and (optionally) use_perms.
Non-encrypted: {"etcd_address":["http://10.0.0.10:2379","http://10.0.0.11:2379","http://10.0.0.12:2379"],"osd_network":"10.0.0.0/24"}
Encrypted: {"etcd_address":["https://10.0.0.10:2379","https://10.0.0.11:2379","https://10.0.0.12:2379"],"use_perms":true,"osd_network":"10.0.0.0/24"}
(Note https:// etcd URLs!)
2) Run: ${process.argv[1]} [./vitastor.conf] [--antietcd-only]
You can run it on etcd/monitor nodes or on an external node.
It configures etcd, generates TLS certificates (on the first or external node), copies
them to other etcd/monitor nodes, and updates vitastor.conf with TLS options.
3) If you have OSD-only nodes, run:
${process.argv[1]} --copy-to-osd-node NODE_NAME ./vitastor.conf
It copies vitastor.conf and required TLS certificates to that node.
OPTIONS:
--antietcd-only
disable etcd (proxy or direct mode), use only antietcd
--gen-certs
force certificate generation even if it's not the first node
--no-certs
disable certificate generation
--copy yes|no|ask
copy vitastor.conf and TLS certificates for monitor&etcd to monitor nodes using scp
(default is ask)
--copy-to-osd-node NODE[,NODE2,...]
copy vitastor.conf and TLS certificates for OSDs to NODES using scp
`;
async function run()
{
const config_path = process.argv[2] || '/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf';
if (config_path == '-h' || config_path == '--help')
let config_path = '/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf';
let config_dir = '/etc/vitastor/';
let gen_certs = 'auto';
let antietcd_only = false;
let copy = 'ask';
let copy_to_osd = null;
for (let i = 2; i < process.argv.length; i++)
{
console.log(
'Initialize systemd etcd service for Vitastor\n'+
'(c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+ (MIT)\n'+
'\n'+
'USAGE:\n'+
'1) Put the same etcd_address into /etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf on all monitor nodes\n'+
'2) Run '+process.argv[1]+' [config_path]\n'
);
process.exit(0);
const arg = process.argv[i];
if (arg == '-h' || arg == '--help')
{
console.log(help_text);
process.exit(0);
}
else if (arg == '--gen-certs')
{
gen_certs = true;
}
else if (arg == '--no-certs')
{
gen_certs = false;
}
else if (arg == '--antietcd-only')
{
antietcd_only = true;
}
else if (arg == '--copy-to-osd-node' && i < process.argv.length-1)
{
i++;
copy_to_osd = process.argv[i].split(/,/);
}
else if (arg == '--copy' && i < process.argv.length-1)
{
i++;
copy = process.argv[i];
if (copy !== 'ask' && copy !== 'yes' && copy !== 'no')
{
console.error('--copy should be "ask", "yes" or "no"');
process.exit(1);
}
}
else if (arg[0] == '-')
{
console.error('Unknown option: '+arg[0]);
process.exit(1);
}
else
{
config_path = arg;
config_dir = path.dirname(arg);
}
}
if (!fs.existsSync(config_path))
{
console.log(config_path+' is missing');
process.exit(1);
}
const config = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(config_path, { encoding: 'utf-8' }));
if (!config.etcd_address)
{
console.log("etcd_address is missing in "+config_path);
process.exit(1);
}
const etcds = (config.etcd_address instanceof Array ? config.etcd_address : (''+config.etcd_address).split(/,/))
.map(s => /^(https?):\/\/(\[[^\]]+\]|[^\[\]\:\/]+)(?::(\d+))?/.exec(s.toLowerCase()))
.filter(s => s)
.map(s => ({
scheme: s[1],
addr: s[2].indexOf(':') && s[2][0] != '[' ? '['+s[2]+']' : s[2],
ip: s[2][0] == '[' ? s[2].substr(1, s[2].length-2) : s[2],
port: s[3],
}));
const tls = etcds.filter(e => e.scheme === 'https').length > 0;
const use_perms = tls && config.use_perms;
const num = select_local_etcd(etcds);
if (copy_to_osd)
{
copy_to_osd_nodes(copy_to_osd, config_dir, use_perms, antietcd_only);
process.exit(0);
}
if (tls)
{
const etcd_ca = config_dir+'/'+path.basename(config.etcd_ca);
if (gen_certs === true)
{
console.log('Certificate generation is requested explicitly, generating');
}
else if (gen_certs === false)
{
console.log('Certificate generation is disabled explicitly, skipping');
}
else if (num < 0)
{
gen_certs = true;
console.log('No matching IPs in etcd_address from '+config_path+', only generating certificates');
}
else if (config.etcd_ca && fs.existsSync(etcd_ca))
{
gen_certs = false;
console.log(etcd_ca+' already exists, assuming certificates are already generated');
}
else if (num === 0)
{
gen_certs = true;
console.log('This is monitor node 1, generating certificates');
}
else
{
console.log('This is monitor node '+(num+1)+', '+etcd_ca+' does not exist, please copy certificates to this node');
process.exit(1);
}
await write_auth_config(config, config_path, etcds, use_perms, antietcd_only);
if (gen_certs)
{
if (copy === 'ask')
copy = await ask_copy('Copy certificates and vitastor.conf to other nodes after generation?');
copy = (copy === 'y' || copy === 'yes');
await make_certs(config_dir, copy, etcds, use_perms, antietcd_only);
}
}
if (num < 0)
{
console.log('No matching IPs in etcd_address from '+config_path);
process.exit(tls && gen_certs ? 0 : 1);
}
await configure_etcd(etcds, num, tls, use_perms);
await enable_mon();
process.exit(0);
}
async function ask_copy(question)
{
const rl = readline.createInterface({
input: process.stdin,
output: process.stdout,
prompt: '> ',
});
let copy;
while (copy != 'y' && copy != 'n' && copy != 'yes' && copy != 'no')
{
if (copy)
console.log('Please type "yes" or "no"');
copy = await new Promise(ok => rl.question(question, ok));
}
return copy;
}
async function copy_to_osd_nodes(to, dir, use_perms, antietcd_only)
{
const osd_to_copy = [ 'vitastor.conf' ];
if (!antietcd_only && !use_perms)
osd_to_copy.push('etcd_ca.crt');
else
osd_to_copy.push('antietcd_ca.crt');
if (use_perms)
osd_to_copy.push('osd.crt', 'osd.key', 'client_ca.crt');
console.warn('Copying configuration to OSD nodes '+to.join(', '));
for (const node of to)
await system("scp "+dir+osd_to_copy.join(" "+dir)+" root@"+node+":/etc/vitastor/");
}
async function make_certs(dir, copy, etcds, use_perms, antietcd_only)
{
console.log(`-----
Generating certificates in ${dir}
-----
`);
const to_copy = [ 'vitastor.conf' ];
const osd_to_copy = [ 'vitastor.conf' ];
if (!antietcd_only)
{
await make_ca("/O=Vitastor etcd CA", dir+"etcd_ca");
await make_signed("/CN=Vitastor etcd", dir+"etcd", dir+"etcd_ca", etcds.map(e => "IP:"+e.ip).join(','));
to_copy.push('etcd_ca.crt', 'etcd.crt', 'etcd.key');
if (!use_perms)
osd_to_copy.push('etcd_ca.crt');
}
if (use_perms || antietcd_only)
{
await make_ca("/O=Vitastor Antietcd CA", dir+"antietcd_ca");
await make_signed("/CN=Vitastor Antietcd", dir+"antietcd", dir+"antietcd_ca", etcds.map(e => "IP:"+e.ip).join(','));
to_copy.push('antietcd_ca.crt', 'antietcd.crt', 'antietcd.key');
osd_to_copy.push('antietcd_ca.crt');
}
if (use_perms)
{
await make_ca("/CN=Vitastor OSD", dir+"osd");
await make_ca("/O=Vitastor Client CA", dir+"client_ca");
await make_signed("/CN=admin", dir+"admin", dir+"client_ca");
to_copy.push('osd.crt', 'osd.key', 'client_ca.crt');
osd_to_copy.push('osd.crt', 'osd.key', 'client_ca.crt');
}
console.log(`-----
Certificates generated, commands to copy them:
- Monitor+OSD node:
cd ${dir} && scp ${to_copy.join(' ')} root@NODE:/etc/vitastor/
- Monitor node:
cd ${dir} && scp ${to_copy.filter(f => f != 'osd.key').join(' ')} root@NODE:/etc/vitastor/
- OSD node:
cd ${dir} && scp ${osd_to_copy.join(' ')} root@NODE:/etc/vitastor/
-----
`);
if (copy)
{
for (const node of etcds)
{
await system("scp "+dir+to_copy.join(" "+dir)+" root@"+node.ip+":/etc/vitastor/");
}
}
else
{
console.warn('Certificates generated in '+dir+', please copy them to other nodes');
}
}
async function write_auth_config(config, config_path, etcds, use_perms, antietcd_only)
{
const auth = {};
if (use_perms)
{
auth["use_antietcd"] = true;
if (!antietcd_only)
{
auth["etcd_proxy"] = {
urls: etcds.map(e => e.ip+':2381'),
cert: "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt",
key: "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.key",
ca: "/etc/vitastor/etcd_ca.crt",
};
}
auth["antietcd_cert"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt";
auth["antietcd_key"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.key";
auth["etcd_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd_ca.crt";
auth["osd_cert"] = "/etc/vitastor/osd.crt";
auth["osd_pkey"] = "/etc/vitastor/osd.key";
auth["osd_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/osd.crt";
auth["client_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/client_ca.crt";
auth["cert"] = "/etc/vitastor/admin.crt";
auth["pkey"] = "/etc/vitastor/admin.key";
}
else
{
if (antietcd_only)
{
auth["use_antietcd"] = true;
auth["antietcd_cert"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt";
auth["antietcd_key"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd.key";
auth["etcd_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/antietcd_ca.crt";
}
else
{
auth["etcd_ca"] = "/etc/vitastor/etcd.crt";
}
}
for (const k in auth)
{
if ((k in config) && JSON.stringify(auth[k]) != JSON.stringify(config[k]))
{
// Auth options already overridden with non-default
console.log(k+" is already overridden in "+config_path+", skipping config update");
return;
}
}
for (const k in auth)
{
config[k] = auth[k];
}
console.log(`-----
Updating ${config_path}
-----
`);
fs.writeFileSync(config_path, JSON.stringify(config, 0, 4));
}
async function configure_etcd(etcds, num, tls, use_perms)
{
const in_docker = fs.existsSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf") &&
fs.existsSync("/etc/vitastor/docker.conf");
if (!in_docker && fs.existsSync("/etc/systemd/system/vitastor-etcd.service"))
@@ -45,37 +331,55 @@ async function run()
console.log("/etc/systemd/system/etcd.service already exists");
process.exit(1);
}
const config = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(config_path, { encoding: 'utf-8' }));
if (!config.etcd_address)
const etcd_url = etcds[num].scheme + '://' + etcds[num].addr;
const options = {
name: 'etcd'+etcds[num].ip.replace(/[^0-9a-z_]/ig, '_'),
advertise_client_urls: etcd_url+':'+(use_perms ? 2381 : 2379),
listen_client_urls: etcd_url+':'+(use_perms ? 2381 : 2379),
initial_advertise_peer_urls: etcd_url+':2380',
listen_peer_urls: etcd_url+':2380',
initial_cluster_token: 'vitastor-etcd-1',
initial_cluster_state: 'new',
initial_cluster: etcds.map(e => `etcd${e.ip.replace(/[^0-9a-z_]/ig, '_')}=${e.scheme}://${e.addr}:2380`).join(','),
snapshot_count: 10000,
max_txn_ops: 100000,
max_request_bytes: 104857600,
auto_compaction_retention: 10,
auto_compaction_mode: 'revision',
};
if (tls)
{
console.log("etcd_address is missing in "+config_path);
process.exit(1);
options['cert_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd.crt';
options['key_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd.key';
if (use_perms)
{
options['client_cert_auth'] = '1';
options['trusted_ca_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/antietcd.crt';
}
options['peer_cert_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd.crt';
options['peer_key_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd.key';
if (use_perms)
{
options['peer_client_cert_auth'] = '1';
options['peer_trusted_ca_file'] = '/etc/vitastor/etcd.crt';
}
}
const etcds = (config.etcd_address instanceof Array ? config.etcd_address : (''+config.etcd_address).split(/,/))
.map(s => (''+s).replace(/^https?:\/\/|(:\d+)?(\/.*)?$/g, '').replace(/^\[(.*)\]$/, '$1').toLowerCase());
const num = select_local_etcd(etcds);
if (num < 0)
let etcd_conf = fs.existsSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf")
? fs.readFileSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf", { encoding: 'utf-8' })
: "";
for (const k in options)
{
console.log('No matching IPs in etcd_address from '+config_path);
process.exit(0);
etcd_conf = replace_env(etcd_conf, 'ETCD_'+k.toUpperCase().replace(/-/, '_'), options[k]);
}
const etcd_url = 'http://' + (etcds[num].indexOf(':') >= 0 ? '['+etcds[num]+']' : etcds[num]);
const etcd_name = 'etcd'+etcds[num].replace(/[^0-9a-z_]/ig, '_');
const etcd_cluster = etcds.map(e => `etcd${e.replace(/[^0-9a-z_]/ig, '_')}=http://${e.indexOf(':') >= 0 ? '['+e+']' : e}:2380`).join(',');
fs.writeFileSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf", etcd_conf);
if (in_docker)
{
let etcd_conf = fs.readFileSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf", { encoding: 'utf-8' });
etcd_conf = replace_env(etcd_conf, 'ETCD_NAME', etcd_name);
etcd_conf = replace_env(etcd_conf, 'ETCD_IP', etcds[num]);
etcd_conf = replace_env(etcd_conf, 'ETCD_INITIAL_CLUSTER', etcd_cluster);
fs.writeFileSync("/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf", etcd_conf);
console.log('etcd for Vitastor configured. Run `systemctl enable --now vitastor-etcd` to start etcd');
process.exit(0);
}
await system(`mkdir -p /var/lib/etcd/vitastor`);
fs.writeFileSync(
"/etc/systemd/system/vitastor-etcd.service",
`[Unit]
"/etc/systemd/system/vitastor-etcd.service", `[Unit]
Description=etcd for vitastor
After=network-online.target local-fs.target time-sync.target
Wants=network-online.target local-fs.target time-sync.target
@@ -83,12 +387,8 @@ Wants=network-online.target local-fs.target time-sync.target
[Service]
Restart=always
Environment=GOGC=50
ExecStart=etcd --name ${etcd_name} --data-dir /var/lib/etcd/vitastor \\
--snapshot-count 10000 --advertise-client-urls ${etcd_url}:2379 --listen-client-urls ${etcd_url}:2379 \\
--initial-advertise-peer-urls ${etcd_url}:2380 --listen-peer-urls ${etcd_url}:2380 \\
--initial-cluster-token vitastor-etcd-1 --initial-cluster ${etcd_cluster} \\
--initial-cluster-state new --max-txn-ops=100000 --max-request-bytes=104857600 \\
--auto-compaction-retention=10 --auto-compaction-mode=revision
EnvironmentFile=/etc/vitastor/etcd.conf
ExecStart=etcd --data-dir /var/lib/etcd/vitastor
WorkingDirectory=/var/lib/etcd/vitastor
ExecStartPre=+chown -R etcd /var/lib/etcd/vitastor
User=etcd
@@ -106,7 +406,11 @@ WantedBy=multi-user.target
// Disable distribution etcd unit and enable our one
await system(`systemctl disable --now etcd`);
await system(`systemctl enable --now vitastor-etcd`);
process.exit(0);
}
async function enable_mon()
{
await system(`systemctl enable --now vitastor-mon`);
}
function replace_env(text, key, value)
@@ -119,16 +423,29 @@ function replace_env(text, key, value)
function select_local_etcd(etcds)
{
const ifaces = os.networkInterfaces();
const local = {};
for (const ifname in ifaces)
{
for (const iface of ifaces[ifname])
for (let i = 0; i < etcds.length; i++)
if (etcds[i] == iface.address.toLowerCase())
return i;
{
const addr = iface.address;
if (iface.family == 'IPv6')
local[addr.toLowerCase()] = local['['+addr.toLowerCase()+']'] = true;
else
local[addr] = true;
}
}
for (let i = 0; i < etcds.length; i++)
{
if (local[etcds[i].addr])
return i;
}
return -1;
}
async function system(cmd)
{
console.log('Running '+cmd);
const cp = child_process.spawn(cmd, { shell: true, stdio: [ 0, 1, 2 ] });
let finish_cb;
cp.on('exit', () => finish_cb && finish_cb());
@@ -136,3 +453,19 @@ async function system(cmd)
await new Promise(ok => finish_cb = ok);
return cp.exitCode;
}
async function make_ca(subj, filename)
{
if (await system("openssl req -days 3650 -x509 -subj '"+subj+"' -addext basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:1"+
" -new -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout "+filename+".key -out "+filename+".crt"))
process.exit(1);
}
async function make_signed(subj, f, ca, san)
{
if (await system(`openssl req -subj '${subj}' ${san ? "-addext 'subjectAltName="+san+"'" : ""} -nodes -new -keyout ${f}.key -out ${f}.csr`))
process.exit(1);
if (await system(`openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -CA ${ca}.crt -CAkey ${ca}.key -CAcreateserial -in ${f}.csr -out ${f}.crt`))
process.exit(1);
fs.unlinkSync(f+".csr");
}
+539
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
// AntiEtcd authentication filter for Vitastor
// (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2026
// License: Mozilla Public License 2.0 or Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
// Permissions are based on:
// 1. Users.
// Stored in /vitastor/config/user/<username>.
// Has 2 properties:
// - type, one of: admin, client.
// admin has full access to all images and also to cluster config.
// client has r/w access to owned images and r/o access to images with reader_group.
// - groups, a list of group names the user is included in.
// 2. Images.
// Stored in /vitastor/config/inode/<pool>/<inode>. Has the following properties:
// - owner (user name)
// - owner_group (group name)
// - reader_group
// 3. Certificates.
// - osd, mon use their own trusted certificates.
const { X509Certificate } = require('node:crypto');
const static_perms = {
invalid: {
keys: {},
prefixes: {},
},
osd: {
keys: { '/pg/config': false },
prefixes: { '/config/': false, '/osd/': true, '/pg/state/': true, '/pg/history/': true, '/pgstats/': true },
},
mon: {
keys: { '/pg/config': true, '/stats': true, '/history/last_clean_pgs': true },
prefixes: {
'/config/': false, '/osd/': false, '/mon/': true, '/pg/history/': true,
'/pgstats/': false, '/inode/stats/': true, '/pool/stats/': true,
},
},
admin: {
keys: { '/stats': false },
prefixes: {
'/config/': true, '/osd/': true, '/index/': true, '/pg/history/': true,
'/mon/': false, '/pg/': false, '/pgstats/': false, '/inode/stats/': false, '/pool/stats/': false,
},
},
client: {
keys: { '/config/global': false, '/config/node_placement': false, '/config/pools': false, '/pg/config': false },
prefixes: { '/osd/state/': false, '/pg/state/': false, '/index/maxid/': false },
},
};
const api_perms = {
osd: { lease_grant: true, lease_revoke: true, lease_keepalive: true, maintenance_status: true },
mon: { lease_grant: true, lease_revoke: true, lease_keepalive: true, maintenance_status: true },
admin: { maintenance_status: true },
client: { maintenance_status: true },
};
class VitastorAuthFilter
{
constructor(antietcd)
{
this.cfg = antietcd.cfg;
this.antietcd = antietcd;
this.prefix = this.cfg.vitastor_prefix || '/vitastor';
this.prefix_parts = this.prefix.split('/');
}
async init()
{
if (!this.cfg.cert || !this.cfg.key || !this.cfg.ca || !this.cfg.osd_ca || !this.cfg.client_cert_auth)
{
throw new Error('Authenticated Vitastor setups require enabled client_cert_auth, cert, key'+
' and separate ca (client CA), osd_ca and optionally mon_ca');
}
this.osd_ca = await this.antietcd.readPEM(this.cfg.osd_ca);
this.osd_ca_obj = new X509Certificate(this.osd_ca);
this.antietcd.tls.ca.push(this.osd_ca);
if (this.cfg.mon_ca)
{
this.mon_ca = await this.antietcd.readPEM(this.cfg.mon_ca);
this.mon_ca_obj = new X509Certificate(this.mon_ca_obj);
this.antietcd.tls.ca.push(this.mon_ca);
}
}
init_context(context, clientCert)
{
let cert = clientCert;
while (cert)
{
if (cert.fingerprint256 == this.osd_ca_obj.fingerprint256)
{
context.user_type = 'osd';
break;
}
if (this.mon_ca_obj && cert.fingerprint256 == this.mon_ca_obj.fingerprint256)
{
context.user_type = 'mon';
break;
}
cert = cert.issuerCertificate;
}
}
_get(path, decode)
{
let cur = this.antietcd.etctree.state;
path = path instanceof Array ? path : path.split('/');
for (const p of path)
{
if (!cur.children)
{
return null;
}
cur = cur.children[p];
if (!cur)
{
return null;
}
}
if (decode)
{
return this._decode(path, cur.value);
}
return cur;
}
_decode(path, cur)
{
if (!cur)
{
return null;
}
if (cur)
{
try
{
cur = JSON.parse(cur);
}
catch (e)
{
console.warn('Invalid JSON in '+(path instanceof Array ? path.join('/') : path)+': '+e);
}
}
return cur;
}
// userInfo: { name: string, type: string, perms: static_perms[type], groups: { [string]: true } }
_check_compare(check, userInfo, checked)
{
let key = String(check.key);
if (key.substr(0, this.prefix.length) !== this.prefix)
{
return false;
}
key = key.substr(this.prefix.length);
if (key in userInfo.perms.keys)
{
return true;
}
for (const pfx in userInfo.perms.prefixes)
{
if (key.substr(0, pfx.length) == pfx)
{
return true;
}
}
if (userInfo.type == 'client')
{
// Image permissions
if (key.substr(0, 14) == '/config/inode/')
{
// Allowed to check that a key does not exist
if (check.target == 'VERSION' && check.version == 0)
{
checked['M'+key] = true;
return true;
}
else if (check.target == 'MOD')
{
const data = this._get(check.key);
if (!data || data.mod_revision != check.mod_revision)
{
// Break check to trigger CAS failure
check.mod_revision = '18446744073709551615'; // UINT64_MAX
return true;
}
const inode = this._decode(check.key, data.value);
if (inode && (inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
checked['M'+key] = true;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/index/image/')
{
// Allowed to check that a key does not exist
if (check.target == 'VERSION' && check.version == 0)
{
checked['M'+key] = true;
return true;
}
else if (check.target == 'MOD')
{
let data = this._get(check.key);
if (!data || data.mod_revision != check.mod_revision)
{
// Break check to trigger CAS failure
check.mod_revision = '18446744073709551615'; // UINT64_MAX
return true;
}
data = this._decode(check.key, data.value);
if (data)
{
const inode = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'inode', data.pool_id, data.id ], true);
if (inode && (inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
checked['M'+key] = true;
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/index/maxid/')
{
const pool_id = key.substr(13);
const pool_cfg = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'pools' ], true);
if (!pool_cfg || !pool_cfg[pool_id] || !pool_cfg[pool_id].creator_group || !userInfo.groups[pool_cfg[pool_id].creator_group])
{
return false;
}
if (check.target == 'VERSION' && check.version == 0)
{
checked['I'+parseInt(key.substr(13))+'_0'] = true;
return true;
}
else if (check.target == 'MOD')
{
const data = this._get(check.key);
if (!data || data.mod_revision != check.mod_revision)
{
// Break check to trigger CAS failure
check.mod_revision = '18446744073709551615'; // UINT64_MAX
return true;
}
checked['I'+parseInt(key.substr(13))+'_'+data.value] = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
}
return false;
}
_check_read(kv, userInfo)
{
let key = String(kv.key);
if (key.substr(0, this.prefix.length) !== this.prefix)
{
return false;
}
key = key.substr(this.prefix.length);
if (key in userInfo.perms.keys)
{
return true;
}
for (const pfx in userInfo.perms.prefixes)
{
if (key.substr(0, pfx.length) == pfx)
{
return true;
}
}
if (userInfo.type == 'client')
{
// Image permissions
if (key.substr(0, 14) == '/config/inode/')
{
const inode = this._decode(kv.key, kv.value);
if (inode && (inode.reader_group && userInfo.groups[inode.reader_group] ||
inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
return true;
}
return false;
}
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/index/image/')
{
const data = this._decode(kv.key, kv.value);
const inode = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'inode', data.pool_id, data.id ], true);
if (inode && (inode.reader_group && userInfo.groups[inode.reader_group] ||
inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
return true;
}
return false;
}
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/inode/stats/')
{
const [ pool_id, id ] = key.substr(13).split('/');
const inode = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'inode', pool_id, id ], true);
if (inode && (inode.reader_group && userInfo.groups[inode.reader_group] ||
inode.owner_group && userInfo.groups[inode.owner_group] ||
inode.owner === userInfo.name))
{
return true;
}
return false;
}
}
return false;
}
_check_write(put, userInfo, checked)
{
let key = String(put.key);
if (key.substr(0, this.prefix.length) !== this.prefix)
{
return false;
}
key = key.substr(this.prefix.length);
if (userInfo.perms.keys[key])
{
return true;
}
for (const pfx in userInfo.perms.prefixes)
{
if (userInfo.perms.prefixes[pfx] && key.substr(0, pfx.length) == pfx)
{
return true;
}
}
if (checked && userInfo.type == 'client')
{
if (key.substr(0, 13) == '/index/maxid/' &&
checked['I'+parseInt(key.substr(13))+'_'+(put.value-1)])
{
// Allowed to increment maxid
return true;
}
if (checked['M'+key])
{
// Allowed to modify known images with CAS checks
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
_check_req(req, userInfo, checked)
{
let r;
if ((r = (req.request_range || req.requestRange)))
{
// All range queries are allowed, but responses are filtered - it's simpler
}
else if ((r = (req.request_put || req.requestPut)))
{
if (!this._check_write(r, userInfo, checked))
return false;
}
else if ((r = (req.request_delete_range || req.requestDeleteRange)))
{
if (!r.range_end || r.range_end === r.key)
{
if (!this._check_write({ key: r.key }, userInfo))
return false;
}
else
{
// All keys in range must satisfy prefix
r.range_end = String(r.range_end);
if (r.key.length != r.range_end.length ||
r.key[r.key.length-1] != '/' ||
r.range_end[r.range_end.length-1] != '0')
{
return false;
}
let key = r.key.substr(this.prefix.length);
let found = false;
for (const pfx in userInfo.perms.prefixes)
{
if (userInfo.perms.prefixes[pfx] && key.substr(0, pfx.length) == pfx)
{
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
_get_user(context)
{
if (context.user_type === 'osd' || context.user_type === 'mon')
{
return {
name: context.user_type,
type: context.user_type,
perms: static_perms[context.user_type],
};
}
if (!context.username)
{
return {};
}
let userInfo = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'user', context.username ], true);
if (!userInfo)
{
userInfo = { type: 'client' };
}
else if (userInfo.type !== 'client' && userInfo.type !== 'admin')
{
userInfo.type = 'client';
}
userInfo.perms = static_perms[userInfo.type] || static_perms['invalid'];
userInfo.name = context.username;
if (userInfo.groups instanceof Array)
{
userInfo.groups = userInfo.groups.reduce((a, c) => { a[c] = true; return a; }, {});
}
else
{
userInfo.groups = {};
}
return userInfo;
}
filter_api(context, api/*, data*/)
{
let type = 'client';
if (context.user_type === 'osd' || context.user_type === 'mon')
{
type = context.user_type;
}
else if (context.username)
{
const userInfo = this._get([ ...this.prefix_parts, 'config', 'user', context.username ], true);
if (userInfo && userInfo.type === 'admin')
{
type = 'admin';
}
}
return api_perms[type] && api_perms[type][api];
}
filter_txn(context, txn)
{
const userInfo = this._get_user(context);
if (!userInfo)
{
return null;
}
const checked = {};
if (txn.compare)
{
for (const check of txn.compare)
{
if (!this._check_compare(check, userInfo, checked))
return null;
}
}
// Special transactions:
// 1. create image: create config/inode and index/image, increment index/maxid/<pool> (with CAS)
// 2. create snapshot: same as create image but also rename previous to @snap
if (txn.success)
{
for (const req of txn.success)
{
if (!this._check_req(req, userInfo, checked))
return null;
}
}
if (txn.failure)
{
for (const req of txn.failure)
{
if (!this._check_req(req, userInfo, null))
return null;
}
}
return txn;
}
filter_txn_response(context, txn, res)
{
if (!res.responses)
{
return;
}
const userInfo = this._get_user(context);
if (!userInfo)
{
for (const resp of res.responses)
{
if (resp.response_range && resp.response_range.kvs)
{
resp.response_range.kvs = [];
}
}
return;
}
for (const resp of res.responses)
{
if (resp.response_range && resp.response_range.kvs)
{
resp.response_range.kvs = resp.response_range.kvs.filter(kv => this._check_read(kv, userInfo));
}
}
}
filter_watch_message(context, msg)
{
if (!msg.result || !msg.result.events)
{
return;
}
const userInfo = this._get_user(context);
if (!userInfo)
{
msg.result.events = [];
return;
}
msg.result.events = msg.result.events.filter(ev => this._check_read(ev.kv, userInfo));
}
}
module.exports = VitastorAuthFilter;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "vitastor",
"version": "3.0.14",
"version": "3.0.15",
"description": "Low-level native bindings to Vitastor client library",
"main": "index.js",
"keywords": [
+45 -10
View File
@@ -366,15 +366,38 @@ sub map_volume
my $prefix = defined $scfg->{vitastor_prefix} ? $scfg->{vitastor_prefix} : 'pve/';
my ($vtype, $img_name, $vmid) = $class->parse_volname($volname);
my $name = $img_name;
my $name = $prefix.$img_name;
$name .= '@'.$snapname if $snapname;
my $mapped = run_cli($scfg, [ 'ls' ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd');
my ($kerneldev) = grep { $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $prefix.$name } keys %$mapped;
return $kerneldev if $kerneldev && -b $kerneldev; # already mapped
my ($kerneldev) = grep {
$mapped->{$_} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $name
} keys %$mapped;
$kerneldev = run_cli($scfg, [ 'map', '--image', $prefix.$name ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd', json => 0);
return $kerneldev;
if ($kerneldev && -b $kerneldev)
{
my $size = `/usr/sbin/blockdev --getsize64 $kerneldev`;
return $kerneldev if $size && $size > 0;
}
my $map_out = run_cli($scfg, [ 'map', '--image', $name ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd', json => 0);
$map_out =~ s/^\s+|\s+$//gso;
# Wait until the device is started
for (my $i = 0; $i < 100; $i++)
{
$mapped = run_cli($scfg, [ 'ls' ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd');
($kerneldev) = grep { $mapped->{$_} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $name } keys %$mapped;
if ($kerneldev && -b $kerneldev)
{
my $size = `/usr/sbin/blockdev --getsize64 $kerneldev`;
return $kerneldev if $size && $size > 0;
}
select(undef, undef, undef, 0.1);
}
die "Failed to map Vitastor image $name via NBD".
($map_out ? ", vitastor-nbd map returned '$map_out'" : "")."\n";
}
sub unmap_volume
@@ -383,13 +406,19 @@ sub unmap_volume
my $prefix = defined $scfg->{vitastor_prefix} ? $scfg->{vitastor_prefix} : 'pve/';
my ($vtype, $name, $vmid) = $class->parse_volname($volname);
$name = $prefix.$name;
$name .= '@'.$snapname if $snapname;
my $mapped = run_cli($scfg, [ 'ls' ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd');
my ($kerneldev) = grep { $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $prefix.$name } keys %$mapped;
if ($kerneldev && -b $kerneldev)
my @kerneldevs = grep {
$mapped->{$_} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} && $mapped->{$_}->{image} eq $name
} keys %$mapped;
for my $kerneldev (@kerneldevs)
{
run_cli($scfg, [ 'unmap', $kerneldev ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd', json => 0);
next if !$kerneldev || !-b $kerneldev;
eval { run_cli($scfg, [ 'unmap', $kerneldev ], binary => '/usr/bin/vitastor-nbd', json => 0); };
warn "Failed to unmap Vitastor image $name from $kerneldev: $@" if $@;
}
return 1;
@@ -405,7 +434,13 @@ sub activate_volume
sub deactivate_volume
{
my ($class, $storeid, $scfg, $volname, $snapname, $cache) = @_;
$class->unmap_volume($storeid, $scfg, $volname, $snapname) if $scfg->{vitastor_nbd};
# Even with vitastor_nbd=0, Proxmox may call map_volume() for special
# volumes like tpmstate0 because swtpm needs a local file/block path.
# Therefore, always try to unmap an existing NBD mapping here.
# unmap_volume() is a no-op if the volume is not currently mapped.
$class->unmap_volume($storeid, $scfg, $volname, $snapname);
return 1;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ from cinder.volume import configuration
from cinder.volume import driver
from cinder.volume import volume_utils
VITASTOR_VERSION = '3.0.14'
VITASTOR_VERSION = '3.0.15'
LOG = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ WORKDIR /root
RUN sed -i 's/enabled=0/enabled=1/' /etc/yum.repos.d/*.repo
RUN dnf -y install epel-release dnf-plugins-core
RUN dnf -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/10/vitastor-release-1.0-1.el10.noarch.rpm
RUN dnf -y install gcc-c++ gperftools-devel fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel isa-l-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel cmake libnl3-devel
RUN dnf -y install gcc-c++ gperftools-devel fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel isa-l-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel cmake libnl3-devel c-ares-devel
RUN dnf download --source fio
RUN rpm --nomd5 -i fio*.src.rpm
RUN cd ~/rpmbuild/SPECS && dnf builddep -y --spec fio.spec
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
Name: vitastor
Version: 3.0.14
Version: 3.0.15
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: Vitastor, a fast software-defined clustered block storage
License: Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
URL: https://vitastor.io/
Source0: vitastor-3.0.14.el10.tar.gz
Source0: vitastor-3.0.15.el10.tar.gz
BuildRequires: gperftools-devel
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ BuildRequires: gf-complete-devel
BuildRequires: rdma-core-devel
BuildRequires: cmake
BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
BuildRequires: c-ares-devel
Requires: vitastor-osd = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-mon = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-client = %{version}-%{release}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ RUN yum -y --enablerepo=extras install centos-release-scl epel-release yum-utils
RUN perl -i -pe 's!mirrorlist=!#mirrorlist=!s; s!#\s*baseurl=http://mirror.centos.org!baseurl=http://vault.centos.org!' /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-SCLo-scl*.repo
RUN yum -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/7/vitastor-release-1.0-1.el7.noarch.rpm
RUN yum -y install devtoolset-9-gcc-c++ devtoolset-9-libatomic-devel gcc make cmake gperftools-devel \
fio rh-nodejs12 jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel libnl3-devel
fio rh-nodejs12 jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel libnl3-devel c-ares-devel
RUN yumdownloader --disablerepo=centos-sclo-rh --source fio
RUN rpm --nomd5 -i fio*.src.rpm
RUN rm -f /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-Media.repo
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
Name: vitastor
Version: 3.0.14
Version: 3.0.15
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: Vitastor, a fast software-defined clustered block storage
License: Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
URL: https://vitastor.io/
Source0: vitastor-3.0.14.el7.tar.gz
Source0: vitastor-3.0.15.el7.tar.gz
BuildRequires: gperftools-devel
BuildRequires: devtoolset-9-gcc-c++
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ BuildRequires: gf-complete-devel
BuildRequires: rdma-core-devel
BuildRequires: cmake3
BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
BuildRequires: c-ares-devel
Requires: vitastor-osd = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-mon = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-client = %{version}-%{release}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ RUN dnf -y install centos-release-advanced-virtualization epel-release dnf-plugi
RUN sed -i 's/^mirrorlist=/#mirrorlist=/; s!#baseurl=.*!baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/centos/8.4.2105/virt/$basearch/$avdir/!; s!^baseurl=.*Source/.*!baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/centos/8.4.2105/virt/Source/advanced-virtualization/!' /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-Advanced-Virtualization.repo
RUN yum -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/8/vitastor-release-1.0-1.el8.noarch.rpm
RUN dnf -y install gcc-toolset-9 gcc-toolset-9-gcc-c++ gperftools-devel \
fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel gf-complete-devel libibverbs-devel libarchive cmake libnl3-devel
fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel gf-complete-devel libibverbs-devel libarchive cmake libnl3-devel c-ares-devel
RUN dnf download --source fio
RUN rpm --nomd5 -i fio*.src.rpm
RUN cd ~/rpmbuild/SPECS && dnf builddep -y --enablerepo=powertools --spec fio.spec
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
Name: vitastor
Version: 3.0.14
Version: 3.0.15
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: Vitastor, a fast software-defined clustered block storage
License: Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
URL: https://vitastor.io/
Source0: vitastor-3.0.14.el8.tar.gz
Source0: vitastor-3.0.15.el8.tar.gz
BuildRequires: gperftools-devel
BuildRequires: gcc-toolset-9-gcc-c++
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ BuildRequires: gf-complete-devel
BuildRequires: rdma-core-devel
BuildRequires: cmake
BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
BuildRequires: c-ares-devel
Requires: vitastor-osd = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-mon = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-client = %{version}-%{release}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ WORKDIR /root
RUN sed -i 's/enabled=0/enabled=1/' /etc/yum.repos.d/*.repo
RUN dnf -y install epel-release dnf-plugins-core
RUN dnf -y install https://vitastor.io/rpms/centos/9/vitastor-release-1.0-1.el9.noarch.rpm
RUN dnf -y install gcc-c++ gperftools-devel fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel libarchive cmake libnl3-devel
RUN dnf -y install gcc-c++ gperftools-devel fio nodejs rpm-build jerasure-devel libisa-l-devel gf-complete-devel rdma-core-devel libarchive cmake libnl3-devel c-ares-devel
RUN dnf download --source fio
RUN rpm --nomd5 -i fio*.src.rpm
RUN cd ~/rpmbuild/SPECS && dnf builddep -y --spec fio.spec
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
Name: vitastor
Version: 3.0.14
Version: 3.0.15
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: Vitastor, a fast software-defined clustered block storage
License: Vitastor Network Public License 1.1
URL: https://vitastor.io/
Source0: vitastor-3.0.14.el9.tar.gz
Source0: vitastor-3.0.15.el9.tar.gz
BuildRequires: gperftools-devel
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ BuildRequires: gf-complete-devel
BuildRequires: rdma-core-devel
BuildRequires: cmake
BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
BuildRequires: c-ares-devel
Requires: vitastor-osd = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-mon = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: vitastor-client = %{version}-%{release}
+11 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ if("${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}" MATCHES "^/usr/local/?$")
endif()
set(ENABLE_COVERAGE false CACHE BOOL "Enable code coverage")
add_definitions(-DVITASTOR_VERSION="3.0.14")
add_definitions(-DVITASTOR_VERSION="3.0.15")
add_definitions(-D_GNU_SOURCE -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -Wall -Wno-sign-compare -Wno-comment -Wno-parentheses -Wno-pointer-arith -fdiagnostics-color=always -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fvisibility=hidden -I ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/src)
add_link_options(-fno-omit-frame-pointer)
if (${WITH_ASAN})
@@ -69,11 +69,21 @@ pkg_check_modules(ISAL libisal)
if (ISAL_LIBRARIES)
add_definitions(-DWITH_ISAL)
endif (ISAL_LIBRARIES)
pkg_check_modules(ISAL_CRYPTO libisal_crypto)
if (ISAL_CRYPTO_LIBRARIES)
add_definitions(-DWITH_ISAL_CRYPTO)
endif (ISAL_CRYPTO_LIBRARIES)
pkg_check_modules(RDMACM librdmacm)
if (RDMACM_LIBRARIES)
add_definitions(-DWITH_RDMACM)
endif (RDMACM_LIBRARIES)
find_package(OpenSSL REQUIRED)
add_definitions(-DWITH_OPENSSL)
pkg_check_modules(CARES REQUIRED libcares)
include_directories(${CARES_INCLUDE_DIRS})
if (${WITH_SYSTEM_LIBURING})
pkg_check_modules(LIBURING REQUIRED liburing>=2.10)
include_directories(${LIBURING_INCLUDE_DIRS})
+5 -1
View File
@@ -83,13 +83,17 @@ void blockstore_disk_t::parse_config(std::map<std::string, std::string> & config
{
data_csum_type = BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_CRC32C;
}
else if (config["data_csum_type"] == "xxh3_32")
{
data_csum_type = BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32;
}
else if (config["data_csum_type"] == "" || config["data_csum_type"] == "none")
{
data_csum_type = BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_NONE;
}
else
{
throw std::runtime_error("data_csum_type="+config["data_csum_type"]+" is unsupported, only \"crc32c\" and \"none\" are supported");
throw std::runtime_error("data_csum_type="+config["data_csum_type"]+" is unsupported, only \"crc32c\", \"xxh3_32\" and \"none\" are supported");
}
csum_block_size = parse_size(config["csum_block_size"]);
discard_on_start = config.find("discard_on_start") != config.end() &&
+1
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#define BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_NONE 0
// Lower byte of checksum type is its length
#define BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_CRC32C 0x104
#define BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32 0x204
#define MOCK_DATA_FD 1000
#define MOCK_META_FD 1001
+106 -30
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include "blockstore_heap.h"
#include "../util/allocator.h"
#include "../util/crc32c.h"
#include "../util/xxh_x86dispatch.h"
#include "../util/malloc_or_die.h"
#define BS_HEAP_FREE_MVCC 1
@@ -65,19 +66,19 @@ uint32_t blockstore_heap_t::get_simple_entry_size()
uint32_t blockstore_heap_t::get_big_entry_size()
{
return sizeof(heap_big_write_t) + dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size*2 +
(!dsk->data_csum_type ? 0 : dsk->data_block_size/dsk->csum_block_size * (dsk->data_csum_type & 0xFF));
(!dsk->csum_block_size ? 0 : dsk->data_block_size/dsk->csum_block_size * (dsk->data_csum_type & 0xFF));
}
uint32_t blockstore_heap_t::get_big_intent_entry_size()
{
return sizeof(heap_big_intent_t) + dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size*2 +
(!dsk->data_csum_type ? 4 : dsk->data_block_size/dsk->csum_block_size * (dsk->data_csum_type & 0xFF));
(!dsk->csum_block_size ? 4 : dsk->data_block_size/dsk->csum_block_size * (dsk->data_csum_type & 0xFF));
}
uint32_t blockstore_heap_t::get_small_entry_size(uint32_t offset, uint32_t len)
{
return sizeof(heap_small_write_t) + dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size +
(!dsk->data_csum_type ? 4 : (dsk->data_csum_type & 0xFF) *
(!dsk->csum_block_size ? 4 : (dsk->data_csum_type & 0xFF) *
((offset+len+dsk->csum_block_size-1)/dsk->csum_block_size - offset/dsk->csum_block_size));
}
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ uint32_t blockstore_heap_t::get_csum_size(heap_entry_t *wr)
uint32_t blockstore_heap_t::get_csum_size(uint32_t entry_type, uint32_t offset, uint32_t len)
{
if (!dsk->data_csum_type)
if (!dsk->csum_block_size)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -217,15 +218,24 @@ void heap_entry_t::set_big_location(blockstore_heap_t *heap, uint64_t location)
big().block_num = location / heap->dsk->data_block_size;
}
uint32_t heap_entry_t::calc_crc32c()
uint32_t heap_entry_t::calc_checksum(blockstore_disk_t *dsk)
{
auto old_crc32c = crc32c;
crc32c = 0;
uint32_t res = ::crc32c(0, (uint8_t*)this, size);
crc32c = old_crc32c;
auto old_checksum = checksum;
checksum = 0;
uint32_t res = 0;
if (dsk->data_csum_type == BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32)
res = (uint32_t)XXH3_64bits(this, size);
else
res = ::crc32c(0, (uint8_t*)this, size);
checksum = old_checksum;
return res;
}
uint32_t heap_entry_t::calc_checksum(blockstore_heap_t *heap)
{
return calc_checksum(heap->dsk);
}
uint64_t blockstore_heap_t::get_pg_id(inode_t inode, uint64_t stripe)
{
uint64_t pg_num = 0;
@@ -380,12 +390,12 @@ corrupted_object:
goto corrupted_object;
}
// Verify crc
uint32_t expected_crc32c = wr->calc_crc32c();
if (wr->crc32c != expected_crc32c)
uint32_t expected_checksum = wr->calc_checksum(this);
if (wr->checksum != expected_checksum)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Error: entry %jx:%jx v%ju l%ju in metadata block %u at %u is corrupt (crc32c mismatch: expected %08x, got %08x). ",
fprintf(stderr, "Error: entry %jx:%jx v%ju l%ju in metadata block %u at %u is corrupt (checksum mismatch: expected %08x, got %08x). ",
wr->inode, wr->stripe, wr->version, wr->lsn,
block_num, block_offset, expected_crc32c, wr->crc32c);
block_num, block_offset, expected_checksum, wr->checksum);
goto corrupted_object;
}
// Verify offset & len
@@ -1083,7 +1093,11 @@ bool blockstore_heap_t::calc_checksums(heap_entry_t *wr, uint8_t *data, bool set
len = wr->big_intent().len;
else
assert(0);
uint32_t real_csum = crc32c(0, data, len);
uint32_t real_csum = 0;
if (dsk->data_csum_type == BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32)
real_csum = (uint32_t)XXH3_64bits(data, len);
else
real_csum = crc32c(0, data, len);
if (set)
{
*wr_csum = real_csum;
@@ -1133,11 +1147,26 @@ static uint32_t crc32c_iter(uint32_t prev_crc, const std::function<uint8_t*(uint
return prev_crc;
}
static void xxh3_iter(XXH3_state_t* xxh3_state, const std::function<uint8_t*(uint32_t start, uint32_t & len)> & next, uint32_t pos, uint32_t size)
{
uint32_t cur_len = 0;
while (size > 0)
{
uint8_t *data = next(pos, cur_len);
assert(data);
cur_len = (cur_len < size ? cur_len : size);
XXH3_64bits_update(xxh3_state, data, cur_len);
pos += cur_len;
size -= cur_len;
}
}
bool blockstore_heap_t::calc_block_checksums(uint32_t *block_csums, uint8_t *bitmap,
uint32_t start, uint32_t end, std::function<uint8_t*(uint32_t start, uint32_t & len)> next,
bool set, std::function<void(uint32_t, uint32_t, uint32_t)> bad_block_cb)
{
bool res = true;
XXH3_state_t* xxh3_state = NULL;
uint32_t pos = start;
uint32_t block_end = (start/dsk->csum_block_size + 1)*dsk->csum_block_size;
uint32_t block_crc = 0;
@@ -1153,43 +1182,90 @@ bool blockstore_heap_t::calc_block_checksums(uint32_t *block_csums, uint8_t *bit
while (pos < end && pos < block_end && !(bitmap[pos/dsk->bitmap_granularity/8] & (1 << ((pos/dsk->bitmap_granularity) % 8))))
pos += dsk->bitmap_granularity;
// zero padding at the beginning or at the end of the block is not counted
if (pos > prev && prev > 0 && pos < block_end)
block_crc = crc32c_pad(block_crc, NULL, 0, pos-prev, 0);
if (pos > prev && prev > blk_start && pos < block_end)
{
if (dsk->data_csum_type == BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32)
{
if (!xxh3_state)
{
xxh3_state = XXH3_createState();
XXH3_64bits_reset(xxh3_state);
}
uint32_t zeropad = pos-prev;
while (zeropad > 0)
{
uint32_t zerolen = zeropad > 4096 ? 4096 : zeropad;
XXH3_64bits_update(xxh3_state, zero_page, zerolen);
zeropad -= zerolen;
}
}
else
block_crc = crc32c_pad(block_crc, NULL, 0, pos-prev, 0);
}
prev = pos;
while (pos < end && pos < block_end && (bitmap[pos/dsk->bitmap_granularity/8] & (1 << ((pos/dsk->bitmap_granularity) % 8))))
pos += dsk->bitmap_granularity;
if (pos > prev)
{
isset = true;
block_crc = crc32c_iter(block_crc, next, prev, pos-prev);
if (dsk->data_csum_type == BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32)
{
if (!xxh3_state)
{
xxh3_state = XXH3_createState();
XXH3_64bits_reset(xxh3_state);
}
xxh3_iter(xxh3_state, next, prev, pos-prev);
}
else
block_crc = crc32c_iter(block_crc, next, prev, pos-prev);
}
prev = pos;
}
}
else
{
block_crc = crc32c_iter(block_crc, next, pos, (end > block_end ? block_end : end)-pos);
if (dsk->data_csum_type == BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32)
{
if (!xxh3_state)
{
xxh3_state = XXH3_createState();
XXH3_64bits_reset(xxh3_state);
}
xxh3_iter(xxh3_state, next, pos, (end > block_end ? block_end : end)-pos);
}
else
block_crc = crc32c_iter(block_crc, next, pos, (end > block_end ? block_end : end)-pos);
pos = (end > block_end ? block_end : end);
isset = true;
}
if (dsk->data_csum_type == BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32 && xxh3_state)
{
block_crc = (uint32_t)XXH3_64bits_digest(xxh3_state);
XXH3_64bits_reset(xxh3_state);
}
if (set)
{
*block_csums = block_crc;
}
else if (isset && block_crc != *block_csums)
{
res = false;
if (bad_block_cb)
{
bad_block_cb(blk_start, *block_csums, block_crc);
res = false;
}
else
return false;
break;
}
block_end += dsk->csum_block_size;
block_crc = 0;
block_csums++;
}
if (dsk->data_csum_type == BLOCKSTORE_CSUM_XXH3_32 && xxh3_state)
{
block_crc = (uint32_t)XXH3_64bits_digest(xxh3_state);
XXH3_freeState(xxh3_state);
xxh3_state = NULL;
}
return res;
}
@@ -1556,7 +1632,7 @@ int blockstore_heap_t::add_entry(uint32_t wr_size, uint32_t *modified_block,
insert_list_items(&li, 1, false);
li->block_num = block_num;
new_wr->size = wr_size;
new_wr->crc32c = new_wr->calc_crc32c();
new_wr->checksum = new_wr->calc_checksum(this);
return 0;
}
@@ -1628,7 +1704,7 @@ int blockstore_heap_t::add_big_write(object_id oid, heap_entry_t *old_head, bool
memset(wr->get_ext_bitmap(this), 0, dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size);
memset(wr->get_int_bitmap(this), 0, dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size);
bitmap_set(wr->get_int_bitmap(this), offset, len, dsk->bitmap_granularity);
if (dsk->data_csum_type)
if (dsk->csum_block_size)
{
memset(wr->get_checksums(this), 0, get_csum_size(wr));
calc_checksums(wr, (uint8_t*)data, true, offset, len);
@@ -1657,7 +1733,7 @@ int blockstore_heap_t::add_redirect_intent(object_id oid, heap_entry_t **obj_ptr
memset(wr->get_ext_bitmap(this), 0, dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size);
memset(wr->get_int_bitmap(this), 0, dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size);
bitmap_set(wr->get_int_bitmap(this), offset, len, dsk->bitmap_granularity);
if (dsk->data_csum_type)
if (dsk->csum_block_size)
memset(wr->get_checksums(this), 0, get_csum_size(wr));
calc_checksums(wr, (uint8_t*)data, true);
*obj_ptr = wr;
@@ -1695,7 +1771,7 @@ int blockstore_heap_t::add_big_intent(object_id oid, heap_entry_t **obj_ptr, uin
memcpy(wr->get_ext_bitmap(this), obj->get_ext_bitmap(this), dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size);
memcpy(wr->get_int_bitmap(this), obj->get_int_bitmap(this), dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size);
bitmap_set(wr->get_int_bitmap(this), offset, len, dsk->bitmap_granularity);
if (dsk->data_csum_type)
if (dsk->csum_block_size)
{
if (checksums)
memcpy(wr->get_checksums(this), checksums, get_csum_size(wr));
@@ -1742,7 +1818,7 @@ int blockstore_heap_t::add_compact(heap_entry_t *obj, uint64_t compact_version,
new_wr->set_big_location(this, compact_location);
memcpy(new_wr->get_int_bitmap(this), new_int_bitmap, dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size);
memcpy(new_wr->get_ext_bitmap(this), new_ext_bitmap, dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size);
if (dsk->data_csum_type && new_csums)
if (dsk->csum_block_size && new_csums)
memcpy(new_wr->get_checksums(this), new_csums, dsk->data_block_size/dsk->csum_block_size*(dsk->data_csum_type & 0xFF));
});
}
@@ -1761,7 +1837,7 @@ int blockstore_heap_t::punch_holes(heap_entry_t *wr, uint8_t *new_bitmap, uint8_
*modified_block = block_num;
memcpy(wr->get_int_bitmap(this), new_bitmap, dsk->clean_entry_bitmap_size);
memcpy(wr->get_checksums(this), new_csums, dsk->data_block_size/dsk->csum_block_size*(dsk->data_csum_type & 0xFF));
wr->crc32c = wr->calc_crc32c();
wr->checksum = wr->calc_checksum(dsk);
return 0;
}
@@ -2300,7 +2376,7 @@ void blockstore_heap_t::use_data(inode_t inode, uint64_t location)
{
auto sh_it = pool_shard_settings.find(INODE_POOL(inode));
if (sh_it != pool_shard_settings.end() && sh_it->second.no_inode_stats)
inode = (INODE_POOL(inode) << POOL_ID_BITS);
inode = INODE_WITH_POOL(INODE_POOL(inode), 0);
assert(!data_alloc->get(location / dsk->data_block_size));
data_alloc->set(location / dsk->data_block_size, true);
inode_space_stats[inode] += dsk->data_block_size;
@@ -2311,7 +2387,7 @@ void blockstore_heap_t::free_data(inode_t inode, uint64_t location)
{
auto sh_it = pool_shard_settings.find(INODE_POOL(inode));
if (sh_it != pool_shard_settings.end() && sh_it->second.no_inode_stats)
inode = (INODE_POOL(inode) << POOL_ID_BITS);
inode = INODE_WITH_POOL(INODE_POOL(inode), 0);
assert(data_alloc->get(location / dsk->data_block_size));
data_alloc->set(location / dsk->data_block_size, false);
auto sp_it = inode_space_stats.find(inode);
+5 -4
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_entry_t
{
uint16_t size;
uint16_t entry_type;
uint32_t crc32c;
uint32_t checksum;
uint64_t lsn;
uint64_t inode;
uint64_t stripe;
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_entry_t
uint32_t *get_checksum(blockstore_heap_t *heap);
uint64_t big_location(blockstore_heap_t *heap);
void set_big_location(blockstore_heap_t *heap, uint64_t location);
uint32_t calc_crc32c();
uint32_t calc_checksum(blockstore_heap_t *heap);
uint32_t calc_checksum(blockstore_disk_t *dsk);
};
struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_small_write_t
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_small_write_t
uint32_t offset;
uint32_t len;
// Also includes 1 bitmap and 1 crc32c after the bitmap if checksums are disabled
// Also includes 1 bitmap and 1 checksum after the bitmap if block checksums are disabled
};
struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_big_write_t
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_big_intent_t
uint32_t offset;
uint32_t len;
// Also includes 2 bitmaps and 1 crc32c if checksums are disabled
// Also includes 2 bitmaps and 1 checksums if block checksums are disabled
};
struct __attribute__((__packed__)) heap_list_item_t
+26 -7
View File
@@ -10,13 +10,18 @@ add_library(vitastor_common STATIC
../../json11/json11.cpp
osd_ops.cpp
pg_states.cpp
msgr_encrypt.cpp
msgr_handshake.cpp
../util/allocator.cpp
../util/addr_util.cpp
../util/timerfd_manager.cpp
../util/str_util.cpp
../util/json_util.cpp
../util/xxh_x86dispatch.c
../util/openssl_util.cpp
)
target_compile_options(vitastor_common PUBLIC -fPIC)
target_link_libraries(vitastor_common ${OPENSSL_LIBRARIES} ${ISAL_CRYPTO_LIBRARIES})
# libvitastor_net.a
set(MSGR_RDMA "")
@@ -34,29 +39,41 @@ add_library(vitastor_net STATIC
msgr_iothread.cpp
msgr_send.cpp
msgr_receive.cpp
msgr_encrypt.cpp
../util/ringloop.cpp
http_client.cpp
${MSGR_RDMA}
${MSGR_RDMACM}
)
target_link_libraries(vitastor_net pthread vitastor_common)
target_link_libraries(vitastor_net pthread vitastor_common ${CARES_LIBRARIES})
target_compile_options(vitastor_net PUBLIC -fPIC)
# libvitastor_client.so
add_library(vitastor_client SHARED
# libvitastor_client_int.a
add_library(vitastor_client_int STATIC
cluster_client.cpp
cluster_client_real.cpp
cluster_client_list.cpp
cluster_client_wb.cpp
vitastor_c.cpp
cluster_client_icache.cpp
)
set_target_properties(vitastor_client PROPERTIES PUBLIC_HEADER "client/vitastor_c.h")
target_link_libraries(vitastor_client
target_link_libraries(vitastor_client_int
vitastor_net
vitastor_cli
${LIBURING_LIBRARIES}
${IBVERBS_LIBRARIES}
${RDMACM_LIBRARIES}
${OPENSSL_LIBRARIES}
${ISAL_CRYPTO_LIBRARIES}
)
target_compile_options(vitastor_client_int PUBLIC -fPIC)
# libvitastor_client.so
add_library(vitastor_client SHARED
vitastor_c.cpp
)
set_target_properties(vitastor_client PROPERTIES PUBLIC_HEADER "client/vitastor_c.h")
target_link_libraries(vitastor_client
vitastor_client_int
)
set_target_properties(vitastor_client PROPERTIES VERSION ${VITASTOR_VERSION} SOVERSION 0)
configure_file(vitastor.pc.in vitastor.pc @ONLY)
@@ -122,10 +139,12 @@ add_executable(test_cluster_client
cluster_client.cpp
cluster_client_list.cpp
cluster_client_wb.cpp
cluster_client_icache.cpp
../test/mock/messenger.cpp
../test/mock/vault.cpp
etcd_state_client_mock.cpp
)
target_link_libraries(test_cluster_client vitastor_common ${LIBURING_LIBRARIES})
target_link_libraries(test_cluster_client vitastor_common ${LIBURING_LIBRARIES} ${OPENSSL_LIBRARIES} ${ISAL_CRYPTO_LIBRARIES})
target_include_directories(test_cluster_client BEFORE PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/src/test/mock)
add_dependencies(build_tests test_cluster_client)
add_test(NAME test_cluster_client COMMAND test_cluster_client)
+116 -70
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ cluster_client_t::cluster_client_t(ring_loop_t *ringloop, timerfd_manager_t *tfd
msgr.stop_client(op->client_id);
delete op;
};
msgr.parse_config(config);
msgr.parse_config(config, true);
st_cli = std::move(st_cli_ptr);
st_cli->on_load_config_hook = [this](json11::Json::object & cfg) { on_load_config_hook(cfg); };
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ cluster_client_t::cluster_client_t(ring_loop_t *ringloop, timerfd_manager_t *tfd
st_cli->on_change_node_placement_hook = [this]() { on_change_node_placement_hook(); };
st_cli->on_load_pgs_hook = [this](bool success) { on_load_pgs_hook(success); };
st_cli->on_reload_hook = [this]() { this->st_cli->load_global_config(); };
st_cli->on_inode_change_hook = [this](uint64_t inode, bool removed) { on_change_inode_hook(inode, removed); };
st_cli->parse_config(config);
st_cli->infinite_start = false;
@@ -70,13 +71,11 @@ cluster_client_t::cluster_client_t(ring_loop_t *ringloop, timerfd_manager_t *tfd
st_cli->infinite_start = config["client_infinite_start"].bool_value();
}
st_cli->load_global_config();
scrap_buffer_size = SCRAP_BUFFER_SIZE;
scrap_buffer = malloc_or_die(scrap_buffer_size);
}
cluster_client_t::~cluster_client_t()
{
vault_destroy();
if (retry_timeout_id >= 0)
{
tfd->clear_timer(retry_timeout_id);
@@ -94,7 +93,6 @@ cluster_client_t::~cluster_client_t()
{
ringloop->unregister_consumer(&consumer);
}
free(scrap_buffer);
delete wb;
wb = NULL;
}
@@ -481,7 +479,9 @@ void cluster_client_t::on_load_config_hook(json11::Json::object & etcd_global_co
self_tree_metrics.clear();
client_hostname = new_hostname;
}
msgr.parse_config(config);
// vault
vault_parse_config();
msgr.parse_config(config, false);
st_cli->parse_config(config);
st_cli->load_pgs();
}
@@ -607,6 +607,9 @@ void cluster_client_t::on_change_pool_config_hook()
pg_counts[pool_item.first] = pool_item.second.real_pg_count;
}
}
inode_cache.clear();
inode_cache_children.clear();
vault_keys.clear();
continue_ops();
}
@@ -673,6 +676,10 @@ bool cluster_client_t::flush()
{
if (!ringloop)
{
if (vault_loading)
{
return false;
}
if (wb->writeback_queue.size())
{
wb->start_writebacks(this, 0);
@@ -695,7 +702,7 @@ bool cluster_client_t::flush()
sync_done = true;
};
execute(sync);
while (!sync_done)
while (!sync_done || vault_loading)
{
ringloop->loop();
if (!sync_done)
@@ -958,10 +965,40 @@ bool cluster_client_t::check_rw(cluster_op_t *op)
{
op->flags |= OP_IMMEDIATE_COMMIT;
}
bool searched = false;
std::shared_ptr<inode_cache_t> icache;
if (op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ || op->opcode == OSD_OP_WRITE)
{
if (!searched)
{
icache = inode_cache_get(op->inode);
searched = true;
}
if (icache && icache->has_parent_loop && op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ)
{
op->retval = -EINVAL;
auto cb = std::move(op->callback);
cb(op);
return false;
}
if (icache && icache->op_enc)
{
// Use shared_ptr aliasing to attach op_enc to the inode cache entry
op->enc = std::shared_ptr<osd_op_enc_t>(icache, icache->op_enc);
}
else
op->enc.reset();
}
else
op->enc.reset();
if ((op->opcode == OSD_OP_WRITE || op->opcode == OSD_OP_DELETE) && !(op->flags & OSD_OP_IGNORE_READONLY))
{
auto ino_it = st_cli->inode_config.find(op->inode);
if (ino_it != st_cli->inode_config.end() && ino_it->second.readonly)
if (!searched)
{
icache = inode_cache_get(op->inode);
searched = true;
}
if (icache && icache->readonly)
{
op->retval = -EROFS;
auto cb = std::move(op->callback);
@@ -972,33 +1009,39 @@ bool cluster_client_t::check_rw(cluster_op_t *op)
op->deoptimise_snapshot = false;
if (enable_writeback && (op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ || op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ_BITMAP || op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ_CHAIN_BITMAP))
{
auto ino_it = st_cli->inode_config.find(op->inode);
if (ino_it != st_cli->inode_config.end())
if (!searched)
{
int chain_size = 0;
while (ino_it != st_cli->inode_config.end() && ino_it->second.parent_id)
icache = inode_cache_get(op->inode);
searched = true;
}
if (icache)
{
for (auto & parent: icache->chain)
{
// Check for loops - FIXME check it in etcd_state_client
if (ino_it->second.parent_id == op->inode ||
chain_size > st_cli->inode_config.size())
{
op->retval = -EINVAL;
auto cb = std::move(op->callback);
cb(op);
return false;
}
if (INODE_POOL(ino_it->second.parent_id) == INODE_POOL(ino_it->first) &&
wb->has_inode(ino_it->second.parent_id))
if (INODE_POOL(parent) == INODE_POOL(op->inode) && wb->has_inode(parent))
{
// Deoptimise reads - we have dirty data for one of the parent layer(s).
op->deoptimise_snapshot = true;
break;
}
chain_size++;
ino_it = st_cli->inode_config.find(ino_it->second.parent_id);
}
}
}
if (icache && icache->err_code)
{
if (icache->err_code == EPERM)
{
op->retval = -EPERM;
auto cb = std::move(op->callback);
cb(op);
return false;
}
else if (icache->err_code == EAGAIN)
{
key_wait_ops.push_back(op);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
@@ -1128,31 +1171,33 @@ resume_2:
}
if (op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ || op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ_CHAIN_BITMAP)
{
// Check parent inode
auto ino_it = st_cli->inode_config.find(op->cur_inode);
// Skip parents from the same pool
int skipped = 0;
while (!op->deoptimise_snapshot &&
ino_it != st_cli->inode_config.end() && ino_it->second.parent_id &&
INODE_POOL(ino_it->second.parent_id) == INODE_POOL(op->cur_inode))
uint64_t next_inode = 0;
auto icache = inode_cache_get(op->cur_inode);
if (icache)
{
// Check for loops - FIXME check it in etcd_state_client
if (ino_it->second.parent_id == op->inode ||
skipped > st_cli->inode_config.size())
if (icache->has_parent_loop)
{
op->retval = -EINVAL;
erase_op(op);
return 1;
}
skipped++;
ino_it = st_cli->inode_config.find(ino_it->second.parent_id);
if (op->deoptimise_snapshot)
{
if (icache->chain.size() > 1)
next_inode = icache->chain[1];
}
else
{
if (icache->other_pool_parent_id)
next_inode = icache->other_pool_parent_id;
}
}
if (ino_it != st_cli->inode_config.end() &&
ino_it->second.parent_id &&
ino_it->second.parent_id != op->inode)
if (next_inode)
{
// Continue reading from the parent inode
op->cur_inode = ino_it->second.parent_id;
icache = inode_cache_get(next_inode);
op->cur_inode = next_inode;
op->enc = (icache && icache->op_enc ? std::shared_ptr<osd_op_enc_t>(icache, icache->op_enc) : nullptr);
op->parts.clear();
op->done_count = 0;
goto resume_0;
@@ -1203,7 +1248,7 @@ resume_2:
return 0;
}
static void add_iov(int size, bool skip, cluster_op_t *op, int &iov_idx, size_t &iov_pos, osd_op_buf_list_t &iov, void *scrap, int scrap_len)
static void add_iov(int size, int skip, cluster_op_t *op, int &iov_idx, size_t &iov_pos, osd_op_buf_list_t &iov)
{
int left = size;
while (left > 0 && iov_idx < op->iov.count)
@@ -1211,7 +1256,7 @@ static void add_iov(int size, bool skip, cluster_op_t *op, int &iov_idx, size_t
int cur_left = op->iov.buf[iov_idx].iov_len - iov_pos;
if (cur_left < left)
{
if (!skip)
if (skip == 0)
{
iov.push_back((uint8_t*)op->iov.buf[iov_idx].iov_base + iov_pos, cur_left);
}
@@ -1221,7 +1266,7 @@ static void add_iov(int size, bool skip, cluster_op_t *op, int &iov_idx, size_t
}
else
{
if (!skip)
if (skip == 0)
{
iov.push_back((uint8_t*)op->iov.buf[iov_idx].iov_base + iov_pos, left);
}
@@ -1230,16 +1275,10 @@ static void add_iov(int size, bool skip, cluster_op_t *op, int &iov_idx, size_t
}
}
assert(left == 0);
if (skip && scrap_len > 0)
if (skip == 1)
{
// All skipped ranges are read into the same useless buffer
left = size;
while (left > 0)
{
int cur_left = scrap_len < left ? scrap_len : left;
iov.push_back(scrap, cur_left);
left -= cur_left;
}
// data read into a NULL buffer will be discarded by messenger
iov.push_back(NULL, size);
}
}
@@ -1259,7 +1298,11 @@ void cluster_client_t::slice_rw(cluster_op_t *op)
// Allocate memory for the bitmap
unsigned object_bitmap_size = ((op->len / pool_cfg.bitmap_granularity + 7) / 8);
object_bitmap_size = (object_bitmap_size < 8 ? 8 : object_bitmap_size);
unsigned bitmap_mem = object_bitmap_size + (pool_cfg.data_block_size / pool_cfg.bitmap_granularity / 8 * pg_data_size) * op->parts.size();
unsigned bitmap_mem = object_bitmap_size +
op->parts.size() * pg_data_size *
(pool_cfg.data_block_size / pool_cfg.bitmap_granularity / 8
// read chain_info - max 4 bytes per block
+ (op->enc ? osd_op_rw_t::chain_info_bytes(op->enc->chain_size)*op->len/pool_cfg.bitmap_granularity : 0));
if (!op->bitmap_buf || op->bitmap_buf_size < bitmap_mem)
{
op->bitmap_buf = realloc_or_die(op->bitmap_buf, bitmap_mem);
@@ -1301,10 +1344,10 @@ void cluster_client_t::slice_rw(cluster_op_t *op)
{
begin = cur;
// Just advance iov_idx & iov_pos
add_iov(cur-prev, true, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov, NULL, 0);
add_iov(cur-prev, 2, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov);
}
else
add_iov(cur-prev, skip_prev, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov, scrap_buffer, scrap_buffer_size);
add_iov(cur-prev, skip_prev ? 1 : 0, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov);
}
skip_prev = skip;
prev = cur;
@@ -1315,11 +1358,11 @@ void cluster_client_t::slice_rw(cluster_op_t *op)
if (skip_prev)
{
// Just advance iov_idx & iov_pos
add_iov(end-prev, true, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov, NULL, 0);
add_iov(end-prev, 2, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov);
end = prev;
}
else
add_iov(cur-prev, skip_prev, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov, scrap_buffer, scrap_buffer_size);
add_iov(cur-prev, skip_prev ? 1 : 0, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov);
if (end == begin)
{
op->done_count++;
@@ -1328,7 +1371,7 @@ void cluster_client_t::slice_rw(cluster_op_t *op)
}
else if (op->opcode != OSD_OP_READ_BITMAP && op->opcode != OSD_OP_READ_CHAIN_BITMAP && op->opcode != OSD_OP_DELETE)
{
add_iov(end-begin, false, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov, NULL, 0);
add_iov(end-begin, 0, op, iov_idx, iov_pos, op->parts[i].iov);
}
op->parts[i].parent = op;
op->parts[i].offset = begin;
@@ -1414,9 +1457,12 @@ int cluster_client_t::try_send(cluster_op_t *op, int i, std::function<void(osd_o
osd_client_t *cl = peer_it->second;
part->flags |= PART_SENT|PART_VALID;
op->inflight_count++;
uint64_t pg_bitmap_size = (pool_cfg.data_block_size / pool_cfg.bitmap_granularity / 8) * (
pool_cfg.scheme == POOL_SCHEME_REPLICATED ? 1 : pool_cfg.pg_size-pool_cfg.parity_chunks
);
uint32_t pg_data_size = (pool_cfg.scheme == POOL_SCHEME_REPLICATED ? 1 : pool_cfg.pg_size-pool_cfg.parity_chunks);
uint64_t pg_bitmap_size = pg_data_size * (pool_cfg.data_block_size / pool_cfg.bitmap_granularity / 8
// read chain_info - max 4 bytes per block
+ (op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ && op->enc
? osd_op_rw_t::chain_info_bytes(op->enc->chain_size)*pool_cfg.data_block_size/pool_cfg.bitmap_granularity
: 0));
uint64_t meta_rev = 0;
if (op->opcode != OSD_OP_READ_BITMAP && op->opcode != OSD_OP_DELETE && !op->deoptimise_snapshot)
{
@@ -1435,6 +1481,7 @@ int cluster_client_t::try_send(cluster_op_t *op, int i, std::function<void(osd_o
.inode = op->cur_inode,
.offset = part->offset,
.len = part->len,
.flags = op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ && op->enc && !op->deoptimise_snapshot ? OSD_OP_RETURN_CHAIN : 0,
.meta_revision = meta_rev,
.version = op->opcode == OSD_OP_WRITE || op->opcode == OSD_OP_DELETE ? op->version : 0,
} },
@@ -1442,6 +1489,7 @@ int cluster_client_t::try_send(cluster_op_t *op, int i, std::function<void(osd_o
? (uint8_t*)op->part_bitmaps + pg_bitmap_size*i : NULL),
.bitmap_len = (unsigned)(op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ || op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ_BITMAP || op->opcode == OSD_OP_READ_CHAIN_BITMAP
? pg_bitmap_size : 0),
.enc = op->enc,
.callback = cb ? cb : [this, part](osd_op_t *op_part)
{
handle_op_part(part);
@@ -1559,6 +1607,9 @@ static inline void mem_or(void *res, const void *r2, unsigned int len)
}
}
// Error priority: others > EPERM > EIO > ENOSPC > ETIMEDOUT > EPIPE
#define ERR_PRIO(e) (((e) == -EPERM ? 5 : ((e) == -EIO ? 4 : ((e) == -ENOSPC ? 3 : ((e) == -ETIMEDOUT ? 2 : ((e) == -EPIPE ? 1 : (!(e) ? 0 : 10)))))))
void cluster_client_t::handle_op_part(cluster_op_part_t *part)
{
cluster_op_t *op = part->parent;
@@ -1567,15 +1618,10 @@ void cluster_client_t::handle_op_part(cluster_op_part_t *part)
{
// Operation failed, retry
part->flags |= PART_ERROR;
if (!op->retval || op->retval == -EPIPE ||
part->op.reply.hdr.retval == -ENOSPC && op->retval == -ETIMEDOUT ||
part->op.reply.hdr.retval == -EIO)
{
// Error priority: EIO > ENOSPC > ETIMEDOUT > EPIPE
if (ERR_PRIO(part->op.reply.hdr.retval) > ERR_PRIO(op->retval))
op->retval = part->op.reply.hdr.retval;
}
uint64_t stop_client_id = 0;
if (op->retval != -EINTR && op->retval != -EIO && op->retval != -ENOSPC)
if (op->retval != -EINTR && op->retval != -EIO && op->retval != -ENOSPC && op->retval != -EPERM)
{
stop_client_id = part->op.client_id;
if (op->retval != -EPIPE || log_level > 0)
+58 -4
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include "messenger.h"
#include "etcd_state_client_http.h"
#include "../util/robin_hood.h"
#define DEFAULT_CLIENT_MAX_DIRTY_BYTES 32*1024*1024
#define DEFAULT_CLIENT_MAX_DIRTY_OPS 1024
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ protected:
cluster_op_t *prev = NULL, *next = NULL;
int prev_wait = 0;
uint64_t flush_id = 0;
std::shared_ptr<osd_op_enc_t> enc;
friend class cluster_client_t;
friend class writeback_cache_t;
};
@@ -80,14 +82,33 @@ struct inode_list_osd_t;
struct inode_list_pg_t;
class writeback_cache_t;
struct inode_cache_t
{
std::vector<inode_t> chain; // only parents from the same pool
uint8_t *key_data = NULL;
osd_op_enc_t *op_enc = NULL;
bool readonly = false;
bool has_parent_loop = false;
inode_t other_pool_parent_id = 0;
int err_code = 0;
~inode_cache_t();
};
struct vault_load_key_t
{
int key_state = 0;
std::string key;
};
// FIXME: Split into public and private interfaces
class __attribute__((visibility("default"))) cluster_client_t
{
timerfd_manager_t *tfd = NULL;
ring_loop_t *ringloop = NULL;
std::map<pool_id_t, uint64_t> pg_counts;
std::map<pool_pg_num_t, osd_num_t> pg_primary;
// config:
// client_max_dirty_* is actually "max unsynced", for the case when immediate_commit is off
uint64_t client_max_dirty_bytes = 0;
uint64_t client_max_dirty_ops = 0;
@@ -99,12 +120,23 @@ class __attribute__((visibility("default"))) cluster_client_t
uint64_t client_max_writeback_iodepth = 0;
std::string conf_hostname;
std::string vault_url;
std::string vault_client_cert;
std::string vault_client_key;
std::string vault_ca;
std::string vault_secret_api_path;
uint64_t vault_timeout_ms = 0;
uint64_t vault_error_timeout_sec = 0;
uint64_t vault_refresh_leeway_sec = 0;
int log_level = 0;
int client_retry_interval = 50; // ms
int client_eio_retry_interval = 1000; // ms
bool client_retry_enospc = true;
int client_wait_up_timeout = 16; // sec (for listings)
// state:
std::string client_hostname;
std::map<std::string, int> self_tree_metrics;
std::map<osd_num_t, int> osd_tree_metrics;
@@ -112,15 +144,28 @@ class __attribute__((visibility("default"))) cluster_client_t
int retry_timeout_id = -1;
int retry_timeout_duration = 0;
std::vector<cluster_op_t*> offline_ops;
std::vector<cluster_op_t*> key_wait_ops;
cluster_op_t *op_queue_head = NULL, *op_queue_tail = NULL;
writeback_cache_t *wb = NULL;
std::set<osd_num_t> dirty_osds;
uint64_t dirty_bytes = 0, dirty_ops = 0;
void *scrap_buffer = NULL;
unsigned scrap_buffer_size = 0;
// inodes require some extra state for read/write, it's stored here.
// moreover, robin_hood access is slightly faster than std::map :)
robin_hood::unordered_flat_map<inode_t, std::shared_ptr<inode_cache_t>> inode_cache;
std::set<std::pair<inode_t, inode_t>> inode_cache_children;
http_context_t *vault_http_ctx = NULL;
http_co_t *vault_http_cli = NULL;
bool vault_loading = false;
std::string vault_token;
bool vault_auth_error = false;
timespec vault_token_expire = {};
std::vector<std::string> vault_key_load_queue;
std::map<std::string, vault_load_key_t> vault_keys;
bool pgs_loaded = false;
std::map<pool_id_t, uint64_t> pg_counts;
ring_consumer_t consumer;
std::vector<std::function<void(void)>> on_ready_hooks;
int list_retry_timeout_id = -1;
@@ -156,6 +201,13 @@ public:
protected:
void continue_ops(int time_passed = 0);
std::shared_ptr<inode_cache_t> inode_cache_get(inode_t ino);
void vault_parse_config();
bool vault_check_token();
void vault_load_keys();
void vault_destroy();
void vault_parse_secret(const std::string & key_id, const std::string & err, json11::Json data);
bool affects_osd(uint64_t inode, uint64_t offset, uint64_t len, osd_num_t osd);
bool affects_pg(uint64_t inode, uint64_t offset, uint64_t len, pool_id_t pool_id, pg_num_t pg_num);
@@ -165,6 +217,7 @@ protected:
void on_change_pg_state_hook(pool_id_t pool_id, pg_num_t pg_num, osd_num_t prev_primary);
void on_change_osd_state_hook(uint64_t peer_osd);
void on_change_node_placement_hook();
void on_change_inode_hook(uint64_t inode, bool removed);
void execute_internal(cluster_op_t *op);
void execute_cas(cluster_op_t *op);
@@ -181,6 +234,7 @@ protected:
void erase_op(cluster_op_t *op);
void calc_wait(cluster_op_t *op);
void inc_wait(uint64_t opcode, uint64_t flags, cluster_op_t *next, int inc);
void continue_lists();
bool continue_listing(inode_list_t *lst);
bool restart_listing(inode_list_t* lst);
+245
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+
// License: VNPL-1.1 or GNU GPL-2.0+ (see README.md for details)
#include <stdexcept>
#include <assert.h>
#include "cluster_client_impl.h"
#include "str_util.h"
inode_cache_t::~inode_cache_t()
{
if (key_data)
{
free(key_data);
key_data = NULL;
op_enc = NULL;
}
}
void cluster_client_t::vault_parse_config()
{
vault_url = config["vault_url"].string_value();
vault_client_cert = config["vault_client_cert"].string_value();
if (vault_client_cert.empty())
vault_client_cert = config["cert"].string_value();
vault_client_key = config["vault_client_key"].string_value();
if (vault_client_key.empty())
vault_client_key = config["pkey"].string_value();
vault_ca = config["vault_ca"].string_value();
vault_secret_api_path = "/v1/secret/";
if (config["vault_secret_api_path"].is_string())
vault_secret_api_path = config["vault_secret_api_path"].string_value();
vault_timeout_ms = config["vault_timeout_ms"].uint64_value();
if (!vault_timeout_ms)
vault_timeout_ms = 5000;
vault_error_timeout_sec = config["vault_error_timeout_sec"].uint64_value();
if (!vault_error_timeout_sec)
vault_error_timeout_sec = 60;
vault_refresh_leeway_sec = config["vault_refresh_leeway_sec"].uint64_value();
if (!vault_refresh_leeway_sec)
vault_refresh_leeway_sec = 60;
}
// FIXME: Rework client API by adding open/close and cache inode information in the "FD" (maybe)
void cluster_client_t::on_change_inode_hook(uint64_t inode, bool removed)
{
std::vector<inode_t> children = { inode };
for (size_t i = 0; i < children.size(); i++)
{
auto it = inode_cache_children.lower_bound(std::make_pair(children[i], (inode_t)0));
while (it != inode_cache_children.end() && it->first == children[i])
{
children.push_back(it->second);
it++;
}
}
for (auto & inode: children)
{
auto it = inode_cache.find(inode);
if (it != inode_cache.end())
{
auto icache = it->second;
for (auto & parent: icache->chain)
{
inode_cache_children.erase(std::make_pair(parent, inode));
}
inode_cache.erase(it);
}
}
}
std::shared_ptr<inode_cache_t> cluster_client_t::inode_cache_get(inode_t ino)
{
auto icache_it = inode_cache.find(ino);
if (icache_it != inode_cache.end())
{
return icache_it->second;
}
// Fill inode cache
auto ino_it = st_cli->inode_config.find(ino);
if (ino_it == st_cli->inode_config.end())
{
inode_cache[ino] = NULL;
return NULL;
}
auto pool_it = st_cli->pool_config.find(INODE_POOL(ino));
if (pool_it == st_cli->pool_config.end())
{
inode_cache[ino] = NULL;
return NULL;
}
auto & inode_cfg = ino_it->second;
auto & pool_cfg = pool_it->second;
std::shared_ptr<inode_cache_t> icache = std::make_shared<inode_cache_t>();
icache->readonly = inode_cfg.readonly;
icache->chain.push_back(ino);
std::vector<inode_config_t*> chain_cfg;
// FIXME: Allow unencrypted read & write when all chain is encrypted with the same key
int enc_key_count = !inode_cfg.enc_key.empty() ? 1 : 0;
if (inode_cfg.parent_id)
{
// Check for loops and cache the chain
robin_hood::unordered_flat_set<inode_t> seen;
seen.insert(ino);
uint64_t parent_id = inode_cfg.parent_id;
while (parent_id)
{
if (seen.find(parent_id) != seen.end())
{
icache->has_parent_loop = true;
break;
}
seen.insert(parent_id);
ino_it = st_cli->inode_config.find(parent_id);
if (INODE_POOL(parent_id) == INODE_POOL(ino))
{
icache->chain.push_back(parent_id);
if (ino_it == st_cli->inode_config.end())
chain_cfg.push_back(NULL);
else
{
chain_cfg.push_back(&ino_it->second);
if (!ino_it->second.enc_key.empty())
enc_key_count++;
}
}
else if (!icache->other_pool_parent_id)
icache->other_pool_parent_id = parent_id;
if (ino_it == st_cli->inode_config.end())
break;
parent_id = ino_it->second.parent_id;
}
}
// Check external keys and wait for loading, if required
if (enc_key_count)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i <= chain_cfg.size(); i++)
{
inode_config_t *cfg = !i ? &inode_cfg : chain_cfg[i-1];
if (cfg && cfg->enc_key.substr(0, strlen(VAULT_KEY_PREFIX)) == VAULT_KEY_PREFIX)
{
auto & ik = vault_keys[inode_cfg.enc_key];
if (ik.key_state == VAULT_KEY_ERROR || vault_url.empty())
{
icache->err_code = EPERM;
enc_key_count = 0;
}
else if (ik.key_state == VAULT_KEY_NOT_LOADED)
{
ik.key_state = VAULT_KEY_LOADING;
vault_key_load_queue.push_back(inode_cfg.enc_key);
vault_load_keys();
icache->err_code = EAGAIN;
enc_key_count = 0;
}
else if (ik.key_state == VAULT_KEY_LOADING)
{
icache->err_code = EAGAIN;
enc_key_count = 0;
}
else
{
assert(ik.key_state == VAULT_KEY_LOADED);
}
}
}
}
// Generate encryption key chain, if applicable
if (enc_key_count)
{
uint8_t *key_data = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(
AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE * enc_key_count +
sizeof(uint8_t*) * icache->chain.size() +
sizeof(osd_op_enc_t)
);
uint8_t **keys = (uint8_t**)(key_data + AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE * enc_key_count);
osd_op_enc_t *enc = (osd_op_enc_t*)((uint8_t*)keys + sizeof(uint8_t*)*icache->chain.size());
size_t key_pos = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i <= chain_cfg.size(); i++)
{
inode_config_t *cfg = !i ? &inode_cfg : chain_cfg[i-1];
if (cfg && !cfg->enc_key.empty())
{
const auto & key = cfg->enc_key.substr(0, strlen(VAULT_KEY_PREFIX)) == VAULT_KEY_PREFIX
? vault_keys.at(cfg->enc_key).key
: cfg->enc_key;
assert(key_pos < AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE * enc_key_count);
assert(key.size() == 2*AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
keys[i] = key_data + key_pos;
fromhexstr(key, AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE, key_data + key_pos);
key_pos += AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE;
}
else
keys[i] = NULL;
}
enc->key_chain = keys;
enc->chain_size = icache->chain.size();
enc->read_chain_bitmap_pos = pool_cfg.data_block_size/pool_cfg.bitmap_granularity/8;
enc->bitmap_granularity = pool_cfg.bitmap_granularity;
icache->key_data = key_data;
icache->op_enc = enc;
}
inode_cache[ino] = icache;
for (auto & parent: icache->chain)
{
if (parent != ino)
inode_cache_children.insert(std::make_pair(parent, ino));
}
return icache;
}
void cluster_client_t::vault_parse_secret(const std::string & key_id, const std::string & err, json11::Json data)
{
vault_loading = false;
auto & k = vault_keys[key_id];
if (err != "")
{
k.key_state = VAULT_KEY_ERROR;
fprintf(stderr, "Vault %s%s%s request failed: %s\n", vault_url.c_str(),
vault_secret_api_path.c_str(), key_id.c_str()+strlen(VAULT_KEY_PREFIX), err.c_str());
}
else
{
auto hexkey = data["data"]["key"].string_value();
if (hexkey.empty() || !ishexstr(hexkey) || hexkey.size() != 2*AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE)
{
k.key_state = VAULT_KEY_ERROR;
fprintf(stderr, "Vault /v1/secret/%s request failed: 'key' is empty or has invalid format\n", key_id.c_str());
}
else
{
k.key_state = VAULT_KEY_LOADED;
k.key = hexkey;
}
}
if (vault_key_load_queue.empty())
{
auto ops = std::move(key_wait_ops);
for (cluster_op_t *op: ops)
inode_cache.erase(op->inode);
for (cluster_op_t *op: ops)
execute_internal(op);
}
else
vault_load_keys();
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
#include "cluster_client.h"
#define SCRAP_BUFFER_SIZE 4*1024*1024
#define PART_SENT 1
#define PART_DONE 2
#define PART_ERROR 4
@@ -18,6 +17,11 @@
#define OP_FLUSH_BUFFER 0x02
#define OP_IMMEDIATE_COMMIT 0x04
#define VAULT_KEY_NOT_LOADED 0
#define VAULT_KEY_LOADING 1
#define VAULT_KEY_LOADED 2
#define VAULT_KEY_ERROR 3
struct cluster_buffer_t
{
uint8_t *buf;
+114
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,124 @@
// License: VNPL-1.1 or GNU GPL-2.0+ (see README.md for details)
#include "cluster_client.h"
#include "cluster_client_impl.h"
#include "etcd_state_client_http.h"
#include "http_client.h"
cluster_client_t* cluster_client_t::create(ring_loop_t *ringloop, timerfd_manager_t *tfd, json11::Json config)
{
auto st_cli = new etcd_state_client_http_t(tfd);
return new cluster_client_t(ringloop, tfd, config, std::unique_ptr<etcd_state_client_t>(st_cli));
}
bool cluster_client_t::vault_check_token()
{
timespec now;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
if (!vault_token_expire.tv_sec || vault_token_expire.tv_sec < now.tv_sec)
{
vault_loading = true;
http_json_post(
vault_http_cli, vault_url+"/v1/auth/cert/login", json11::Json::object{}, "",
(http_options_t){ .timeout = (int)vault_timeout_ms, .keepalive = true },
[this](http_message_t *response)
{
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &vault_token_expire);
vault_loading = false;
std::string err;
json11::Json data;
response->parse_json_response(err, data);
if (err != "")
{
vault_token_expire.tv_sec += vault_error_timeout_sec;
fprintf(stderr, "Vault request failed: %s\n", err.c_str());
}
else
{
uint64_t ttl = data["auth"]["lease_duration"].uint64_value();
vault_token = data["auth"]["client_token"].string_value();
if (vault_token.empty() || !ttl)
{
vault_token_expire.tv_sec += vault_error_timeout_sec;
fprintf(stderr, "No token or lease_duration in Vault response: %s\n", data.dump().c_str());
}
else
{
if (ttl < vault_refresh_leeway_sec)
vault_token_expire.tv_sec += ttl/2;
else
vault_token_expire.tv_sec += ttl - vault_refresh_leeway_sec;
}
}
vault_load_keys();
}
);
return false;
}
if (vault_token.empty())
{
// Auth error happened, mark all loads as failed
for (auto & key_id: vault_key_load_queue)
{
auto & k = vault_keys[key_id];
k.key_state = VAULT_KEY_ERROR;
}
vault_key_load_queue.clear();
auto ops = std::move(key_wait_ops);
for (cluster_op_t *op: ops)
inode_cache.erase(op->inode);
for (cluster_op_t *op: ops)
execute_internal(op);
return false;
}
return true;
}
void cluster_client_t::vault_destroy()
{
if (vault_http_ctx)
{
http_destroy(vault_http_cli);
http_context_destroy(vault_http_ctx);
vault_http_cli = NULL;
vault_http_ctx = NULL;
}
}
void cluster_client_t::vault_load_keys()
{
if (vault_loading || !vault_key_load_queue.size())
{
return;
}
if (!vault_http_ctx)
{
std::string error;
vault_http_ctx = http_context_init(tfd, vault_client_cert, vault_client_key, vault_ca, true, error);
if (!vault_http_ctx)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize HTTP context for Vault: %s\n", error.c_str());
exit(1);
}
vault_http_cli = http_init(vault_http_ctx);
}
if (!vault_check_token())
{
return;
}
std::string key_id = vault_key_load_queue[0];
vault_key_load_queue.erase(vault_key_load_queue.begin());
vault_loading = true;
http_get(
vault_http_cli, vault_url+vault_secret_api_path+key_id.substr(strlen(VAULT_KEY_PREFIX)), "X-Vault-Token: "+vault_token+"\r\n",
(http_options_t){ .timeout = (int)vault_timeout_ms, .keepalive = true },
[this, key_id](http_message_t *response)
{
vault_loading = false;
std::string err;
json11::Json data;
response->parse_json_response(err, data);
vault_parse_secret(key_id, err, data);
}
);
}
+209 -74
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+
// License: VNPL-1.1 or GNU GPL-2.0+ (see README.md for details)
#include <assert.h>
#include "malloc_or_die.h"
#include "osd_ops.h"
#include "msgr_op.h"
#include "pg_states.h"
#include "etcd_state_client.h"
#include "addr_util.h"
#include "str_util.h"
#include "json_util.h"
etcd_state_client_t::~etcd_state_client_t()
{
@@ -51,48 +52,93 @@ std::vector<std::string> etcd_state_client_t::get_addresses()
return addrs;
}
void etcd_state_client_t::add_etcd_url(std::string addr)
std::shared_ptr<user_info_t> etcd_state_client_t::get_user(const std::string & username)
{
if (addr.length() > 0)
auto user_it = user_info.find(username);
if (user_it != user_info.end())
{
return user_it->second;
}
auto inf = std::make_shared<user_info_t>();
inf->name = username;
return inf;
}
bool etcd_state_client_t::check_image_perm(const std::shared_ptr<user_info_t> & user_info, inode_t inode_num, bool write)
{
if (user_info->type == user_type_t::ADMIN)
{
return true;
}
auto cache_it = user_info->perm_cache.find(inode_num);
if (cache_it != user_info->perm_cache.end() &&
cache_it->second.mod_revision == user_perm_cache_revision)
{
return write ? (cache_it->second.perm == user_perm_t::OWNER) : (cache_it->second.perm != user_perm_t::DENY);
}
auto inode_it = inode_config.find(inode_num);
if (inode_it == inode_config.end())
{
return false;
}
// FIXME Implement cache reset after reworking etcd interaction to not keep everything in memory
auto & perm_item = user_info->perm_cache[inode_num];
perm_item.mod_revision = user_perm_cache_revision;
perm_item.perm = (user_info->name == inode_it->second.owner || inode_it->second.owner_group != "" &&
user_info->groups.find(inode_it->second.owner_group) != user_info->groups.end()
? user_perm_t::OWNER : (inode_it->second.reader_group != "" &&
user_info->groups.find(inode_it->second.reader_group) != user_info->groups.end()
? user_perm_t::READER : user_perm_t::DENY));
return write ? (perm_item.perm == user_perm_t::OWNER) : (perm_item.perm != user_perm_t::DENY);
}
void etcd_state_client_t::add_etcd_url(std::string etcd_address)
{
if (etcd_address.size() > 0)
{
if (strtolower(addr.substr(0, 7)) == "http://")
addr = addr.substr(7);
else if (strtolower(addr.substr(0, 8)) == "https://")
{
fprintf(stderr, "HTTPS is unsupported for etcd. Either use plain HTTP or setup a local proxy for etcd interaction\n");
exit(1);
}
if (!local_ips.size())
local_ips = getifaddr_list(std::vector<addr_mask_t>(), true);
std::string check_addr;
int pos = addr.find('/');
int pos2 = addr.find(':');
if (pos2 >= 0)
check_addr = addr.substr(0, pos2);
else if (pos >= 0)
check_addr = addr.substr(0, pos);
else
check_addr = addr;
if (pos == std::string::npos)
addr += "/v3";
bool local = false;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < local_ips.size(); i++)
{
if (local_ips[i] == check_addr)
{
local = true;
break;
}
// Fill local_ips
for (auto & ip: getifaddr_list(std::vector<addr_mask_t>(), true))
local_ips.insert(ip);
}
auto & to = local ? this->etcd_local : this->etcd_addresses;
std::string etcd_api_path;
bool ssl = false;
if (etcd_address.substr(0, 8) == "https://")
{
ssl = true;
etcd_address = etcd_address.substr(8);
}
else if (etcd_address.substr(0, 7) == "http://")
etcd_address = etcd_address.substr(7);
auto pos = etcd_address.find('/');
if (pos != std::string::npos)
{
etcd_api_path = etcd_address.substr(pos);
etcd_address = etcd_address.substr(0, pos);
}
else
etcd_api_path = "/v3";
pos = etcd_address.find(':');
auto check_addr = (pos != std::string::npos ? etcd_address.substr(0, pos) : etcd_address);
bool is_local = local_ips.find(check_addr) != local_ips.end();
auto & to = (is_local ? etcd_local : etcd_addresses);
check_addr = (ssl ? "https://" : "http://") + etcd_address + etcd_api_path;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < to.size(); i++)
{
if (to[i] == addr)
if (to[i] == check_addr)
break;
}
if (i >= to.size())
to.push_back(addr);
{
to.push_back(check_addr);
// Check if it's a domain name
sockaddr_storage ss;
bool is_name = !is_local && !string_to_addr(etcd_address, true, 0, &ss);
auto & to_addr = (is_local ? etcd_local_addr_urls : (is_name ? etcd_name_urls : etcd_nonlocal_addr_urls));
to_addr.push_back((http_url_t){ .ssl = ssl, .addr = etcd_address, .hostname = etcd_address, .path = etcd_api_path });
}
}
}
@@ -100,6 +146,9 @@ void etcd_state_client_t::parse_config(const json11::Json & config)
{
this->etcd_local.clear();
this->etcd_addresses.clear();
this->etcd_local_addr_urls.clear();
this->etcd_nonlocal_addr_urls.clear();
this->etcd_name_urls.clear();
if (config["etcd_address"].is_string())
{
std::string ea = config["etcd_address"].string_value();
@@ -120,6 +169,22 @@ void etcd_state_client_t::parse_config(const json11::Json & config)
add_etcd_url(ea.string_value());
}
}
if (this->etcd_client_cert != "")
{
this->etcd_client_cert = config["etcd_client_cert"].string_value();
this->etcd_client_key = config["etcd_client_key"].string_value();
}
else if (this->osd_num)
{
this->etcd_client_cert = config["osd_cert"].string_value();
this->etcd_client_key = config["osd_pkey"].string_value();
}
else
{
this->etcd_client_cert = config["cert"].string_value();
this->etcd_client_key = config["pkey"].string_value();
}
this->etcd_ca = config["etcd_ca"].string_value();
this->etcd_prefix = config["etcd_prefix"].string_value();
if (this->etcd_prefix == "")
{
@@ -223,12 +288,8 @@ void etcd_state_client_t::load_pgs(std::function<void(const std::string &)> cb)
json11::Json::array txn = {
json11::Json::object {
{ "request_range", json11::Json::object {
{ "key", base64_encode(etcd_prefix+"/config/pools") },
} }
},
json11::Json::object {
{ "request_range", json11::Json::object {
{ "key", base64_encode(etcd_prefix+"/config/pgs") },
{ "key", base64_encode(etcd_prefix+"/config/") },
{ "range_end", base64_encode(etcd_prefix+"/config0") },
} }
},
json11::Json::object {
@@ -236,12 +297,6 @@ void etcd_state_client_t::load_pgs(std::function<void(const std::string &)> cb)
{ "key", base64_encode(etcd_prefix+"/pg/config") },
} }
},
json11::Json::object {
{ "request_range", json11::Json::object {
{ "key", base64_encode(etcd_prefix+"/config/inode/") },
{ "range_end", base64_encode(etcd_prefix+"/config/inode0") },
} }
},
json11::Json::object {
{ "request_range", json11::Json::object {
{ "key", base64_encode(etcd_prefix+"/pg/history/") },
@@ -494,6 +549,8 @@ void etcd_state_client_t::parse_state(const etcd_kv_t & kv)
pc.used_for_app = "fs:"+pc.used_for_app;
else
pc.used_for_app = pool_item.second["used_for_app"].as_string();
// Create group permission
pc.creator_group = pool_item.second["creator_group"].string_value();
// Local Read Configuration
std::string local_reads = pool_item.second["local_reads"].string_value();
if (local_reads == "nearest")
@@ -817,37 +874,15 @@ void etcd_state_client_t::parse_state(const etcd_kv_t & kv)
{
on_inode_change_hook(inode_num, true);
}
if (this->inode_config.find(inode_num) != this->inode_config.end())
{
user_perm_cache_revision = kv.mod_revision;
}
this->inode_config.erase(inode_num);
}
else
{
inode_t parent_inode_num = value["parent_id"].uint64_value();
if (parent_inode_num && !(parent_inode_num >> (64-POOL_ID_BITS)))
{
uint64_t parent_pool_id = value["parent_pool"].uint64_value();
if (!parent_pool_id)
parent_inode_num |= pool_id << (64-POOL_ID_BITS);
else if (parent_pool_id >= POOL_ID_MAX)
{
fprintf(
stderr, "Inode %ju/%ju parent_pool value is invalid, ignoring parent setting\n",
inode_num >> (64-POOL_ID_BITS), inode_num & (((uint64_t)1 << (64-POOL_ID_BITS)) - 1)
);
parent_inode_num = 0;
}
else
parent_inode_num |= parent_pool_id << (64-POOL_ID_BITS);
}
insert_inode_config((inode_config_t){
.num = inode_num,
.name = value["name"].string_value(),
.size = value["size"].uint64_value(),
.parent_id = parent_inode_num,
.readonly = value["readonly"].bool_value(),
.deleted = value["deleted"].bool_value(),
.meta = value["meta"],
.mod_revision = kv.mod_revision,
});
insert_inode_config(deserialize_inode_cfg(inode_num, kv.value, kv.mod_revision));
}
}
}
@@ -858,6 +893,38 @@ void etcd_state_client_t::parse_state(const etcd_kv_t & kv)
if (on_change_node_placement_hook)
on_change_node_placement_hook();
}
else if (key.substr(0, etcd_prefix.length()+13) == etcd_prefix+"/config/user/")
{
// <etcd_prefix>/config/user/<username>
auto name = key.substr(etcd_prefix.length()+13);
auto & inf = user_info[name];
if (!value.is_object())
{
if (inf)
{
inf->type = user_type_t::CLIENT;
inf->groups.clear();
inf->perm_cache.clear();
}
user_info.erase(name);
}
else
{
if (!inf)
{
inf = std::make_shared<user_info_t>();
inf->name = name;
}
inf->type = value["type"] == "admin" ? user_type_t::ADMIN : user_type_t::CLIENT;
inf->groups.clear();
for (auto & group: value["groups"].array_items())
{
if (group.string_value() != "")
inf->groups.insert(group.string_value());
}
inf->perm_cache.clear();
}
}
}
uint32_t etcd_state_client_t::parse_immediate_commit(const std::string & immediate_commit_str, uint32_t default_value)
@@ -880,7 +947,12 @@ uint32_t etcd_state_client_t::parse_scheme(const std::string & scheme)
void etcd_state_client_t::insert_inode_config(const inode_config_t & cfg)
{
this->inode_config[cfg.num] = cfg;
auto & cfg_ref = this->inode_config[cfg.num];
if (cfg_ref.mod_revision != cfg.mod_revision)
{
user_perm_cache_revision = cfg.mod_revision;
}
cfg_ref = cfg;
if (cfg.name != "")
{
this->inode_by_name[cfg.name] = cfg.num;
@@ -936,6 +1008,10 @@ json11::Json::object etcd_state_client_t::serialize_inode_cfg(inode_config_t *cf
new_cfg["parent_pool"] = (uint64_t)INODE_POOL(cfg->parent_id);
new_cfg["parent_id"] = (uint64_t)INODE_NO_POOL(cfg->parent_id);
}
if (!cfg->enc_key.empty())
{
new_cfg["enc_key"] = cfg->enc_key;
}
if (cfg->readonly)
{
new_cfg["readonly"] = true;
@@ -944,6 +1020,18 @@ json11::Json::object etcd_state_client_t::serialize_inode_cfg(inode_config_t *cf
{
new_cfg["deleted"] = true;
}
if (!cfg->owner.empty())
{
new_cfg["owner"] = cfg->owner;
}
if (!cfg->owner_group.empty())
{
new_cfg["owner_group"] = cfg->owner_group;
}
if (!cfg->reader_group.empty())
{
new_cfg["reader_group"] = cfg->reader_group;
}
if (cfg->meta.is_object())
{
new_cfg["meta"] = cfg->meta;
@@ -951,6 +1039,53 @@ json11::Json::object etcd_state_client_t::serialize_inode_cfg(inode_config_t *cf
return new_cfg;
}
inode_config_t etcd_state_client_t::deserialize_inode_cfg(uint64_t inode_num, json11::Json value, uint64_t mod_revision)
{
inode_t parent_inode_num = value["parent_id"].uint64_value();
if (parent_inode_num && !INODE_POOL(parent_inode_num))
{
uint64_t parent_pool_id = value["parent_pool"].uint64_value();
if (!parent_pool_id)
parent_inode_num = INODE_WITH_POOL(INODE_POOL(inode_num), parent_inode_num);
else if (parent_pool_id >= POOL_ID_MAX)
{
fprintf(
stderr, "Inode %u/%ju parent_pool value is invalid, ignoring parent setting\n",
INODE_POOL(inode_num), INODE_NO_POOL(inode_num)
);
parent_inode_num = 0;
}
else
parent_inode_num |= parent_pool_id << (64-POOL_ID_BITS);
}
std::string enc_key;
if (!value["enc_key"].is_null())
{
enc_key = value["enc_key"].string_value();
if (enc_key.substr(0, strlen(VAULT_KEY_PREFIX)) != VAULT_KEY_PREFIX &&
(enc_key.size() != 2*AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE || !ishexstr(enc_key)))
{
enc_key = "";
fprintf(stderr, "Inode %u/%ju has invalid enc_key, should be %u bit hex string or Vault key reference\n",
INODE_POOL(inode_num), INODE_NO_POOL(inode_num), AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
}
}
return (inode_config_t){
.num = inode_num,
.name = value["name"].string_value(),
.size = value["size"].uint64_value(),
.parent_id = parent_inode_num,
.readonly = value["readonly"].bool_value(),
.deleted = value["deleted"].bool_value(),
.enc_key = std::move(enc_key),
.owner = value["owner"].string_value(),
.owner_group = value["owner_group"].string_value(),
.reader_group = value["reader_group"].string_value(),
.meta = value["meta"],
.mod_revision = mod_revision,
};
}
int etcd_state_client_t::address_count()
{
return etcd_addresses.size() + etcd_local.size();
+58 -4
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,12 @@
#pragma once
#include <set>
#include <memory>
#include "json11/json11.hpp"
#include "object_id.h"
#include "timerfd_manager.h"
#include "../util/robin_hood.h"
#define ETCD_CONFIG_WATCH_ID 1
#define ETCD_OSD_STATE_WATCH_ID 2
@@ -19,6 +21,8 @@
#define MAX_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE 128*1024*1024
#define DEFAULT_BITMAP_GRANULARITY 4096
#define VAULT_KEY_PREFIX "vault:"
#ifndef IMMEDIATE_NONE
#define IMMEDIATE_NONE 0
#define IMMEDIATE_SMALL 1
@@ -66,6 +70,7 @@ struct pool_config_t
std::map<pg_num_t, pg_config_t> pg_config;
uint64_t scrub_interval = 0;
std::string used_for_app;
std::string creator_group;
int backfillfull = 0;
int local_reads = 0;
@@ -83,6 +88,9 @@ struct inode_config_t
inode_t parent_id = 0;
bool readonly = false;
bool deleted = false;
std::string enc_key;
// Permissions
std::string owner, owner_group, reader_group;
// Arbitrary metadata
json11::Json meta;
// Change revision of the metadata in etcd
@@ -95,14 +103,49 @@ struct inode_watch_t
inode_config_t cfg = {};
};
struct http_url_t
{
bool ssl;
std::string addr;
std::string hostname;
std::string path;
};
enum class user_type_t
{
CLIENT = 0,
ADMIN = 1,
};
struct user_perm_t
{
enum class perm_type_t: uint8_t;
constexpr static perm_type_t DENY = (perm_type_t)0;
constexpr static perm_type_t READER = (perm_type_t)1;
constexpr static perm_type_t OWNER = (perm_type_t)2;
uint64_t mod_revision = 0;
perm_type_t perm = DENY;
};
struct user_info_t
{
std::string name;
user_type_t type;
robin_hood::unordered_flat_set<std::string> groups;
robin_hood::unordered_flat_map<inode_t, user_perm_t> perm_cache;
};
struct http_co_t;
struct __attribute__((visibility("default"))) etcd_state_client_t
{
protected:
std::vector<std::string> local_ips;
std::vector<std::string> etcd_addresses;
std::set<std::string> local_ips;
std::vector<std::string> etcd_local;
std::vector<std::string> etcd_addresses;
std::vector<http_url_t> etcd_local_addr_urls;
std::vector<http_url_t> etcd_nonlocal_addr_urls;
std::vector<http_url_t> etcd_name_urls;
std::vector<inode_watch_t*> watches;
std::set<osd_num_t> seen_peers;
bool new_pg_config = false;
@@ -121,7 +164,12 @@ public:
uint64_t global_block_size = DEFAULT_BLOCK_SIZE;
uint32_t global_bitmap_granularity = DEFAULT_BITMAP_GRANULARITY;
uint32_t global_immediate_commit = IMMEDIATE_NONE;
uint64_t osd_num = 0;
std::string etcd_prefix;
std::string etcd_client_cert;
std::string etcd_client_key;
std::string etcd_ca;
int log_level = 0;
uint64_t etcd_watch_revision_config = 0;
@@ -132,6 +180,8 @@ public:
std::map<osd_num_t, json11::Json> peer_states;
std::map<inode_t, inode_config_t> inode_config;
std::map<std::string, inode_t> inode_by_name;
robin_hood::unordered_flat_map<std::string, std::shared_ptr<user_info_t>> user_info;
uint64_t user_perm_cache_revision = 0;
json11::Json node_placement;
std::function<void(std::map<std::string, etcd_kv_t> &)> on_change_hook;
@@ -150,13 +200,17 @@ public:
std::function<void(http_co_t *)> on_start_watcher_hook;
json11::Json::object serialize_inode_cfg(inode_config_t *cfg);
inode_config_t deserialize_inode_cfg(uint64_t inode_num, json11::Json value, uint64_t mod_revision);
etcd_kv_t parse_etcd_kv(const json11::Json & kv_json);
std::vector<std::string> get_addresses();
virtual void etcd_call_oneshot(std::string etcd_address, std::string api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) = 0;
virtual void etcd_call(std::string api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) = 0;
std::shared_ptr<user_info_t> get_user(const std::string & username);
bool check_image_perm(const std::shared_ptr<user_info_t> & user_info, inode_t inode_num, bool write);
virtual void etcd_call_oneshot(const std::string & etcd_address, const std::string & api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) = 0;
virtual void etcd_call(const std::string & api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) = 0;
void etcd_txn(json11::Json txn, int timeout, int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback);
void etcd_txn_slow(json11::Json txn, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback);
virtual void etcd_add_watch(json11::Json watch) = 0;
virtual std::string get_username() = 0;
void load_global_config(std::function<void(const std::string &)> cb);
virtual void load_global_config() = 0;
void load_pgs(std::function<void(const std::string &)> cb);
+164 -106
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2019+
// License: VNPL-1.1 or GNU GPL-2.0+ (see README.md for details)
#include <assert.h>
#include "etcd_state_client_http.h"
#include "addr_util.h"
#include "http_client.h"
@@ -16,12 +17,12 @@ etcd_state_client_http_t::~etcd_state_client_http_t()
stop_ws_keepalive();
if (etcd_watch_ws)
{
http_close(etcd_watch_ws);
http_destroy(etcd_watch_ws);
etcd_watch_ws = NULL;
}
if (keepalive_client)
{
http_close(keepalive_client);
http_destroy(keepalive_client);
keepalive_client = NULL;
}
if (load_pgs_timer_id >= 0)
@@ -29,6 +30,11 @@ etcd_state_client_http_t::~etcd_state_client_http_t()
tfd->clear_timer(load_pgs_timer_id);
load_pgs_timer_id = -1;
}
if (http_ctx)
{
http_context_destroy(http_ctx);
http_ctx = NULL;
}
etcd_watches_initialised = -1;
}
@@ -40,55 +46,56 @@ void etcd_state_client_http_t::etcd_add_watch(json11::Json watch)
}
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::etcd_call_oneshot(std::string etcd_address, std::string api, json11::Json payload,
std::string etcd_state_client_http_t::get_username()
{
return http_context_get_ssl_cn(get_http_ctx());
}
http_context_t *etcd_state_client_http_t::get_http_ctx()
{
if (!http_ctx)
{
std::string error;
http_ctx = http_context_init(tfd, etcd_client_cert, etcd_client_key, etcd_ca, true, error);
if (!http_ctx)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize HTTP context: %s\n", error.c_str());
exit(1);
}
}
return http_ctx;
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::etcd_call_oneshot(const std::string & etcd_url, const std::string & api, json11::Json payload,
int timeout, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback)
{
std::string etcd_api_path;
int pos = etcd_address.find('/');
if (pos >= 0)
{
etcd_api_path = etcd_address.substr(pos);
etcd_address = etcd_address.substr(0, pos);
}
std::string req = payload.dump();
req = "POST "+etcd_api_path+api+" HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: "+etcd_address+"\r\n"
"Content-Type: application/json\r\n"
"Content-Length: "+std::to_string(req.size())+"\r\n"
"Connection: close\r\n"
"\r\n"+req;
auto http_cli = http_init(tfd);
auto cb = [http_cli, callback](const http_response_t *response)
auto http_cli = http_init(get_http_ctx());
http_json_post(http_cli, etcd_url+api, payload, "", { .timeout = timeout }, [http_cli, callback](http_message_t *response)
{
std::string err;
json11::Json data;
response->parse_json_response(err, data);
callback(err, data);
http_close(http_cli);
};
http_request(http_cli, etcd_address, req, { .timeout = timeout }, cb);
http_destroy(http_cli);
});
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::etcd_call(std::string api, json11::Json payload, int timeout,
void etcd_state_client_http_t::etcd_call(const std::string & api, json11::Json payload, int timeout,
int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback)
{
if (!etcd_addresses.size() && !etcd_local.size())
pick_next_etcd([=]()
{
fprintf(stderr, "etcd_address is missing in Vitastor configuration\n");
exit(1);
}
pick_next_etcd();
std::string etcd_address = selected_etcd_address;
std::string etcd_api_path;
int pos = etcd_address.find('/');
if (pos >= 0)
{
etcd_api_path = etcd_address.substr(pos);
etcd_address = etcd_address.substr(0, pos);
}
etcd_call_selected(api, payload, timeout, retries, interval, callback);
});
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::etcd_call_selected(const std::string & api, json11::Json payload, int timeout,
int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback)
{
const auto & url = selected_etcd_url;
std::string req = payload.dump();
req = "POST "+etcd_api_path+api+" HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: "+etcd_address+"\r\n"
req = "POST "+url.path+api+" HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: "+url.hostname+"\r\n"
"Content-Type: application/json\r\n"
"Content-Length: "+std::to_string(req.size())+"\r\n"
"Connection: keep-alive\r\n"
@@ -96,15 +103,15 @@ void etcd_state_client_http_t::etcd_call(std::string api, json11::Json payload,
"\r\n"+req;
retries--;
auto cb = [this, api, payload, timeout, retries, interval, callback,
cur_addr = selected_etcd_address](const http_response_t *response)
cur_addr = url.addr](http_message_t *response)
{
std::string err;
json11::Json data;
response->parse_json_response(err, data);
if (err != "")
{
if (cur_addr == selected_etcd_address)
selected_etcd_address = "";
if (cur_addr == selected_etcd_url.addr)
selected_etcd_url = (http_url_t){};
if (retries > 0)
{
if (this->log_level > 0)
@@ -132,10 +139,8 @@ void etcd_state_client_http_t::etcd_call(std::string api, json11::Json payload,
callback(err, data);
};
if (!keepalive_client)
{
keepalive_client = http_init(tfd);
}
http_request(keepalive_client, etcd_address, req, { .timeout = timeout, .keepalive = true }, cb);
keepalive_client = http_init(get_http_ctx());
http_request(keepalive_client, url.addr, req, { .timeout = timeout, .keepalive = true, .ssl = url.ssl }, cb);
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::parse_config(const json11::Json & config)
@@ -149,66 +154,130 @@ void etcd_state_client_http_t::parse_config(const json11::Json & config)
}
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::pick_next_etcd()
{
if (selected_etcd_address != "")
return;
if (addresses_to_try.size() == 0)
{
// Prefer local etcd, if any
for (int i = 0; i < etcd_local.size(); i++)
addresses_to_try.push_back(etcd_local[i]);
std::vector<int> ns;
for (int i = 0; i < etcd_addresses.size(); i++)
ns.push_back(i);
if (!rand_initialized)
{
timespec tv;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &tv);
srand48(tv.tv_sec*1000000000 + tv.tv_nsec);
rand_initialized = true;
}
while (ns.size())
{
int i = lrand48() % ns.size();
addresses_to_try.push_back(etcd_addresses[ns[i]]);
ns.erase(ns.begin()+i, ns.begin()+i+1);
}
}
selected_etcd_address = addresses_to_try[0];
addresses_to_try.erase(addresses_to_try.begin(), addresses_to_try.begin()+1);
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::start_etcd_watcher()
void etcd_state_client_http_t::pick_next_etcd(std::function<void()> cb)
{
if (!etcd_addresses.size() && !etcd_local.size())
{
fprintf(stderr, "etcd_address is missing in Vitastor configuration\n");
exit(1);
}
pick_next_etcd();
std::string etcd_address = selected_etcd_address;
std::string etcd_api_path;
int pos = etcd_address.find('/');
if (pos >= 0)
if (selected_etcd_url.addr != "")
{
etcd_api_path = etcd_address.substr(pos);
etcd_address = etcd_address.substr(0, pos);
cb();
return;
}
if (etcd_urls_to_try.size() != 0)
{
selected_etcd_url = std::move(etcd_urls_to_try[0]);
etcd_urls_to_try.erase(etcd_urls_to_try.begin());
cb();
return;
}
on_resolve_queue.push_back(std::move(cb));
if (on_resolve_queue.size() > 1)
{
// Already resolving
return;
}
assert(!resolve_count);
local_to_try = 0;
for (auto & url: etcd_local_addr_urls)
{
// Prefer local IPs, if any
etcd_urls_to_try.push_back(url);
local_to_try++;
}
for (auto & url: etcd_nonlocal_addr_urls)
{
etcd_urls_to_try.push_back(url);
}
resolve_count++;
for (auto & url: etcd_name_urls)
{
resolve_count++;
http_resolve(get_http_ctx(), url.ssl, url.addr, [this, url](const std::string & error, const std::vector<std::string>& addresses)
{
if (error != "")
fprintf(stderr, "Error resolving %s: %s\n", url.addr.c_str(), error.c_str());
for (auto & addr: addresses)
{
auto url_copy = url;
url_copy.addr = addr;
if (local_ips.find(addr) != local_ips.end())
{
etcd_urls_to_try.insert(etcd_urls_to_try.begin(), std::move(url_copy));
local_to_try++;
}
else
etcd_urls_to_try.push_back(std::move(url_copy));
}
resolve_count--;
if (!resolve_count)
pick_next_etcd_on_resolve();
});
}
resolve_count--;
if (!resolve_count)
{
pick_next_etcd_on_resolve();
}
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::pick_next_etcd_on_resolve()
{
if (!etcd_urls_to_try.size())
{
fprintf(stderr, "None of etcd_address could be resolved\n");
exit(1);
}
if (!rand_initialized)
{
timespec tv;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &tv);
srand48(tv.tv_sec*1000000000 + tv.tv_nsec);
rand_initialized = true;
}
// Shuffle addresses
for (size_t i = etcd_urls_to_try.size()-1; i > local_to_try; i--)
{
size_t j = local_to_try + lrand48() % (i - local_to_try);
if (j != i)
std::swap(etcd_urls_to_try[i], etcd_urls_to_try[j]);
}
selected_etcd_url = std::move(etcd_urls_to_try[0]);
etcd_urls_to_try.erase(etcd_urls_to_try.begin());
auto cbs = std::move(on_resolve_queue);
for (auto cb: cbs)
{
cb();
}
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::start_etcd_watcher()
{
pick_next_etcd([this]()
{
start_etcd_watcher_selected();
});
}
void etcd_state_client_http_t::start_etcd_watcher_selected()
{
const auto & url = selected_etcd_url;
etcd_watches_initialised = 0;
ws_alive = 1;
if (etcd_watch_ws)
{
http_close(etcd_watch_ws);
etcd_watch_ws = NULL;
}
if (this->log_level > 1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Trying to connect to etcd websocket at %s, watch from revision %ju/%ju/%ju\n", etcd_address.c_str(),
fprintf(stderr, "Trying to connect to etcd websocket at %s%s%s (hostname %s), watch from revision %ju/%ju/%ju\n",
url.ssl ? "https://" : "http://", url.addr.c_str(), url.path.c_str(), url.hostname.c_str(),
etcd_watch_revision_config, etcd_watch_revision_osd, etcd_watch_revision_pg);
}
etcd_watch_ws = open_websocket(tfd, etcd_address, etcd_api_path+"/watch", etcd_slow_timeout,
[this, cur_addr = selected_etcd_address](const http_response_t *msg)
if (!etcd_watch_ws)
etcd_watch_ws = http_init(get_http_ctx());
else
http_close(etcd_watch_ws);
open_websocket(etcd_watch_ws, url.addr, url.hostname, url.path+"/watch", { .timeout = etcd_slow_timeout, .ssl = url.ssl },
[this, cur_addr = url.addr](http_message_t *msg)
{
if (msg->body.length())
{
@@ -251,7 +320,6 @@ void etcd_state_client_http_t::start_etcd_watcher()
fprintf(stderr, "Revisions before %ju were compacted by etcd, reloading state\n",
data["result"]["compact_revision"].uint64_value());
http_close(etcd_watch_ws);
etcd_watch_ws = NULL;
etcd_watch_revision_config = etcd_watch_revision_osd = etcd_watch_revision_pg = 0;
on_reload_hook();
}
@@ -296,7 +364,7 @@ void etcd_state_client_http_t::start_etcd_watcher()
etcd_watch_revision_pg = watch_rev;
else if (watch_id == ETCD_OSD_STATE_WATCH_ID)
etcd_watch_revision_osd = watch_rev;
addresses_to_try.clear();
etcd_urls_to_try.clear();
}
// First gather all changes into a hash to remove multiple overwrites
std::map<std::string, etcd_kv_t> changes;
@@ -326,13 +394,8 @@ void etcd_state_client_http_t::start_etcd_watcher()
if (msg->eof)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Disconnected from etcd %s\n", cur_addr.c_str());
if (cur_addr == selected_etcd_address)
selected_etcd_address = "";
if (etcd_watch_ws)
{
http_close(etcd_watch_ws);
etcd_watch_ws = NULL;
}
if (cur_addr == selected_etcd_url.addr)
selected_etcd_url = (http_url_t){};
if (etcd_watches_initialised == 0)
{
// Connection not established, retry in <etcd_quick_timeout>
@@ -407,12 +470,7 @@ void etcd_state_client_http_t::start_ws_keepalive()
{
if (this->log_level > 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Websocket ping failed, disconnecting from etcd %s\n", selected_etcd_address.c_str());
}
if (etcd_watch_ws)
{
http_close(etcd_watch_ws);
etcd_watch_ws = NULL;
fprintf(stderr, "Websocket ping failed, disconnecting from etcd %s\n", selected_etcd_url.addr.c_str());
}
start_etcd_watcher();
}
+20 -6
View File
@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@
#include "etcd_state_client.h"
struct http_context_t;
struct __attribute__((visibility("default"))) etcd_state_client_http_t: public etcd_state_client_t
{
protected:
timerfd_manager_t *tfd = NULL;
std::string selected_etcd_address;
std::vector<std::string> addresses_to_try;
int ws_keepalive_timer = -1;
int ws_alive = 0;
bool rand_initialized = false;
@@ -18,17 +18,31 @@ protected:
timespec etcd_last_reload = {};
int load_pgs_timer_id = -1;
http_co_t *keepalive_client = NULL;
http_co_t *etcd_watch_ws = NULL;
http_context_t *http_ctx = NULL;
size_t local_to_try = 0;
std::vector<http_url_t> etcd_urls_to_try;
http_url_t selected_etcd_url;
size_t resolve_count = 0;
std::vector<std::function<void()>> on_resolve_queue;
void pick_next_etcd();
void pick_next_etcd(std::function<void()> cb);
void pick_next_etcd_on_resolve();
void start_etcd_watcher();
void start_etcd_watcher_selected();
void stop_ws_keepalive();
void start_ws_keepalive();
http_context_t *get_http_ctx();
public:
http_co_t *etcd_watch_ws = NULL;
etcd_state_client_http_t(timerfd_manager_t *tfd);
void etcd_call_oneshot(std::string etcd_address, std::string api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) override;
void etcd_call(std::string api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) override;
void etcd_call_oneshot(const std::string & etcd_url, const std::string & api, json11::Json payload,
int timeout, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) override;
void etcd_call(const std::string & api, json11::Json payload, int timeout,
int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) override;
void etcd_call_selected(const std::string & api, json11::Json payload, int timeout,
int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback);
void etcd_add_watch(json11::Json watch) override;
std::string get_username() override;
void load_global_config() override;
void load_pgs() override;
void parse_config(const json11::Json & config) override;
+7 -2
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,12 @@ void etcd_state_client_mock_t::etcd_add_watch(json11::Json watch)
{
}
void etcd_state_client_mock_t::etcd_call_oneshot(std::string etcd_address, std::string api, json11::Json payload,
std::string etcd_state_client_mock_t::get_username()
{
return username;
}
void etcd_state_client_mock_t::etcd_call_oneshot(const std::string & etcd_address, const std::string & api, json11::Json payload,
int timeout, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback)
{
}
@@ -43,7 +48,7 @@ void etcd_state_client_mock_t::set(const std::string& key, json11::Json data, ui
this->data[key] = (etcd_mock_key_data_t){ .value = data.dump(), .mod_revision = mod_revision, .lease_id = lease_id };
}
void etcd_state_client_mock_t::etcd_call(std::string api, json11::Json payload, int timeout,
void etcd_state_client_mock_t::etcd_call(const std::string & api, json11::Json payload, int timeout,
int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback)
{
if (paused)
+4 -2
View File
@@ -30,13 +30,15 @@ struct etcd_state_client_mock_t: public etcd_state_client_t
public:
std::map<uint64_t, uint64_t> leases;
std::map<std::string, etcd_mock_key_data_t> data;
std::string username;
etcd_state_client_mock_t();
void set(const std::string& key, json11::Json data, uint64_t mod_revision = 0, uint64_t lease_id = 0);
void pause();
void resume();
void etcd_call_oneshot(std::string etcd_address, std::string api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) override;
void etcd_call(std::string api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) override;
void etcd_call_oneshot(const std::string & etcd_address, const std::string & api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) override;
void etcd_call(const std::string & api, json11::Json payload, int timeout, int retries, int interval, std::function<void(std::string, json11::Json)> callback) override;
void etcd_add_watch(json11::Json watch) override;
std::string get_username() override;
void load_global_config() override;
void load_pgs() override;
};
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+26 -5
View File
@@ -17,14 +17,19 @@
class timerfd_manager_t;
#pragma GCC visibility push(default)
struct http_options_t
{
int timeout;
bool want_streaming;
bool keepalive;
bool ssl;
};
struct http_response_t
struct http_context_t;
struct http_message_t
{
std::string error;
@@ -41,10 +46,26 @@ struct http_response_t
// Opened websocket or keepalive HTTP connection
struct http_co_t;
http_co_t* http_init(timerfd_manager_t *tfd);
http_co_t* open_websocket(timerfd_manager_t *tfd, const std::string & host, const std::string & path,
int timeout, std::function<void(const http_response_t *msg)> on_message);
http_context_t* http_context_init(timerfd_manager_t *tfd, const std::string & ssl_cert, const std::string & ssl_key,
const std::string & ssl_ca, bool verify_peer, std::string & error);
std::string http_context_get_ssl_cn(http_context_t *ctx);
void http_resolve(http_context_t *ctx, bool ssl, std::string host,
std::function<void(const std::string & error, const std::vector<std::string> & addrs)> cb);
void http_context_destroy(http_context_t *ctx);
http_co_t* http_init(http_context_t *ctx = NULL);
void open_websocket(http_co_t *handler, const std::string & addr, const std::string & hostname, const std::string & path,
const http_options_t & options, std::function<void(http_message_t *msg)> on_message);
void http_request(http_co_t *handler, const std::string & host, const std::string & request,
const http_options_t & options, std::function<void(const http_response_t *response)> response_callback);
const http_options_t & options, std::function<void(http_message_t *response)> response_callback);
void http_get(http_co_t *handler, const std::string & url, const std::string & headers,
const http_options_t & options, std::function<void(http_message_t *response)> response_callback);
void http_json_post(http_co_t *handler, const std::string & url, json11::Json body, const std::string & headers,
const http_options_t & options, std::function<void(http_message_t *response)> response_callback);
void http_post_message(http_co_t *handler, uint8_t type, const std::string & msg);
void http_serve(http_co_t *handler, int peer_fd, const http_options_t & options,
std::function<void(http_message_t *msg)> request_callback);
void http_reply(http_co_t *handler, const std::string & reply);
void http_close(http_co_t *co);
void http_destroy(http_co_t *co);
#pragma GCC visibility pop
+111 -24
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <stdexcept>
#include "addr_util.h"
#include "str_util.h"
#include "messenger.h"
#ifdef WITH_RDMA
#include "msgr_rdma.h"
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
void osd_messenger_t::init()
{
init_tls();
#ifdef WITH_RDMACM
if (use_rdmacm)
{
@@ -184,10 +186,67 @@ osd_messenger_t::~osd_messenger_t()
rdmacm_evch = NULL;
}
#endif
for (auto encrypt_ctx: encrypt_xts_pool)
{
destroy_aes_xts_encrypt(encrypt_ctx);
}
for (auto decrypt_ctx: decrypt_xts_pool)
{
destroy_aes_xts_decrypt(decrypt_ctx);
}
destroy_tls();
}
void osd_messenger_t::parse_config(const json11::Json & config)
static int parse_proto_checksums(const json11::Json & val, int default_value)
{
if (val.is_string())
{
const auto & str = val.string_value();
if (str == "full")
return MSGR_CSUM_FULL;
else if (str == "payload")
return MSGR_CSUM_PAYLOAD;
else if (str == "gcm")
return MSGR_CSUM_GCM;
else if (str == "none")
return 0;
else if (str == "")
return default_value;
}
else if (val.is_null())
return default_value;
fprintf(stderr, "proto_checksums should be \"full\", \"payload\", \"gcm\", \"none\""
", \"\" or null (default), but it is: %s\n", val.dump().c_str());
exit(1);
}
void osd_messenger_t::parse_config(const json11::Json & config, bool init)
{
this->max_cipher_pool_size = config["max_cipher_pool_size"].uint64_value();
if (!this->max_cipher_pool_size)
this->max_cipher_pool_size = 256;
this->receive_buffer_size = (uint32_t)config["tcp_header_buffer_size"].uint64_value();
if (!this->receive_buffer_size || this->receive_buffer_size > 1024*1024*1024)
this->receive_buffer_size = 65536;
this->min_zerocopy_send_size = config["min_zerocopy_send_size"].is_null()
? DEFAULT_MIN_ZEROCOPY_SEND_SIZE
: (int)config["min_zerocopy_send_size"].int64_value();
this->peer_connect_interval = config["peer_connect_interval"].uint64_value();
if (!this->peer_connect_interval)
this->peer_connect_interval = 5;
this->peer_connect_timeout = config["peer_connect_timeout"].uint64_value();
if (!this->peer_connect_timeout)
this->peer_connect_timeout = 5;
this->osd_idle_timeout = config["osd_idle_timeout"].uint64_value();
if (!this->osd_idle_timeout)
this->osd_idle_timeout = 5;
this->osd_ping_timeout = config["osd_ping_timeout"].uint64_value();
if (!this->osd_ping_timeout)
this->osd_ping_timeout = 5;
this->log_level = config["log_level"].uint64_value();
// All other parameters are only set on init
if (!init)
return;
#ifdef WITH_RDMA
if (!config["use_rdma"].is_null())
{
@@ -218,31 +277,27 @@ void osd_messenger_t::parse_config(const json11::Json & config)
if (!this->rdma_max_msg || this->rdma_max_msg > 128*1024*1024)
this->rdma_max_msg = 129*1024;
#endif
if (!osd_num)
{
tls_cert = config["cert"].string_value();
tls_key = config["pkey"].string_value();
osd_tls_ca = config["osd_ca"].string_value();
}
else
{
tls_cert = config["osd_cert"].string_value();
tls_key = config["osd_pkey"].string_value();
osd_tls_ca = config["osd_ca"].string_value();
client_tls_ca = config["client_ca"].string_value();
}
this->use_proto_checksums = parse_proto_checksums(config["proto_checksums"], MSGR_CSUM_PAYLOAD);
this->force_proto_checksums = parse_proto_checksums(config["force_proto_checksums"], tls_cert != "" ? MSGR_CSUM_PAYLOAD : 0);
if (!osd_num)
this->iothread_count = (uint32_t)config["client_iothread_count"].uint64_value();
else
this->iothread_count = (uint32_t)config["osd_iothread_count"].uint64_value();
this->receive_buffer_size = (uint32_t)config["tcp_header_buffer_size"].uint64_value();
if (!this->receive_buffer_size || this->receive_buffer_size > 1024*1024*1024)
this->receive_buffer_size = 65536;
this->use_sync_send_recv = config["use_sync_send_recv"].bool_value() ||
config["use_sync_send_recv"].uint64_value();
this->min_zerocopy_send_size = config["min_zerocopy_send_size"].is_null()
? DEFAULT_MIN_ZEROCOPY_SEND_SIZE
: (int)config["min_zerocopy_send_size"].int64_value();
this->peer_connect_interval = config["peer_connect_interval"].uint64_value();
if (!this->peer_connect_interval)
this->peer_connect_interval = 5;
this->peer_connect_timeout = config["peer_connect_timeout"].uint64_value();
if (!this->peer_connect_timeout)
this->peer_connect_timeout = 5;
this->osd_idle_timeout = config["osd_idle_timeout"].uint64_value();
if (!this->osd_idle_timeout)
this->osd_idle_timeout = 5;
this->osd_ping_timeout = config["osd_ping_timeout"].uint64_value();
if (!this->osd_ping_timeout)
this->osd_ping_timeout = 5;
this->log_level = config["log_level"].uint64_value();
config["use_sync_send_recv"].uint64_value() || !ringloop;
// OSD public & cluster networks
this->osd_networks.clear();
if (config["osd_network"].is_string())
@@ -399,7 +454,7 @@ void osd_messenger_t::try_connect_peer_tcp(osd_num_t peer_osd, const char *peer_
cl->peer_state = PEER_CONNECTING;
cl->connect_timeout_id = -1;
cl->osd_num = peer_osd;
cl->in_buf = malloc_or_die(receive_buffer_size);
cl->in_buf = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(receive_buffer_size);
clients[client_id] = cl;
clients_by_fd[peer_fd] = cl;
tfd->set_fd_handler(peer_fd, true, [this](int peer_fd, int epoll_events)
@@ -448,6 +503,7 @@ void osd_messenger_t::handle_connect_epoll(int peer_fd)
handle_peer_epoll(peer_fd, epoll_events);
});
// Check OSD number
init_tls_client(cl);
check_peer_config(cl);
}
@@ -537,7 +593,12 @@ void osd_messenger_t::check_peer_config(osd_client_t *cl)
// Inform that we're OSD <osd_num>
payload["osd_num"] = osd_num;
}
payload["features"] = json11::Json::object{ { "check_sequencing", true } };
auto features = json11::Json::object{ { "check_sequencing", true } };
if (use_proto_checksums)
{
features["proto_checksums"] = use_proto_checksums;
}
payload["features"] = features;
#ifdef WITH_RDMA
if (!use_rdmacm && rdma_contexts.size())
{
@@ -577,6 +638,11 @@ void osd_messenger_t::check_peer_config(osd_client_t *cl)
err = true;
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get config from OSD %ju (retval=%jd), disconnecting peer\n", cl->osd_num, op->reply.hdr.retval);
}
else if (cl->gcm_enabled && !cl->hs_result.peer_is_osd)
{
err = true;
fprintf(stderr, "Client %ju is not authenticated as an OSD, disconnecting peer\n", cl->client_id);
}
else
{
config = json11::Json::parse(std::string((char*)op->buf), json_err);
@@ -604,6 +670,21 @@ void osd_messenger_t::check_peer_config(osd_client_t *cl)
err = !check_config_hook(cl, config);
}
}
if (!err && use_proto_checksums)
{
auto peer_csums = config["features"]["proto_checksums"].uint64_value();
if (peer_csums == MSGR_CSUM_GCM && use_proto_checksums == MSGR_CSUM_GCM && cl->gcm_enabled)
cl->proto_csum_status = MSGR_CSUM_GCM;
else if (peer_csums == MSGR_CSUM_FULL && use_proto_checksums == MSGR_CSUM_FULL)
cl->proto_csum_status = MSGR_CSUM_FULL;
else if (peer_csums && use_proto_checksums)
cl->proto_csum_status = MSGR_CSUM_PAYLOAD;
if (cl->proto_csum_status < force_proto_checksums)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Error: OSD %ju use_proto_checksums security level is lower than force_proto_checksums\n", cl->osd_num);
err = true;
}
}
if (err)
{
osd_num_t peer_osd = cl->osd_num;
@@ -675,7 +756,8 @@ void osd_messenger_t::accept_connections(int listen_fd)
cl->peer_port = ntohs(((sockaddr_in*)&addr)->sin_port);
cl->peer_fd = peer_fd;
cl->peer_state = PEER_CONNECTED;
cl->in_buf = malloc_or_die(receive_buffer_size);
cl->in_buf = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(receive_buffer_size);
init_tls_client(cl);
// Add FD to epoll
tfd->set_fd_handler(peer_fd, false, [this](int peer_fd, int epoll_events)
{
@@ -718,6 +800,11 @@ bool osd_messenger_t::is_use_rdmacm()
}
#endif
bool osd_messenger_t::is_encryption_enabled()
{
return tls_cert != "" || tls_key != "" || osd_tls_ca != "";
}
json11::Json::object osd_messenger_t::read_config(const json11::Json & config)
{
json11::Json::object file_config;
+122 -15
View File
@@ -12,12 +12,20 @@
#include <deque>
#include <vector>
#include <openssl/types.h>
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
#include <isa-l_crypto/aes_gcm.h>
#endif
#include "../util/xxh_x86dispatch.h"
#include "../util/robin_hood.h"
#include "malloc_or_die.h"
#include "json11/json11.hpp"
#include "msgr_op.h"
#include "timerfd_manager.h"
#include "addr_util.h"
#include "msgr_handshake.h"
#include <ringloop.h>
#define CL_READ_HDR 1
@@ -31,12 +39,17 @@
#define PEER_RDMA 4
#define PEER_STOPPED 5
#define MSGR_CSUM_PAYLOAD 1
#define MSGR_CSUM_FULL 2
#define MSGR_CSUM_GCM 4
#define MSGR_CSUM_NEG 8
#define VITASTOR_CONFIG_PATH "/etc/vitastor/vitastor.conf"
#define DEFAULT_MIN_ZEROCOPY_SEND_SIZE 32*1024
#define MSGR_SENDP_HDR 1
#define MSGR_SENDP_FREE 2
#define AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE 32
#define AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE 12
#define MAX_SIMPLE_PAYLOAD_SIZE 1048576
@@ -51,6 +64,13 @@ struct msgr_rdma_connection_t;
struct msgr_rdma_context_t;
#endif
struct op_aes_xts_encrypt_t;
struct op_aes_xts_decrypt_t;
void destroy_aes_xts_encrypt(op_aes_xts_encrypt_t *encrypt_ctx);
void destroy_aes_xts_decrypt(op_aes_xts_decrypt_t *decrypt_ctx);
struct user_info_t;
struct osd_client_t
{
uint64_t client_id = 0;
@@ -67,23 +87,49 @@ struct osd_client_t
osd_num_t in_osd_num = 0;
bool is_incoming = false;
void *in_buf = NULL;
uint8_t *in_buf = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_RDMA
msgr_rdma_connection_t *rdma_conn = NULL;
#endif
bool gcm_enabled = false;
msgr_handshake_i *hs = NULL;
msgr_handshake_result_t hs_result;
std::shared_ptr<user_info_t> user_info;
std::vector<uint8_t> my_key, peer_key;
uint64_t my_iv_ctr = 0, peer_iv_ctr = 0;
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
isal_gcm_key_data my_key_isal, peer_key_isal;
isal_gcm_context_data *enc_ctx = NULL;
isal_gcm_context_data *dec_ctx = NULL;
#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_ctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dec_ctx = NULL;
#endif
uint8_t enc_tag[16];
size_t enc_tag_size = 0;
uint8_t dec_tag[16];
size_t dec_tag_size = 0;
// Read state
bool io_error = false;
int read_ready = 0;
osd_op_t *read_op = NULL;
size_t read_op_size = 0;
size_t read_op_pos = 0;
iovec read_iov = { 0 };
msghdr read_msg = { 0 };
int read_remaining = 0;
int read_state = 0;
osd_op_buf_list_t recv_list;
std::vector<iovec> recv_list;
std::vector<int> recv_flags;
uint64_t read_op_id = 1;
bool check_sequencing = false;
bool enable_pg_locks = false;
op_aes_xts_decrypt_t *xts_dec_ctx = NULL;
size_t read_op_inline_decrypt_pos = 0;
size_t read_op_inline_decrypt_in = 0;
int proto_csum_status = 0;
XXH3_state_t* read_csum_state = NULL;
// Incoming operations
std::vector<osd_op_t*> received_ops;
@@ -96,11 +142,17 @@ struct osd_client_t
std::set<pool_pg_num_t> dirty_pgs;
// Write state
std::deque<osd_op_t *> write_ops;
osd_op_t *write_op = NULL;
size_t write_op_pos = 0;
msghdr write_msg = { 0 };
int write_state = 0;
std::vector<iovec> send_list, next_send_list;
std::vector<msgr_sendp_t> outbox, next_outbox;
std::vector<iovec> send_list;
size_t send_list_size = 0;
std::deque<osd_op_t*> send_free_ops;
std::vector<osd_op_t*> zc_free_list;
op_aes_xts_encrypt_t *xts_enc_ctx = NULL;
XXH3_state_t* write_csum_state = NULL;
~osd_client_t();
void cancel_ops();
@@ -142,9 +194,19 @@ struct osd_messenger_t;
struct rdmacm_connecting_t;
#endif
class msgr_op_reader_t;
class msgr_op_writer_t;
struct __attribute__((visibility("default"))) osd_messenger_t
{
protected:
friend class copy_op_reader_t;
friend class gcm_op_reader_t;
friend class get_op_reader_t;
friend class copy_op_writer_t;
friend class gcm_op_writer_t;
friend class get_op_writer_t;
int keepalive_timer_id = -1;
uint32_t receive_buffer_size = 0;
@@ -156,6 +218,12 @@ protected:
bool use_sync_send_recv = false;
int min_zerocopy_send_size = DEFAULT_MIN_ZEROCOPY_SEND_SIZE;
int iothread_count = 0;
int max_cipher_pool_size = 256;
std::string tls_cert;
std::string tls_key;
std::string osd_tls_ca;
std::string client_tls_ca;
#ifdef WITH_RDMA
bool use_rdma = true;
@@ -173,12 +241,32 @@ protected:
robin_hood::unordered_flat_map<rdma_cm_id*, rdmacm_connecting_t*> rdmacm_connecting;
#endif
bool gcm_enabled = false;
msgr_handshake_ctx_i *hs_ctx = NULL;
void init_tls();
void destroy_tls();
void init_tls_client(osd_client_t *cl);
bool do_tls_handshake(osd_client_t *cl, bool from_recv = false);
bool derive_aes_keys(osd_client_t *cl, bool update_my, bool update_peer);
std::vector<msgr_iothread_t*> iothreads;
std::vector<uint64_t> read_ready_clients;
std::vector<uint64_t> write_ready_clients;
// We don't use ringloop->set_immediate here because we may have no ringloop in client :)
std::deque<osd_op_t*> set_immediate_ops;
std::vector<op_aes_xts_encrypt_t*> encrypt_xts_pool;
std::vector<op_aes_xts_decrypt_t*> decrypt_xts_pool;
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
std::vector<isal_gcm_context_data*> encrypt_gcm_pool;
std::vector<isal_gcm_context_data*> decrypt_gcm_pool;
#else
std::vector<EVP_CIPHER_CTX*> encrypt_gcm_pool;
std::vector<EVP_CIPHER_CTX*> decrypt_gcm_pool;
#endif
public:
timerfd_manager_t *tfd = NULL;
ring_loop_i *ringloop = NULL;
@@ -199,12 +287,14 @@ public:
std::vector<addr_mask_t> osd_cluster_network_masks;
std::vector<std::string> all_osd_networks;
std::vector<addr_mask_t> all_osd_network_masks;
int use_proto_checksums = 0;
int force_proto_checksums = 0;
// op statistics
osd_op_stats_t stats, recovery_stats;
void init();
void init_iothreads();
void parse_config(const json11::Json & config);
void parse_config(const json11::Json & config, bool init);
void connect_peer(uint64_t osd_num, json11::Json peer_state);
void stop_client(uint64_t client_id, bool force_delete = false);
void destroy_client(osd_client_t *cl);
@@ -213,6 +303,7 @@ public:
std::function<void(osd_num_t)> repeer_pgs;
std::function<void(osd_num_t)> break_pg_locks;
std::function<bool(osd_client_t*, json11::Json)> check_config_hook;
std::function<void(osd_client_t*)> handshake_hook;
void read_requests();
void send_replies();
void accept_connections(int listen_fd);
@@ -234,6 +325,7 @@ public:
rdma_cm_id *rdmacm_listen(const std::string & bind_address, int rdmacm_port, int *bound_port, int log_level);
void rdmacm_destroy_listener(rdma_cm_id *listener);
#endif
bool is_encryption_enabled();
void inc_op_stats(osd_op_stats_t & stats, uint64_t opcode, timespec & tv_begin, timespec & tv_end, uint64_t len);
void measure_exec(osd_op_t *cur_op);
@@ -250,15 +342,30 @@ protected:
bool try_send(osd_client_t *cl);
void handle_send(int result, bool prev, bool more, osd_client_t *cl);
bool op_write_to(osd_client_t *cl, msgr_op_writer_t & wr);
void next_write_op(osd_client_t *cl);
bool op_write_buf(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *src, size_t src_len, uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len, bool skip_csum, size_t & from, size_t & done);
bool op_copy_data_to(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len, size_t & from, size_t & done);
size_t copy_ops_to(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len);
template<typename T> size_t copy_ops_to_with(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len);
bool handle_read(int result, osd_client_t *cl);
bool handle_read_buffer(osd_client_t *cl, void *curbuf, int remain);
bool handle_finished_read(osd_client_t *cl);
bool handle_op_hdr(osd_client_t *cl);
bool handle_reply_hdr(osd_client_t *cl);
void handle_reply_ready(osd_op_t *op);
void handle_read(int result, osd_client_t *cl);
bool handle_read_buffer(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *curbuf, size_t bufsize);
template<typename T> bool handle_buffer_with(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *curbuf, size_t bufsize);
bool handle_hdr(osd_client_t *cl);
bool allocate_op_buffers(osd_client_t *cl);
bool allocate_reply_buffers(osd_client_t *cl, osd_op_t *op);
bool op_read_from(osd_client_t *cl, msgr_op_reader_t & rdr);
bool handle_finished_op(osd_client_t *cl);
void handle_immediate_ops();
void op_encrypted_copy_buf(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *enc_buf, size_t enc_len, uint8_t *plain, size_t plain_len, size_t & done_plain, size_t & done_enc);
void op_encrypt_free(osd_client_t* cl);
void op_decrypted_copy_buf(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *enc_buf, size_t enc_len, uint8_t *plain, size_t plain_len, size_t & done_plain, size_t & done_enc);
void op_decrypt_start(osd_client_t* cl);
void op_decrypt_inline(osd_client_t* cl);
void op_decrypt_free(osd_client_t* cl);
#ifdef WITH_RDMA
void try_send_rdma(osd_client_t *cl);
bool init_recv_rdma(osd_client_t *cl);
+663
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,663 @@
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2026+
// License: VNPL-1.1 or GNU GPL-2.0+ (see README.md for details)
#include <assert.h>
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
#include <isa-l_crypto/isal_crypto_api.h>
#endif
#include "str_util.h"
#include "etcd_state_client.h"
#include "messenger.h"
#include "msgr_encrypt.h"
#include "http_client.h"
#include "openssl_util.h"
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
op_aes_xts_encrypt_t::op_aes_xts_encrypt_t()
{
#ifndef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
if (!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_xts(), NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
#endif
}
op_aes_xts_encrypt_t::~op_aes_xts_encrypt_t()
{
assert(!encrypted);
#ifndef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
#endif
if (tmp)
free(tmp);
}
void op_aes_xts_encrypt_t::start(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *key, uint64_t start_offset, size_t block_size)
{
assert(!encrypted);
this->cl = cl;
this->start_offset = start_offset;
this->key = key;
this->block_size = block_size;
this->offset = 0;
this->encrypted = false;
this->tmp_pos = 0;
if (tmp && tmp_size != block_size)
{
free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
tmp_size = 0;
}
#ifndef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) != 1)
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
#endif
}
void op_aes_xts_encrypt_t::encrypt_block(uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out)
{
uint8_t iv[16] = { 0 };
*((uint64_t*)iv) = start_offset + offset - offset%block_size;
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
int r = isal_aes_xts_enc_256(key+32, key, iv, block_size, in, out);
assert(r == 0 || r == ISAL_CRYPTO_ERR_XTS_SAME_KEYS);
#else
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) != 1)
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
int actual_out = 0;
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &actual_out, in, block_size) != 1)
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
assert(actual_out == block_size);
#endif
}
static inline void copy_or_gcm(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *in, size_t n)
{
if (cl->proto_csum_status != MSGR_CSUM_GCM)
memcpy(out, in, n);
else
{
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
int r = isal_aes_gcm_enc_256_update(&cl->my_key_isal, cl->enc_ctx, out, in, n);
assert(!r);
#else
int actual_out;
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(cl->enc_ctx, out, &actual_out, in, n) != 1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "EncryptUpdate error: ");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
assert(actual_out == n);
#endif
}
}
void op_aes_xts_encrypt_t::update(uint8_t *in, size_t max_in, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, size_t & done_in, size_t & done_out)
{
// Fucking AES-XTS implementations (all of them) don't have streaming support,
// crafting IV to resume encryption is slow, so we have to accumulate a full block
// and encrypt it at once :-(
// And then we have to support consuming it in parts because it's simpler for the
// higher layers.
if (encrypted)
{
// Copy accumulated and encrypted output
assert(tmp);
if (max_out > block_size - tmp_pos)
max_out = block_size - tmp_pos;
copy_or_gcm(cl, out, tmp + tmp_pos, max_out);
done_out += max_out;
tmp_pos += max_out;
if (tmp_pos >= block_size)
{
encrypted = false;
done_in += 1;
}
}
else if (max_in < block_size - offset%block_size)
{
// Just accumulate input
if (!tmp)
{
tmp = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(block_size);
tmp_size = block_size;
}
memcpy(tmp + offset%block_size, in, max_in);
done_in += max_in;
offset += max_in;
}
else if (max_out < block_size)
{
// Accumulate and encrypt input in <tmp>, then copy part of it to <out>
if (!tmp)
{
tmp = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(block_size);
tmp_size = block_size;
}
max_in = block_size - offset%block_size;
memcpy(tmp + offset%block_size, in, max_in);
encrypt_block(tmp, tmp);
encrypted = true;
copy_or_gcm(cl, out, tmp, max_out);
tmp_pos = max_out;
done_in += max_in-1;
offset += max_in;
done_out += max_out;
}
else if (!(offset%block_size))
{
// Full block - simplest case
encrypt_block(in, out);
if (cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_GCM)
copy_or_gcm(cl, out, out, block_size);
done_in += block_size;
offset += block_size;
done_out += block_size;
}
else
{
// Accumulate input and encrypt directly to <output>
assert(tmp);
max_in = block_size - offset%block_size;
memcpy(tmp + offset%block_size, in, max_in);
encrypt_block(tmp, out);
if (cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_GCM)
copy_or_gcm(cl, out, out, block_size);
done_in += max_in;
offset += max_in;
done_out += block_size;
}
}
void destroy_aes_xts_encrypt(op_aes_xts_encrypt_t *encrypt_ctx)
{
delete encrypt_ctx;
}
op_aes_xts_decrypt_t::op_aes_xts_decrypt_t()
{
#ifndef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
if (!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_xts(), NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
#endif
}
op_aes_xts_decrypt_t::~op_aes_xts_decrypt_t()
{
assert(!decrypted);
#ifndef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
#endif
if (tmp)
free(tmp);
}
void op_aes_xts_decrypt_t::start(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t **key_chain, size_t chain_size, void *key_indexes, uint64_t start_offset, size_t block_size)
{
assert(!decrypted);
this->cl = cl;
this->start_offset = start_offset;
this->key_chain = key_chain;
this->chain_size = chain_size;
this->key_indexes = key_indexes;
this->key_index_bytes = osd_op_rw_t::chain_info_bytes(chain_size);
assert(chain_size <= 1 || key_indexes != NULL);
this->block_size = block_size;
this->offset = 0;
this->tmp_pos = 0;
if (tmp && tmp_size != block_size)
{
free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
tmp_size = 0;
}
#ifndef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
if (chain_size == 1 && key_chain[0] && EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key_chain[0], NULL) != 1)
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
#endif
}
void op_aes_xts_decrypt_t::decrypt_block(uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out)
{
uint8_t *key = NULL;
if (chain_size > 1)
{
uint32_t key_index = key_index_bytes == 1
? ((uint8_t*)key_indexes)[offset/block_size]
: (key_index_bytes == 2
? ((uint16_t*)key_indexes)[offset/block_size]
: (key_index_bytes == 4
? ((uint32_t*)key_indexes)[offset/block_size]
: UINT32_MAX));
assert(key_index < chain_size);
key = key_chain[key_index];
}
else
{
key = key_chain[0];
}
if (!key)
{
if (in != out)
memcpy(out, in, block_size);
return;
}
uint8_t iv[16] = { 0 };
*((uint64_t*)iv) = start_offset + offset - offset%block_size;
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
int r = isal_aes_xts_dec_256(key+32, key, iv, block_size, in, out);
assert(r == 0 || r == ISAL_CRYPTO_ERR_XTS_SAME_KEYS);
#else
if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, chain_size == 1 ? NULL : key, iv) != 1)
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
int actual_out = 0;
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out, &actual_out, in, block_size) != 1)
{
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
assert(actual_out == block_size);
#endif
}
static inline void gcm_dec(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *in, size_t n)
{
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
int r = isal_aes_gcm_dec_256_update(&cl->peer_key_isal, cl->dec_ctx, out, in, n);
assert(!r);
#else
int actual_out;
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(cl->dec_ctx, out, &actual_out, in, n) != 1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "DecryptUpdate error: ");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
assert(actual_out == n);
#endif
}
// out may be NULL, in this case all input is still decrypted to calculate checksums,
// but part of it is skipped and not copied to out
void op_aes_xts_decrypt_t::update(uint8_t *in, size_t max_in, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, size_t & done_in, size_t & done_out)
{
// Fucking AES-XTS implementations (all of them) don't have streaming support,
// crafting IV to resume decryption is slow, so we have to accumulate a full block
// and decrypt it at once :-(
// And then we have to support consuming it in parts because clients sometimes need
// fragmented output.
if (decrypted)
{
// Copy accumulated and decrypted output
assert(tmp);
if (max_out > block_size - tmp_pos)
max_out = block_size - tmp_pos;
if (out)
memcpy(out, tmp + tmp_pos, max_out);
done_out += max_out;
tmp_pos += max_out;
if (tmp_pos >= block_size)
{
decrypted = false;
done_in += 1;
}
}
else if (max_in < block_size - offset%block_size)
{
// Just accumulate input
if (!tmp)
{
tmp = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(block_size);
tmp_size = block_size;
}
memcpy(tmp + offset%block_size, in, max_in);
done_in += max_in;
offset += max_in;
}
else if (max_out < block_size || !out)
{
// Accumulate and decrypt input in <tmp>, then copy part of it to <out>
if (!tmp)
{
tmp = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(block_size);
tmp_size = block_size;
}
max_in = block_size - offset%block_size;
memcpy(tmp + offset%block_size, in, max_in);
if (cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_GCM)
gcm_dec(cl, tmp, tmp, block_size);
decrypt_block(tmp, tmp);
decrypted = true;
if (out)
memcpy(out, tmp, max_out);
tmp_pos = max_out;
done_in += max_in-1;
offset += max_in;
done_out += max_out;
}
else if (!(offset%block_size))
{
// Full block - simplest case
if (cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_GCM)
{
if (!tmp)
{
tmp = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(block_size);
tmp_size = block_size;
}
gcm_dec(cl, tmp, in, block_size);
if (out)
decrypt_block(tmp, out);
}
else
decrypt_block(in, out);
done_in += block_size;
offset += block_size;
done_out += block_size;
}
else
{
// Accumulate input and decrypt directly to <output>
assert(tmp);
max_in = block_size - offset%block_size;
memcpy(tmp + offset%block_size, in, max_in);
assert(out);
if (cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_GCM)
gcm_dec(cl, tmp, tmp, block_size);
decrypt_block(tmp, out);
done_in += max_in;
offset += max_in;
done_out += block_size;
}
}
void destroy_aes_xts_decrypt(op_aes_xts_decrypt_t *decrypt_ctx)
{
delete decrypt_ctx;
}
void osd_messenger_t::op_encrypted_copy_buf(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *enc_buf, size_t enc_len, uint8_t *plain, size_t plain_len, size_t & done_plain, size_t & done_enc)
{
if (!cl->xts_enc_ctx)
{
if (encrypt_xts_pool.size())
{
cl->xts_enc_ctx = encrypt_xts_pool.back();
encrypt_xts_pool.pop_back();
}
else
cl->xts_enc_ctx = new op_aes_xts_encrypt_t();
assert(cl->write_op->enc->key_chain[0]);
cl->xts_enc_ctx->start(cl, cl->write_op->enc->key_chain[0], cl->write_op->req.rw.offset, cl->write_op->enc->bitmap_granularity);
}
size_t old_out = done_enc;
while (done_plain < plain_len && done_enc < enc_len)
{
size_t done_in = 0;
size_t done_out = 0;
cl->xts_enc_ctx->update(plain+done_plain, plain_len-done_plain, enc_buf+done_enc, enc_len-done_enc, done_in, done_out);
done_enc += done_out;
cl->write_op_pos += done_in;
done_plain += done_in;
}
if (cl->write_csum_state && done_enc > old_out)
XXH3_64bits_update(cl->write_csum_state, enc_buf+old_out, done_enc-old_out);
}
void osd_messenger_t::op_decrypted_copy_buf(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *enc_buf, size_t enc_len, uint8_t *plain, size_t plain_len, size_t & done_plain, size_t & done_enc)
{
op_decrypt_start(cl);
size_t old_in = done_enc;
while (done_plain < plain_len && done_enc < enc_len)
{
size_t done_in = 0;
size_t done_out = 0;
// plain == NULL means skip output
cl->xts_dec_ctx->update(enc_buf+done_enc, enc_len-done_enc, plain ? plain+done_plain : NULL, plain_len-done_plain, done_in, done_out);
done_enc += done_in;
cl->read_op_pos += done_out;
cl->read_op_inline_decrypt_in += done_in;
done_plain += done_out;
}
if (cl->read_csum_state && done_enc > old_in)
XXH3_64bits_update(cl->read_csum_state, enc_buf+old_in, done_enc-old_in);
}
void osd_messenger_t::op_decrypt_start(osd_client_t* cl)
{
if (!cl->xts_dec_ctx)
{
if (decrypt_xts_pool.size())
{
cl->xts_dec_ctx = decrypt_xts_pool.back();
decrypt_xts_pool.pop_back();
}
else
cl->xts_dec_ctx = new op_aes_xts_decrypt_t();
auto & enc = cl->read_op->enc;
assert(cl->read_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_READ);
cl->xts_dec_ctx->start(cl, enc->key_chain, enc->chain_size,
(cl->read_op->req.rw.flags & OSD_OP_RETURN_CHAIN) ? (uint8_t*)cl->read_op->bitmap + enc->read_chain_bitmap_pos : 0,
cl->read_op->req.rw.offset, enc->bitmap_granularity);
}
}
void osd_messenger_t::op_decrypt_inline(osd_client_t* cl)
{
op_decrypt_start(cl);
osd_op_t *op = cl->read_op;
size_t from_in = cl->read_op_inline_decrypt_in;
int i = 0;
while (i < op->iov.count && from_in >= op->iov.buf[i].iov_len)
{
from_in -= op->iov.buf[i].iov_len;
i++;
}
size_t from_out = cl->read_op_inline_decrypt_pos - OSD_PACKET_SIZE - op->reply.rw.bitmap_len;
int j = 0;
while (j < op->iov.count && from_out >= op->iov.buf[j].iov_len)
{
from_out -= op->iov.buf[j].iov_len;
j++;
}
while (i < op->iov.count && j < op->iov.count)
{
uint8_t *in = (uint8_t*)op->iov.buf[i].iov_base + from_in;
size_t in_len = op->iov.buf[i].iov_len - from_in;
uint8_t *out = (uint8_t*)op->iov.buf[j].iov_base + from_out;
size_t out_len = op->iov.buf[j].iov_len - from_out;
size_t done_in = 0;
size_t done_out = 0;
cl->xts_dec_ctx->update(in, in_len, out, out_len, done_in, done_out);
if (done_in >= in_len)
{
i++;
from_in = 0;
}
else
from_in += done_in;
if (done_out >= out_len)
{
j++;
from_out = 0;
}
else
from_out += done_out;
}
assert(j >= op->iov.count);
}
void osd_messenger_t::op_decrypt_free(osd_client_t* cl)
{
if (cl->xts_dec_ctx)
{
if (decrypt_xts_pool.size() > max_cipher_pool_size)
delete cl->xts_dec_ctx;
else
decrypt_xts_pool.push_back(cl->xts_dec_ctx);
cl->xts_dec_ctx = NULL;
}
}
void osd_messenger_t::op_encrypt_free(osd_client_t* cl)
{
if (cl->xts_enc_ctx)
{
if (encrypt_xts_pool.size() > max_cipher_pool_size)
delete cl->xts_enc_ctx;
else
encrypt_xts_pool.push_back(cl->xts_enc_ctx);
cl->xts_enc_ctx = NULL;
}
}
bool osd_messenger_t::derive_aes_keys(osd_client_t *cl, bool update_my, bool update_peer)
{
if (!cl->hs_result.shared_secret.size())
{
cl->hs_result = cl->hs->get_result();
if (handshake_hook)
{
handshake_hook(cl);
}
}
std::vector<uint8_t> old_my = cl->my_key, old_peer = cl->peer_key;
// Both keys include AES key and iv + xxhash3 secret
const auto len = AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE + AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE + XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE;
cl->my_key.resize(len);
cl->peer_key.resize(len);
bool ok = true;
if (update_my || !old_my.size())
{
ok = ok && hs_ctx->derive_kdf(cl->hs_result.shared_secret.data(), cl->hs_result.shared_secret.size(),
old_my.size() ? old_my.data() : NULL, old_my.size(),
cl->is_incoming ? "server key" : "client key", cl->my_key.data(), len);
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
if (ok)
isal_aes_gcm_pre_256(cl->my_key.data(), &cl->my_key_isal);
#endif
cl->my_iv_ctr = 0;
}
if (update_peer || !old_peer.size())
{
ok = ok && hs_ctx->derive_kdf(cl->hs_result.shared_secret.data(), cl->hs_result.shared_secret.size(),
old_peer.size() ? old_peer.data() : NULL, old_peer.size(),
!cl->is_incoming ? "server key" : "client key", cl->peer_key.data(), len);
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
if (ok)
isal_aes_gcm_pre_256(cl->peer_key.data(), &cl->peer_key_isal);
#endif
cl->peer_iv_ctr = 0;
}
return ok;
}
void osd_messenger_t::init_tls()
{
if (!tls_cert.empty() || !tls_key.empty() || !osd_tls_ca.empty() || !client_tls_ca.empty())
{
if (tls_cert.empty() || tls_key.empty() || osd_tls_ca.empty() || osd_num && client_tls_ca.empty())
{
if (osd_num)
fprintf(stderr, "Vitastor transport encryption requires osd_cert, osd_pkey, osd_ca, client_ca options for OSDs\n");
else
fprintf(stderr, "Vitastor transport encryption requires cert, pkey and osd_ca options\n");
exit(1);
}
else
{
#ifndef __MOCK__
gcm_enabled = true;
hs_ctx = msgr_handshake_ctx_i::create_ctx();
if (!hs_ctx->init(tls_cert, tls_key, osd_tls_ca, client_tls_ca))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", hs_ctx->get_error().c_str());
exit(1);
}
#endif
}
}
}
void osd_messenger_t::init_tls_client(osd_client_t *cl)
{
if (gcm_enabled)
{
cl->gcm_enabled = true;
cl->hs = hs_ctx->create();
cl->hs->init(cl->is_incoming);
if (cl->hs->out_size())
{
if (cl->write_state == 0)
{
cl->write_state = CL_WRITE_READY;
write_ready_clients.push_back(cl->client_id);
}
}
}
}
void osd_messenger_t::destroy_tls()
{
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
for (isal_gcm_context_data *ctx: encrypt_gcm_pool)
{
free(ctx);
}
for (isal_gcm_context_data *ctx: decrypt_gcm_pool)
{
free(ctx);
}
#else
for (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx: encrypt_gcm_pool)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
}
for (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx: decrypt_gcm_pool)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
}
#endif
if (hs_ctx)
{
delete hs_ctx;
hs_ctx = NULL;
}
}
+72
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// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2026+
// License: VNPL-1.1 or GNU GPL-2.0+ (see README.md for details)
#include <stdint.h>
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
#include <isa-l_crypto/aes_xts.h>
#endif
#include "../util/xxh_x86dispatch.h"
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
struct osd_client_t;
class op_aes_xts_encrypt_t
{
#ifndef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
#endif
osd_client_t *cl = NULL;
uint64_t start_offset = 0;
uint8_t *key = NULL;
size_t offset = 0;
size_t block_size = 0;
uint8_t *tmp = NULL;
size_t tmp_size = 0;
size_t tmp_pos = 0;
bool encrypted = false;
void encrypt_block(uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out);
public:
op_aes_xts_encrypt_t();
~op_aes_xts_encrypt_t();
void start(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *key, uint64_t start_offset, size_t block_size);
void update(uint8_t *in, size_t max_in, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, size_t & done_in, size_t & done_out);
};
void destroy_aes_xts_encrypt(op_aes_xts_encrypt_t *encrypt_ctx);
class op_aes_xts_decrypt_t
{
#ifndef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
#endif
osd_client_t *cl = NULL;
uint64_t start_offset = 0;
uint8_t **key_chain = NULL;
size_t chain_size = 0;
void *key_indexes = NULL;
int key_index_bytes = 0;
size_t offset = 0;
size_t block_size = 0;
uint8_t *tmp = NULL;
size_t tmp_size = 0;
size_t tmp_pos = 0;
bool decrypted = false;
void decrypt_block(uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out);
public:
op_aes_xts_decrypt_t();
~op_aes_xts_decrypt_t();
void start(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t **key_chain, size_t chain_size, void *key_indexes, uint64_t start_offset, size_t block_size);
void update(uint8_t *in, size_t max_in, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, size_t & done_in, size_t & done_out);
};
void destroy_aes_xts_decrypt(op_aes_xts_decrypt_t *decrypt_ctx);
+810
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// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2026+
// License: VNPL-1.1 or GNU GPL-2.0+ (see README.md for details)
#include <stdint.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <memory>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "msgr_handshake.h"
#include "malloc_or_die.h"
#include "openssl_util.h"
#include "str_util.h"
#define AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE 32
#define AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE 12
// TLS 1.3-like handshake
// 1. Client->server: EC public key
// 2. Server->client: EC public key, encrypted certificate and digital signature of the handshake
// 3. Client->server: encrypted certificate and digital signature of the handshake
// "vitaECDH" interleaved
#define MSGR_HS_MAGIC 0x4861447443694576l
#define MSGR_HS_MAX_LEN 131072
#define MSGR_HS_SERVER_INIT 0
#define MSGR_HS_CLIENT_INIT 1
#define MSGR_HS_SERVER_REPLY 2
#define MSGR_HS_CLIENT_REPLY 3
#define MSGR_HS_DONE 100
#define MSGR_HS_ERROR 101
struct __attribute__((__packed__)) msgr_handshake_hdr_t
{
uint32_t msg_len;
uint64_t magic;
uint32_t type;
};
class msgr_handshake_ctx_t: public msgr_handshake_ctx_i
{
friend class msgr_handshake_t;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *params = NULL;
X509_STORE *ca = NULL;
X509 *osd_ca = NULL;
X509 *client_ca = NULL;
std::string my_cert_pem;
X509 *my_cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *my_pubkey = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *my_privkey = NULL;
EVP_KDF_CTX* kdf_ctx = NULL;
std::string error;
bool on_error(const std::string & prefix);
public:
~msgr_handshake_ctx_t();
msgr_handshake_i* create() override;
bool init(const std::string & pem_cert, const std::string & pem_key,
const std::string & pem_osd_ca, const std::string & pem_client_ca) override;
std::string get_error() override;
bool derive_kdf(const uint8_t* insecret, size_t insecret_len,
const uint8_t* salt, size_t salt_len, const char *label, uint8_t *outsecret, size_t outsize) override;
};
class msgr_handshake_t: public msgr_handshake_i
{
msgr_handshake_ctx_t *ctx = NULL;
bool is_server = false;
std::vector<uint8_t> full_handshake;
std::vector<uint8_t> in_buf;
uint8_t *out_buf = NULL;
size_t out_buf_size = 0;
std::string error;
int state = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ec_key = NULL;
X509 *peer_cert = NULL;
bool peer_is_osd = false;
std::vector<uint8_t> shared_secret;
std::vector<uint8_t> hs_key, peer_hs_key;
msgr_handshake_hdr_t *cur_hdr = NULL;
uint8_t *cur_buf = NULL;
size_t cur_left = 0;
bool on_error(const std::string & prefix);
bool derive_shared_secret(EVP_PKEY *peer_ec_key);
bool derive_hs_keys(const uint8_t *encoded_peer_key, size_t encoded_key_len);
bool sign(std::vector<uint8_t> & out);
bool verify(const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len);
bool encrypt(const uint8_t* src, size_t len, uint8_t* dest);
bool decrypt(const uint8_t* src, size_t & len, uint8_t* dest);
bool make_client_init();
bool make_server_reply();
bool make_client_reply();
bool verify_peer(const uint8_t *peer_cert_pem, size_t peer_cert_len);
ssize_t start_msg(uint8_t* src, size_t len, uint32_t expected_type);
bool read_with_len(const uint8_t* & dst, uint32_t & dst_len);
bool handle_client_init();
bool handle_server_reply();
bool handle_client_reply();
bool handle_peer_cert(const uint8_t *key, uint32_t key_len);
void complete();
public:
// Workflow: create -> init -> handle -> get_result/get_error -> destruct
msgr_handshake_t(msgr_handshake_ctx_t *ctx): ctx(ctx) {}
~msgr_handshake_t();
bool init(bool server_mode) override;
ssize_t handle(uint8_t* in_buf, size_t in_size) override;
bool done() override;
uint8_t *get_out() override;
size_t out_size() override;
void eat_out(size_t n) override;
void reset_out() override;
msgr_handshake_result_t get_result() override;
std::string get_error() override;
};
msgr_handshake_ctx_i* msgr_handshake_ctx_i::create_ctx()
{
return new msgr_handshake_ctx_t();
}
msgr_handshake_i* msgr_handshake_ctx_t::create()
{
return new msgr_handshake_t(this);
}
bool msgr_handshake_ctx_t::init(const std::string & pem_cert, const std::string & pem_key,
const std::string & pem_osd_ca, const std::string & pem_client_ca)
{
if (pem_cert.substr(0, 5) == "-----")
my_cert_pem = pem_cert;
else
{
my_cert_pem = read_file(pem_cert);
if (my_cert_pem.empty())
{
error = "Failed to load certificate file";
return false;
}
}
{
BIO *bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(my_cert_pem.data(), my_cert_pem.size());
if (!bio)
return on_error("BIO_new_mem_buf: ");
my_cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
if (!my_cert)
return on_error("Failed to load certificate: ");
}
if (!(my_pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(my_cert)))
return on_error("X509_get0_pubkey: ");
if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_sha384)))
return on_error("EVP_get_digestbynid SHA384: ");
if (!(my_privkey = openssl_load_key(pem_key)))
return on_error("Failed to load private key: ");
if (!(ca = X509_STORE_new()))
return on_error("X509_STORE_CTX_new: ");
if (!(osd_ca = openssl_load_cert(pem_osd_ca)))
return on_error("Failed to load OSD CA certificate: ");
if (X509_STORE_add_cert(ca, osd_ca) <= 0)
return on_error("X509_STORE_add_cert OSD CA: ");
if (!pem_client_ca.empty() && !(client_ca = openssl_load_cert(pem_client_ca)))
return on_error("Failed to load client CA certificate: ");
if (client_ca && X509_STORE_add_cert(ca, client_ca) <= 0)
return on_error("X509_STORE_add_cert client CA: ");
if (!(pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL)))
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id: ");
if (EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init: ");
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, /*NID_X9_62_prime256v1*/NID_secp384r1) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid: ");
if (EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &params) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_paramgen: ");
EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "hkdf", NULL);
if (!kdf)
return on_error("EVP_KDF_fetch: ");
kdf_ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
return true;
}
std::string msgr_handshake_ctx_t::get_error()
{
return error;
}
msgr_handshake_ctx_t::~msgr_handshake_ctx_t()
{
if (pctx)
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
if (params)
EVP_PKEY_free(params);
if (ca)
X509_STORE_free(ca);
if (osd_ca)
X509_free(osd_ca);
if (client_ca)
X509_free(client_ca);
my_pubkey = NULL;
if (my_cert)
X509_free(my_cert);
if (my_privkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(my_privkey);
if (kdf_ctx)
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kdf_ctx);
}
bool msgr_handshake_ctx_t::on_error(const std::string & prefix)
{
error = prefix+ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL);
return false;
}
bool msgr_handshake_ctx_t::derive_kdf(const uint8_t* insecret, size_t insecret_len,
const uint8_t* salt, size_t salt_len, const char *label, uint8_t *outsecret, size_t outsize)
{
OSSL_PARAM params[5];
int n = 0;
params[n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("digest", (char*)"sha384", (size_t)7);
params[n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string("key", (void*)insecret, insecret_len);
params[n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string("info", (void*)label, strlen(label)+1);
params[n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string("salt", (salt ? (void*)salt : (void*)""), salt_len);
params[n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
assert(n <= sizeof(params)/sizeof(OSSL_PARAM));
if (EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kdf_ctx, params) <= 0)
return false;
if (EVP_KDF_derive(kdf_ctx, outsecret, outsize, NULL) <= 0)
return false;
return true;
}
msgr_handshake_t::~msgr_handshake_t()
{
if (out_buf)
free(out_buf);
if (peer_cert)
X509_free(peer_cert);
if (ec_key)
EVP_PKEY_free(ec_key);
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::on_error(const std::string & prefix)
{
error = prefix+ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL);
state = MSGR_HS_ERROR;
return false;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::init(bool server_mode)
{
this->ctx = ctx;
std::unique_ptr<EVP_PKEY_CTX, decltype(&EVP_PKEY_CTX_free)> kctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ctx->params, NULL), EVP_PKEY_CTX_free);
if (!kctx)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_new with EC params: ");
if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(kctx.get()) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_keygen_init: ");
if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx.get(), &ec_key) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_keygen: ");
if (!server_mode)
{
// Send initial message - only the EC public key
if (!make_client_init())
return false;
}
this->is_server = server_mode;
this->state = server_mode ? MSGR_HS_SERVER_INIT : MSGR_HS_CLIENT_INIT;
return true;
}
static void copy_to(std::vector<uint8_t> & buf, const void* src, uint32_t len)
{
size_t old_size = buf.size();
buf.resize(buf.size() + len);
memcpy(buf.data() + old_size, src, len);
}
static void copy_to_raw(uint8_t* & buf, const void* src, size_t len)
{
memcpy(buf, src, len);
buf += len;
}
static void copy_to_with_len(std::vector<uint8_t> & buf, const void* src, uint32_t len)
{
copy_to(buf, &len, sizeof(len));
copy_to(buf, src, len);
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::derive_shared_secret(EVP_PKEY *peer_ec_key)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *dh_ctx = NULL;
if (!(dh_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ec_key, NULL)))
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_new for ECDH: ");
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive_init(dh_ctx))
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dh_ctx);
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_derive_init: ");
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(dh_ctx, peer_ec_key))
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dh_ctx);
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer: ");
}
size_t len = 0;
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(dh_ctx, NULL, &len))
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dh_ctx);
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_derive get length: ");
}
shared_secret.resize(len);
assert(len == 48);
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(dh_ctx, shared_secret.data(), &len))
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dh_ctx);
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_derive: ");
}
assert(len == shared_secret.size());
shared_secret.resize(len);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dh_ctx);
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::derive_hs_keys(const uint8_t *encoded_peer_key, size_t encoded_key_len)
{
std::unique_ptr<EVP_PKEY, decltype(&EVP_PKEY_free)> peer_ec_key(EVP_PKEY_new(), EVP_PKEY_free);
if (!peer_ec_key)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_new: ");
if (EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(peer_ec_key.get(), ec_key) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters: ");
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(peer_ec_key.get(), encoded_peer_key, encoded_key_len) <= 0)
return on_error("Invalid handshake peer key: ");
if (!derive_shared_secret(peer_ec_key.get()))
return false;
hs_key.resize(AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE + AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE);
peer_hs_key.resize(AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE + AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE);
if (!ctx->derive_kdf(shared_secret.data(), shared_secret.size(),
NULL, 0, (state == MSGR_HS_SERVER_INIT ? "server hs key" : "client hs key"),
hs_key.data(), hs_key.size()))
return on_error("derive_kdf: ");
if (!ctx->derive_kdf(shared_secret.data(), shared_secret.size(),
NULL, 0, (state != MSGR_HS_SERVER_INIT ? "server hs key" : "client hs key"),
peer_hs_key.data(), peer_hs_key.size()))
return on_error("derive_kdf: ");
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::sign(std::vector<uint8_t> & out)
{
std::unique_ptr<EVP_MD_CTX, decltype(&EVP_MD_CTX_free)> md_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX_new(), EVP_MD_CTX_free);
if (!md_ctx)
return on_error("EVP_MD_CTX_create: ");
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), NULL, ctx->md, NULL, ctx->my_privkey) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_DigestSignInit: ");
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx.get(), full_handshake.data(), full_handshake.size()) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_DigestSignUpdate: ");
size_t siglen = 0;
if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx.get(), NULL, &siglen) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_DigestSignFinal get length: ");
size_t oldsize = out.size();
out.resize(oldsize + siglen);
if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx.get(), out.data() + oldsize, &siglen) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_DigestSignFinal: ");
out.resize(oldsize + siglen);
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::verify(const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len)
{
std::unique_ptr<EVP_MD_CTX, decltype(&EVP_MD_CTX_free)> md_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX_new(), EVP_MD_CTX_free);
if (!md_ctx)
return on_error("EVP_MD_CTX_create: ");
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx.get(), NULL, ctx->md, NULL, X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert)) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_DigestVerifyInit: ");
if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx.get(), full_handshake.data(), full_handshake.size()) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate: ");
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx.get(), signature, signature_len) <= 0)
return false;
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::encrypt(const uint8_t* src, size_t len, uint8_t* dest)
{
std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)> enc_ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
if (!ctx)
return on_error("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new: ");
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(enc_ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL, hs_key.data(), hs_key.data() + AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_EncryptInit AES-256-GCM: ");
int actual_out;
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(enc_ctx.get(), dest, &actual_out, src, len) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_EncryptUpdate: ");
assert(actual_out == len);
if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(enc_ctx.get(), NULL, &actual_out) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_EncryptFinal: ");
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(enc_ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, 16, dest+len) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG: ");
(*(uint64_t*)(hs_key.data() + AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE))++; // change IV
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::decrypt(const uint8_t *src, size_t & len, uint8_t* dest)
{
if (len <= 16) // only tag?!
{
len = 0;
error = "Handshake decryption failed";
state = MSGR_HS_ERROR;
return false;
}
std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)> dec_ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
if (!ctx)
return on_error("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new: ");
if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(dec_ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL, peer_hs_key.data(), peer_hs_key.data() + AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_DecryptInit AES-256-GCM: ");
int actual_out;
len -= 16;
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(dec_ctx.get(), dest, &actual_out, src, len) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_DecryptUpdate: ");
assert(actual_out == len);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dec_ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, 16, (void*)(src+len)) <= 0)
return on_error("EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG: ");
if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(dec_ctx.get(), NULL, &actual_out) <= 0)
{
error = "Handshake decryption failed";
state = MSGR_HS_ERROR;
return false;
}
(*(uint64_t*)(peer_hs_key.data() + AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE))++; // change IV
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::make_client_init()
{
uint8_t *key = NULL;
size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ec_key, &key);
if (!key_len)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key: ");
const size_t old_out_size = out_buf_size;
out_buf_size += key_len + sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t);
out_buf = (uint8_t*)realloc_or_die(out_buf, out_buf_size);
uint8_t *buf = out_buf + old_out_size;
msgr_handshake_hdr_t *hdr = (msgr_handshake_hdr_t *)buf;
hdr->msg_len = key_len + sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t);
hdr->magic = MSGR_HS_MAGIC;
hdr->type = MSGR_HS_CLIENT_INIT;
memcpy(buf + sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t), key, key_len);
copy_to(full_handshake, &hdr->type, sizeof(hdr->type));
copy_to_with_len(full_handshake, key, key_len);
OPENSSL_free(key);
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::make_server_reply()
{
uint8_t *key = NULL;
size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ec_key, &key);
if (!key_len)
return on_error("EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key: ");
// Append type, key and raw certificate to signed data and sign it
msgr_handshake_hdr_t hdr = { .magic = MSGR_HS_MAGIC, .type = MSGR_HS_SERVER_REPLY };
copy_to(full_handshake, &hdr.type, sizeof(hdr.type));
copy_to_with_len(full_handshake, key, key_len);
copy_to_with_len(full_handshake, ctx->my_cert_pem.data(), ctx->my_cert_pem.size());
std::vector<uint8_t> signature;
if (!sign(signature))
{
OPENSSL_free(key);
return false;
}
// Encrypt certificate and signature
std::vector<uint8_t> encrypt_data;
copy_to_with_len(encrypt_data, ctx->my_cert_pem.data(), ctx->my_cert_pem.size());
copy_to_with_len(encrypt_data, signature.data(), signature.size());
encrypt_data.resize(encrypt_data.size()+16);
if (!encrypt(encrypt_data.data(), encrypt_data.size()-16, encrypt_data.data()))
{
OPENSSL_free(key);
return false;
}
// Construct message
hdr.msg_len = sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t) + 4 + key_len + encrypt_data.size();
out_buf = (uint8_t*)realloc_or_die(out_buf, (out_buf_size += hdr.msg_len));
uint8_t *cur = out_buf + out_buf_size - hdr.msg_len;
copy_to_raw(cur, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
copy_to_raw(cur, &key_len, 4);
copy_to_raw(cur, key, key_len);
copy_to_raw(cur, encrypt_data.data(), encrypt_data.size());
OPENSSL_free(key);
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::make_client_reply()
{
// Append type and raw certificate to signed data and sign it
msgr_handshake_hdr_t hdr = { .magic = MSGR_HS_MAGIC, .type = MSGR_HS_CLIENT_REPLY };
copy_to(full_handshake, &hdr.type, sizeof(hdr.type));
copy_to_with_len(full_handshake, ctx->my_cert_pem.data(), ctx->my_cert_pem.size());
std::vector<uint8_t> signature;
if (!sign(signature))
return false;
// Encrypt certificate and signature
std::vector<uint8_t> encrypt_data;
copy_to_with_len(encrypt_data, ctx->my_cert_pem.data(), ctx->my_cert_pem.size());
copy_to_with_len(encrypt_data, signature.data(), signature.size());
encrypt_data.resize(encrypt_data.size()+16);
if (!encrypt(encrypt_data.data(), encrypt_data.size()-16, encrypt_data.data()))
return false;
// Construct message
hdr.msg_len = sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t) + encrypt_data.size();
out_buf = (uint8_t*)realloc_or_die(out_buf, (out_buf_size += hdr.msg_len));
uint8_t *cur = out_buf + out_buf_size - hdr.msg_len;
copy_to_raw(cur, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
copy_to_raw(cur, encrypt_data.data(), encrypt_data.size());
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::verify_peer(const uint8_t *peer_cert_pem, size_t peer_cert_len)
{
BIO *bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(peer_cert_pem, peer_cert_len);
if (!bio)
return on_error("BIO_new_mem_buf: ");
peer_cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
if (!peer_cert)
{
error = "Invalid peer certificate";
state = MSGR_HS_ERROR;
return false;
}
std::unique_ptr<X509_STORE_CTX, decltype(&X509_STORE_CTX_free)> ca_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX_new(), X509_STORE_CTX_free);
if (!ca_ctx)
return on_error("X509_STORE_CTX_new: ");
if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(ca_ctx.get(), ctx->ca, peer_cert, NULL) <= 0)
return on_error("X509_STORE_CTX_init: ");
// Maybe use X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ca_ctx.get()), 2) ?
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ca_ctx.get(), is_server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
if (X509_verify_cert(ca_ctx.get()) <= 0)
{
error = "Peer certificate verification failed: ";
error += X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ca_ctx.get()));
state = MSGR_HS_ERROR;
return false;
}
peer_is_osd = (X509_verify(peer_cert, X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->osd_ca)) > 0);
if (!is_server && !peer_is_osd)
{
error = "Peer is not an OSD";
state = MSGR_HS_ERROR;
return false;
}
return true;
}
ssize_t msgr_handshake_t::start_msg(uint8_t* src, size_t len, uint32_t expected_type)
{
size_t orig_len = len;
size_t to_buffer = (len < sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t)-in_buf.size()
? len : sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t)-in_buf.size());
in_buf.insert(in_buf.end(), src, src+to_buffer);
len -= to_buffer;
src += to_buffer;
if (in_buf.size() < sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t))
return 0;
cur_hdr = (msgr_handshake_hdr_t *)in_buf.data();
if (cur_hdr->magic != MSGR_HS_MAGIC ||
cur_hdr->type != expected_type ||
cur_hdr->msg_len <= sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t) ||
cur_hdr->msg_len >= MSGR_HS_MAX_LEN)
{
error = "Invalid handshake packet magic, type or size";
state = MSGR_HS_ERROR;
return -1;
}
to_buffer = (len < cur_hdr->msg_len-in_buf.size()
? len : cur_hdr->msg_len-in_buf.size());
in_buf.insert(in_buf.end(), src, src+to_buffer);
cur_hdr = (msgr_handshake_hdr_t *)in_buf.data();
len -= to_buffer;
src += to_buffer;
if (in_buf.size() < cur_hdr->msg_len)
return 0;
cur_left = cur_hdr->msg_len - sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t);
cur_buf = in_buf.data() + sizeof(msgr_handshake_hdr_t);
return orig_len - len;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::read_with_len(const uint8_t* & dst, uint32_t & dst_len)
{
if (cur_left < 4)
{
error = "Handshake packet too short";
state = MSGR_HS_ERROR;
return false;
}
dst_len = *(uint32_t*)cur_buf;
cur_buf += 4;
cur_left -= 4;
if (cur_left < dst_len)
{
error = "Handshake packet too short";
state = MSGR_HS_ERROR;
return false;
}
dst = cur_buf;
cur_buf += dst_len;
cur_left -= dst_len;
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::handle_client_init()
{
// Derive shared secret and handshake keys
if (!derive_hs_keys(cur_buf, cur_left))
return false;
// Add type and key to full_handshake
copy_to(full_handshake, &cur_hdr->type, sizeof(cur_hdr->type));
copy_to_with_len(full_handshake, cur_buf, cur_left);
in_buf.clear();
return true;
}
// Decrypt and check peer certificate
bool msgr_handshake_t::handle_peer_cert(const uint8_t *key, uint32_t key_len)
{
if (!decrypt(cur_buf, cur_left, cur_buf))
return false;
const uint8_t *peer_cert_pem = NULL;
uint32_t peer_cert_len = 0;
if (!read_with_len(peer_cert_pem, peer_cert_len))
return false;
// Parse and verify certificate
if (!verify_peer(peer_cert_pem, peer_cert_len))
return false;
// Verify signature
copy_to(full_handshake, &cur_hdr->type, sizeof(cur_hdr->type));
if (key)
copy_to_with_len(full_handshake, key, key_len);
copy_to_with_len(full_handshake, peer_cert_pem, peer_cert_len);
const uint8_t *signature = NULL;
uint32_t signature_len = 0;
if (!read_with_len(signature, signature_len))
return false;
if (!verify(signature, signature_len))
return false;
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::handle_server_reply()
{
// Derive shared secret and handshake keys
const uint8_t *key = NULL;
uint32_t key_len = 0;
if (!read_with_len(key, key_len))
return false;
if (!derive_hs_keys(key, key_len))
return false;
// Decrypt and check peer certificate
if (!handle_peer_cert(key, key_len))
return false;
in_buf.clear();
return true;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::handle_client_reply()
{
// Decrypt and check peer certificate
if (!handle_peer_cert(NULL, 0))
return false;
in_buf.clear();
return true;
}
void msgr_handshake_t::complete()
{
state = MSGR_HS_DONE;
hs_key.clear();
peer_hs_key.clear();
full_handshake.clear();
}
ssize_t msgr_handshake_t::handle(uint8_t* in_buf, size_t in_size)
{
if (state == MSGR_HS_SERVER_INIT)
{
ssize_t r = start_msg(in_buf, in_size, MSGR_HS_CLIENT_INIT);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return in_size;
if (!handle_client_init())
return -1;
// Send encrypted & signed response
if (!make_server_reply())
return -1;
state = MSGR_HS_SERVER_REPLY;
return r;
}
else if (state == MSGR_HS_CLIENT_INIT)
{
ssize_t r = start_msg(in_buf, in_size, MSGR_HS_SERVER_REPLY);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return in_size;
if (!handle_server_reply())
return -1;
// Verification passed, send certificate to the server
if (!make_client_reply())
return -1;
// Finished!
complete();
return r;
}
else if (state == MSGR_HS_SERVER_REPLY)
{
ssize_t r = start_msg(in_buf, in_size, MSGR_HS_CLIENT_REPLY);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return in_size;
if (!handle_client_reply())
return -1;
// Verification passed
// Finished!
complete();
return r;
}
else if (state == MSGR_HS_DONE)
{
return 0;
}
else if (state != MSGR_HS_ERROR)
{
error = "Unexpected handshake state: "+std::to_string(state);
}
return -1;
}
bool msgr_handshake_t::done()
{
return (state == MSGR_HS_DONE);
}
uint8_t *msgr_handshake_t::get_out()
{
return out_buf;
}
size_t msgr_handshake_t::out_size()
{
return out_buf_size;
}
void msgr_handshake_t::eat_out(size_t n)
{
if (n >= out_buf_size)
{
free(out_buf);
out_buf = NULL;
out_buf_size = 0;
}
else
{
memmove(out_buf, out_buf + n, out_buf_size - n);
out_buf_size -= n;
}
}
void msgr_handshake_t::reset_out()
{
out_buf = NULL;
out_buf_size = 0;
}
msgr_handshake_result_t msgr_handshake_t::get_result()
{
if (state != MSGR_HS_DONE)
return msgr_handshake_result_t{};
X509_up_ref(peer_cert);
return msgr_handshake_result_t{
.peer_cert = peer_cert,
.peer_is_osd = peer_is_osd,
.shared_secret = shared_secret,
};
}
std::string msgr_handshake_t::get_error()
{
return error;
}
+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
// Copyright (c) Vitaliy Filippov, 2026+
// License: VNPL-1.1 or GNU GPL-2.0+ (see README.md for details)
#pragma once
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <openssl/types.h>
#define AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE 32
#define AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE 12
#define AES_256_GCM_MAX_IV_CTR ((uint64_t)1 << 32)
// TLS 1.3-like handshake
// 1. Client->server: EC public key
// 2. Server->client: EC public key, encrypted certificate and digital signature of the handshake
// 3. Client->server: encrypted certificate and digital signature of the handshake
struct msgr_handshake_result_t
{
X509 *peer_cert = NULL;
bool peer_is_osd = false;
std::vector<uint8_t> shared_secret;
};
class msgr_handshake_i
{
public:
// Workflow: create -> init -> handle_msg -> get_result/get_error -> destruct
virtual ~msgr_handshake_i() = default;
virtual bool init(bool server_mode) = 0;
virtual ssize_t handle(uint8_t* in_buf, size_t in_size) = 0;
virtual bool done() = 0;
virtual uint8_t *get_out() = 0;
virtual size_t out_size() = 0;
virtual void eat_out(size_t n) = 0;
virtual void reset_out() = 0;
virtual msgr_handshake_result_t get_result() = 0;
virtual std::string get_error() = 0;
};
class msgr_handshake_ctx_i
{
public:
static msgr_handshake_ctx_i* create_ctx();
virtual ~msgr_handshake_ctx_i() = default;
virtual msgr_handshake_i* create() = 0;
virtual bool init(const std::string & pem_cert, const std::string & pem_key,
const std::string & pem_osd_ca, const std::string & pem_client_ca) = 0;
virtual std::string get_error() = 0;
virtual bool derive_kdf(const uint8_t* insecret, size_t insecret_len,
const uint8_t* salt, size_t salt_len, const char *label, uint8_t *outsecret, size_t outsize) = 0;
};
+21 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
#pragma once
#include <memory>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -16,6 +18,8 @@
#define OSD_OP_INLINE_BUF_COUNT 16
#define AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE 64
// Kind of a vector with small-list-optimisation
struct osd_op_buf_list_t
{
@@ -152,6 +156,19 @@ struct blockstore_op_t;
struct osd_primary_op_data_t;
struct osd_op_enc_t
{
// Keys may contain more information in the future, like encryption algorithm and key ID
// In this case, key_chain will become inode_key_t* with inode_key_t also being a structure
// Currently all keys are required to be 512 bit (64 byte) long, for AES-256-XTS
// Raw pointers are convenient for messenger code; external users may use shared_ptr aliasing
// to implement complex freeing of osd_op_enc_t along with their external inode cache info
uint8_t** key_chain = NULL;
size_t chain_size = 0;
uint32_t read_chain_bitmap_pos = 0;
uint32_t bitmap_granularity = 0;
};
struct __attribute__((visibility("default"))) osd_op_t
{
timespec tv_begin = { 0 }, tv_end = { 0 };
@@ -166,8 +183,10 @@ struct __attribute__((visibility("default"))) osd_op_t
void *bitmap = NULL;
unsigned bitmap_len = 0;
size_t bmp_data = 0;
void *bitmap_buf = NULL;
uint8_t *bitmap_buf = NULL;
void *rmw_buf = NULL;
std::shared_ptr<osd_op_enc_t> enc;
uint64_t csum = 0; // network layer checksum
osd_primary_op_data_t* op_data = NULL;
std::function<void(osd_op_t*)> callback;
@@ -177,4 +196,5 @@ struct __attribute__((visibility("default"))) osd_op_t
void cancel();
bool is_recovery_related();
uint64_t calc_data_checksum();
};
+19 -62
View File
@@ -571,28 +571,6 @@ static void try_send_rdma_wr(osd_client_t *cl, ibv_sge *sge, int op_sge)
cl->rdma_conn->cur_send++;
}
static int try_send_rdma_copy(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *dst, int dst_len)
{
auto rc = cl->rdma_conn;
int total_dst_len = dst_len;
while (dst_len > 0 && rc->send_pos < cl->send_list.size())
{
iovec & iov = cl->send_list[rc->send_pos];
uint32_t len = (uint32_t)(iov.iov_len-rc->send_buf_pos < dst_len
? iov.iov_len-rc->send_buf_pos : dst_len);
memcpy(dst, (uint8_t*)iov.iov_base+rc->send_buf_pos, len);
dst += len;
dst_len -= len;
rc->send_buf_pos += len;
if (rc->send_buf_pos >= iov.iov_len)
{
rc->send_pos++;
rc->send_buf_pos = 0;
}
}
return total_dst_len-dst_len;
}
void osd_messenger_t::try_send_rdma(osd_client_t *cl)
{
auto rc = cl->rdma_conn;
@@ -620,7 +598,12 @@ void osd_messenger_t::try_send_rdma(osd_client_t *cl)
: rc->send_done_pos-rc->send_out_pos);
if (dst_len > rc->max_msg)
dst_len = rc->max_msg;
copied = try_send_rdma_copy(cl, dst, dst_len);
copied = copy_ops_to(cl, dst, dst_len);
if (cl->io_error)
{
stop_client(cl->client_id);
return;
}
if (copied > 0)
{
rc->send_out_pos += copied;
@@ -636,6 +619,7 @@ void osd_messenger_t::try_send_rdma(osd_client_t *cl)
};
try_send_rdma_wr(cl, &sge, 1);
rc->send_sizes.push_back(copied);
cl->send_free_ops.push_back(NULL); // end marker
}
}
}
@@ -732,9 +716,6 @@ void osd_messenger_t::handle_rdma_events(msgr_rdma_context_t *rdma_context)
}
if (!is_send)
{
// Reset OSD ping state - client is obviously alive
cl->ping_time_remaining = 0;
cl->idle_time_remaining = osd_idle_timeout;
rc->cur_recv--;
if (!handle_read_buffer(cl, rc->recv_buffers[rc->next_recv_buf], wc[i].byte_len))
{
@@ -746,56 +727,32 @@ void osd_messenger_t::handle_rdma_events(msgr_rdma_context_t *rdma_context)
else
{
rc->cur_send--;
uint64_t sent_size = rc->send_sizes.at(0);
rc->send_sizes.erase(rc->send_sizes.begin(), rc->send_sizes.begin()+1);
// byte_len is not filled for send operations
uint64_t sent_size = rc->send_sizes.front();
rc->send_sizes.pop_front();
rc->send_done_pos += sent_size;
rc->send_out_full = false;
if (rc->send_done_pos == rc->send_out_size)
rc->send_done_pos = 0;
assert(rc->send_done_pos < rc->send_out_size);
int send_pos = 0, send_buf_pos = 0;
while (sent_size > 0)
while (osd_op_t *op = cl->send_free_ops.front())
{
if (sent_size >= cl->send_list.at(send_pos).iov_len)
{
sent_size -= cl->send_list[send_pos].iov_len;
send_pos++;
}
if (!((size_t)op & 7))
delete op;
else
{
send_buf_pos = sent_size;
sent_size = 0;
}
free((void*)((size_t)op & ~(size_t)7));
cl->send_free_ops.pop_front();
}
assert(rc->send_pos >= send_pos);
if (rc->send_pos == send_pos)
cl->send_free_ops.pop_front();
if ((cl->proto_csum_status & MSGR_CSUM_NEG) && !cl->write_op && !cl->write_ops.size())
{
rc->send_buf_pos -= send_buf_pos;
}
rc->send_pos -= send_pos;
for (int i = 0; i < send_pos; i++)
{
if (cl->outbox[i].flags & MSGR_SENDP_FREE)
{
// Reply fully sent
delete cl->outbox[i].op;
}
}
if (send_pos > 0)
{
cl->send_list.erase(cl->send_list.begin(), cl->send_list.begin()+send_pos);
cl->outbox.erase(cl->outbox.begin(), cl->outbox.begin()+send_pos);
}
if (send_buf_pos > 0)
{
cl->send_list[0].iov_base = (uint8_t*)cl->send_list[0].iov_base + send_buf_pos;
cl->send_list[0].iov_len -= send_buf_pos;
// Checksums negotiated, enable
cl->proto_csum_status = cl->proto_csum_status & (~MSGR_CSUM_NEG);
}
try_send_rdma(cl);
}
}
} while (event_count > 0);
handle_immediate_ops();
}
void osd_messenger_t::destroy_rdma_conn(msgr_rdma_connection_t *rdma_conn)
+6 -3
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,11 @@
#include <infiniband/verbs.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <deque>
#include "addr_util.h"
struct osd_op_t;
struct msgr_rdma_address_t
{
ibv_gid gid;
@@ -72,11 +75,11 @@ struct msgr_rdma_connection_t
int cur_send = 0, cur_recv = 0;
int send_pos = 0, send_buf_pos = 0;
int next_recv_buf = 0;
std::vector<void*> recv_buffers;
std::vector<uint8_t*> recv_buffers;
msgr_rdma_buf_t recv_buf;
std::vector<uint64_t> send_sizes;
std::deque<uint64_t> send_sizes;
msgr_rdma_buf_t send_out;
int send_out_pos = 0, send_done_pos = 0, send_out_size = 0;
size_t send_out_pos = 0, send_done_pos = 0, send_out_size = 0;
bool send_out_full = false;
~msgr_rdma_connection_t();
+5 -1
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct rdmacm_connecting_t
int tcp_port = 0;
int timeout_ms = 0;
int timeout_id = -1;
bool is_incoming = false;
msgr_rdma_context_t *rdma_context = NULL;
};
@@ -292,6 +293,7 @@ void osd_messenger_t::rdmacm_accept(rdma_cm_event *ev)
conn->client_id = next_client_id++;
conn->parsed_addr = *(sockaddr_storage*)rdma_get_peer_addr(ev->id);
conn->rdma_context = rdma_context;
conn->is_incoming = true;
rdmacm_set_conn_timeout(conn);
rdmacm_connecting[ev->id] = conn;
fprintf(stderr, "[OSD %ju] new client %ju: connection from %s via RDMA-CM\n", this->osd_num, conn->client_id,
@@ -492,11 +494,13 @@ void osd_messenger_t::rdmacm_established(rdma_cm_event *ev)
cl->peer_addr = conn->parsed_addr;
cl->peer_port = conn->rdmacm_port;
cl->client_id = conn->client_id;
cl->is_incoming = conn->is_incoming;
cl->peer_state = PEER_RDMA;
cl->connect_timeout_id = -1;
cl->osd_num = peer_osd;
cl->in_buf = malloc_or_die(receive_buffer_size);
cl->in_buf = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(receive_buffer_size);
cl->rdma_conn = rc;
init_tls_client(cl);
clients[conn->client_id] = cl;
if (conn->timeout_id >= 0)
{
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+665 -131
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,424 @@
#include "messenger.h"
#include "msgr_iothread.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#define WR_GCM 1
#define WR_XTS 2
#define WR_NO_CSUM 4
#define GCM_TMP_BUF_SIZE 4096
class msgr_op_writer_t
{
public:
virtual bool write(uint8_t *src, size_t src_len, int flags = 0) = 0;
virtual bool finish() = 0;
};
class copy_op_writer_t: public msgr_op_writer_t
{
protected:
osd_messenger_t* msgr;
osd_client_t* cl;
size_t from;
uint8_t *curbuf;
size_t bufsize;
size_t done;
public:
copy_op_writer_t(osd_messenger_t* msgr, osd_client_t* cl, uint8_t *curbuf, size_t bufsize):
msgr(msgr), cl(cl), from(cl->write_op_pos), curbuf(curbuf), bufsize(bufsize), done(0)
{}
void reset()
{
from = cl->write_op_pos;
}
bool write(uint8_t *src, size_t src_len, int flags = 0) override
{
if (from >= src_len)
{
from -= src_len;
return true;
}
if (flags & WR_XTS)
{
msgr->op_encrypted_copy_buf(cl, curbuf, bufsize, src, src_len, from, done);
}
else
{
size_t n = src_len-from;
if (n > bufsize-done)
n = bufsize-done;
if (cl->write_csum_state && !(flags & WR_NO_CSUM))
XXH3_64bits_update(cl->write_csum_state, src+from, n);
memcpy(curbuf+done, src+from, n);
done += n;
cl->write_op_pos += n;
from += n;
}
if (from < src_len)
return false;
from = 0;
return true;
}
bool finish() override
{
return true;
}
size_t get_done()
{
return done;
}
};
class gcm_op_writer_t: public msgr_op_writer_t
{
osd_messenger_t* msgr;
osd_client_t* cl;
size_t from;
uint8_t *curbuf;
size_t bufsize;
size_t done;
public:
gcm_op_writer_t(osd_messenger_t* msgr, osd_client_t* cl, uint8_t *curbuf, size_t bufsize):
msgr(msgr), cl(cl), from(cl->write_op_pos), curbuf(curbuf), bufsize(bufsize), done(0)
{
}
void reset()
{
from = cl->write_op_pos;
init_ctx(msgr, cl);
}
static void init_ctx(osd_messenger_t* msgr, osd_client_t *cl)
{
if (!cl->enc_ctx)
{
if (msgr->encrypt_gcm_pool.size())
{
cl->enc_ctx = msgr->encrypt_gcm_pool.back();
msgr->encrypt_gcm_pool.pop_back();
}
else
{
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
cl->enc_ctx = (isal_gcm_context_data*)malloc_or_die(sizeof(isal_gcm_context_data));
#else
cl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
assert(cl->enc_ctx);
int r = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(cl->enc_ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (r != 1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "EncryptInit error: ");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
#endif
}
}
if (cl->my_iv_ctr >= AES_256_GCM_MAX_IV_CTR)
{
// Rotate key every 2^32 messages
bool ok = msgr->derive_aes_keys(cl, true, false);
assert(ok);
}
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
int r = isal_aes_gcm_init_256(&cl->my_key_isal, cl->enc_ctx, cl->my_key.data() + AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE, NULL, 0);
if (r != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "isal_aes_gcm_init_256 error %d\n", r);
abort();
}
#else
int r = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(cl->enc_ctx, NULL, NULL, (uint8_t*)cl->my_key.data(), cl->my_key.data() + AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE);
if (r != 1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "EncryptInit error: ");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
#endif
// Increase IV
cl->my_iv_ctr++;
(*(uint64_t*)(cl->my_key.data() + AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE))++;
}
static void free_ctx(osd_messenger_t* msgr, osd_client_t *cl)
{
if (msgr->encrypt_gcm_pool.size() < msgr->max_cipher_pool_size)
msgr->encrypt_gcm_pool.push_back(cl->enc_ctx);
else
{
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
free(cl->enc_ctx);
#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cl->enc_ctx);
#endif
}
cl->enc_ctx = NULL;
}
bool write(uint8_t *src, size_t src_len, int flags) override
{
if (from >= src_len)
{
from -= src_len;
return true;
}
if (flags & WR_XTS)
{
msgr->op_encrypted_copy_buf(cl, curbuf, bufsize, src, src_len, from, done);
}
else if (flags & WR_GCM)
{
size_t n = src_len-from;
if (n > bufsize-done)
n = bufsize-done;
if (!n)
return false;
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
int r = isal_aes_gcm_enc_256_update(&cl->my_key_isal, cl->enc_ctx, curbuf+done, src+from, n);
assert(!r);
#else
int actual_out;
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(cl->enc_ctx, curbuf+done, &actual_out, src+from, n) != 1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "EncryptUpdate error: ");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
assert(actual_out == n);
#endif
if (cl->write_csum_state && !(flags & WR_NO_CSUM))
XXH3_64bits_update(cl->write_csum_state, src+from, n);
done += n;
cl->write_op_pos += n;
from += n;
}
else
{
size_t n = src_len-from;
if (n > bufsize-done)
n = bufsize-done;
if (!n)
return false;
if (cl->write_csum_state && !(flags & WR_NO_CSUM))
XXH3_64bits_update(cl->write_csum_state, src+from, n);
memcpy(curbuf+done, src+from, n);
done += n;
cl->write_op_pos += n;
from += n;
}
if (from < src_len)
return false;
from = 0;
return true;
}
static void write_tag_to(osd_messenger_t *msgr, osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *dst)
{
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
int r = isal_aes_gcm_enc_256_finalize(&cl->my_key_isal, cl->enc_ctx, dst, 16);
assert(!r);
#else
int actual_out = 0;
int r = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(cl->enc_ctx, NULL, &actual_out);
if (r != 1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "EncryptFinal error: ");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
assert(actual_out == 0);
r = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cl->enc_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, 16, dst);
assert(r == 1);
#endif
}
bool finish() override
{
// Tag is 16 bytes
if (done >= bufsize)
return false;
if (bufsize-done < 16 || cl->enc_tag_size)
{
// No space for the full tag, but msgr_rdma expects us to always fill the whole buffer
if (!cl->enc_tag_size)
{
write_tag_to(msgr, cl, cl->enc_tag);
cl->enc_tag_size = 16;
}
size_t n = bufsize-done;
if (n > cl->enc_tag_size)
n = cl->enc_tag_size;
memcpy(curbuf+done, cl->enc_tag+16-cl->enc_tag_size, n);
done += n;
cl->enc_tag_size -= n;
if (cl->enc_tag_size > 0)
return false;
}
else
{
// The whole tag fits at once
write_tag_to(msgr, cl, curbuf+done);
done += 16;
}
free_ctx(msgr, cl);
return true;
}
size_t get_done()
{
return done;
}
};
class get_op_writer_t: public msgr_op_writer_t
{
osd_messenger_t* msgr;
osd_client_t* cl;
size_t from;
size_t done;
size_t op_enc;
size_t enc_size;
size_t done_enc;
uint8_t *enc_buf;
public:
get_op_writer_t(osd_messenger_t* msgr, osd_client_t* cl, uint8_t*, size_t):
msgr(msgr), cl(cl), from(cl->write_op_pos), done(0), enc_size(0), done_enc(0), enc_buf(NULL)
{
}
void reset()
{
op_enc = 0;
from = cl->write_op_pos;
if (cl->gcm_enabled)
{
gcm_op_writer_t::init_ctx(msgr, cl);
}
}
void extend_tmp(size_t n)
{
if (!enc_buf || done_enc + n > enc_size)
{
enc_size = n < GCM_TMP_BUF_SIZE ? GCM_TMP_BUF_SIZE : n;
enc_buf = (uint8_t*)malloc_or_die(enc_size);
done_enc = 0;
assert(!((size_t)enc_buf & 7));
cl->send_free_ops.push_back((osd_op_t*)((size_t)enc_buf | 1));
}
}
void send_tmp(size_t n)
{
if (cl->send_list.size() && cl->send_list.back().iov_base == (enc_buf + done_enc))
cl->send_list.back().iov_len += n;
else
cl->send_list.push_back((iovec){ .iov_base = enc_buf + done_enc, .iov_len = n });
done += n;
done_enc += n;
}
bool write(uint8_t *src, size_t src_len, int flags) override
{
if (from >= src_len)
{
// Skip
from -= src_len;
return true;
}
if (cl->send_list.size() >= IOV_MAX-1)
{
// Make sure tag always fits
return false;
}
if (flags & WR_XTS)
{
// Allocate a temporary buffer and encrypt data to it
if (!op_enc)
{
assert(cl->write_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_WRITE);
op_enc = cl->write_op->req.rw.len - from + (from % 16);
assert(op_enc > 0);
extend_tmp(op_enc);
}
size_t new_done = done_enc;
msgr->op_encrypted_copy_buf(cl, enc_buf, enc_size, src, src_len, from, new_done);
send_tmp(new_done-done_enc);
assert(from == src_len);
}
else if ((flags & WR_GCM) && cl->gcm_enabled)
{
// Allocate a temporary buffer and encrypt data to it
size_t n = src_len-from;
extend_tmp(n);
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
int r = isal_aes_gcm_enc_256_update(&cl->my_key_isal, cl->enc_ctx, enc_buf+done_enc, src+from, n);
assert(!r);
#else
int actual_out;
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(cl->enc_ctx, enc_buf+done_enc, &actual_out, src+from, n) != 1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "EncryptUpdate error: ");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
abort();
}
assert(actual_out == n);
#endif
if (cl->write_csum_state && !(flags & WR_NO_CSUM))
XXH3_64bits_update(cl->write_csum_state, src+from, n);
send_tmp(n);
cl->write_op_pos += n;
from += n;
if (from < src_len)
return false;
from = 0;
return true;
}
else
{
if (cl->write_csum_state && !(flags & WR_NO_CSUM))
XXH3_64bits_update(cl->write_csum_state, src+from, src_len-from);
cl->send_list.push_back((iovec){ src+from, src_len-from });
done += src_len-from;
cl->write_op_pos += src_len-from;
}
from = 0;
return true;
}
bool finish() override
{
if (cl->enc_ctx)
{
// Tag is 16 bytes
extend_tmp(16);
gcm_op_writer_t::write_tag_to(msgr, cl, enc_buf + done_enc);
send_tmp(16);
gcm_op_writer_t::free_ctx(msgr, cl);
}
return true;
}
size_t get_done()
{
return done;
}
};
void osd_messenger_t::outbox_push(osd_op_t *cur_op)
{
assert(cur_op->client_id);
@@ -22,6 +440,7 @@ void osd_messenger_t::outbox_push(osd_op_t *cur_op)
{
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &cur_op->tv_begin);
cur_op->req.hdr.id = ++cl->send_op_id;
cl->sent_ops[cur_op->req.hdr.id] = cur_op;
}
else
{
@@ -38,82 +457,9 @@ void osd_messenger_t::outbox_push(osd_op_t *cur_op)
}
// Can't be not found because client IDs are unique
assert(found);
}
auto & to_send_list = cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen ? cl->next_send_list : cl->send_list;
auto & to_outbox = cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen ? cl->next_outbox : cl->outbox;
if (cur_op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN)
{
measure_exec(cur_op);
to_send_list.push_back((iovec){ .iov_base = cur_op->reply.buf, .iov_len = OSD_PACKET_SIZE });
}
else
{
to_send_list.push_back((iovec){ .iov_base = cur_op->req.buf, .iov_len = OSD_PACKET_SIZE });
cl->sent_ops[cur_op->req.hdr.id] = cur_op;
}
to_outbox.push_back((msgr_sendp_t){ .op = cur_op, .flags = MSGR_SENDP_HDR });
// Bitmap
if (cur_op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN &&
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_READ &&
cur_op->reply.sec_rw.attr_len > 0)
{
to_send_list.push_back((iovec){
.iov_base = cur_op->bitmap,
.iov_len = cur_op->reply.sec_rw.attr_len,
});
to_outbox.push_back((msgr_sendp_t){ .op = cur_op, .flags = 0 });
}
else if (cur_op->op_type == OSD_OP_OUT &&
(cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_WRITE || cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_WRITE_STABLE) &&
cur_op->req.sec_rw.attr_len > 0)
{
to_send_list.push_back((iovec){
.iov_base = cur_op->bitmap,
.iov_len = cur_op->req.sec_rw.attr_len,
});
to_outbox.push_back((msgr_sendp_t){ .op = cur_op, .flags = 0 });
}
// Operation data
if ((cur_op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN
? (cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_READ ||
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_READ ||
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_LIST ||
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SHOW_CONFIG ||
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_DESCRIBE)
: (cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_WRITE ||
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_WRITE ||
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_WRITE_STABLE ||
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_STABILIZE ||
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_ROLLBACK ||
cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SHOW_CONFIG)) && cur_op->iov.count > 0)
{
for (int i = 0; i < cur_op->iov.count; i++)
{
if (cur_op->iov.buf[i].iov_len > 0)
{
assert(cur_op->iov.buf[i].iov_base);
to_send_list.push_back(cur_op->iov.buf[i]);
to_outbox.push_back((msgr_sendp_t){ .op = cur_op, .flags = 0 });
}
}
}
if (cur_op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_READ_BMP)
{
if (cur_op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN && cur_op->reply.hdr.retval > 0)
{
to_send_list.push_back((iovec){ .iov_base = cur_op->buf, .iov_len = (size_t)cur_op->reply.hdr.retval });
to_outbox.push_back((msgr_sendp_t){ .op = cur_op, .flags = 0 });
}
else if (cur_op->op_type == OSD_OP_OUT && cur_op->req.sec_read_bmp.len > 0)
{
to_send_list.push_back((iovec){ .iov_base = cur_op->buf, .iov_len = (size_t)cur_op->req.sec_read_bmp.len });
to_outbox.push_back((msgr_sendp_t){ .op = cur_op, .flags = 0 });
}
}
if (cur_op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN)
{
to_outbox[to_outbox.size()-1].flags |= MSGR_SENDP_FREE;
}
cl->write_ops.push_back(cur_op);
#ifdef WITH_RDMA
if (cl->peer_state == PEER_RDMA)
{
@@ -124,17 +470,17 @@ void osd_messenger_t::outbox_push(osd_op_t *cur_op)
if (!ringloop)
{
// FIXME: It's worse because it doesn't allow batching
while (cl->outbox.size())
while (cl->write_op || cl->write_ops.size())
{
try_send(cl);
}
}
else
{
if ((cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen > 0 || !try_send(cl)) && (cl->write_state == 0))
if (!try_send(cl) && cl->write_state == 0)
{
cl->write_state = CL_WRITE_READY;
write_ready_clients.push_back(cur_op->client_id);
write_ready_clients.push_back(cl->client_id);
}
ringloop->wakeup();
}
@@ -142,12 +488,49 @@ void osd_messenger_t::outbox_push(osd_op_t *cur_op)
bool osd_messenger_t::try_send(osd_client_t *cl)
{
if (!cl->send_list.size() || cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen > 0 || cl->peer_state == PEER_STOPPED || cl->peer_fd < 0)
if (cl->peer_state == PEER_STOPPED || cl->peer_fd < 0)
{
return true;
}
if (cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen > 0 || !ringloop->space_left() && !use_sync_send_recv)
{
return false;
}
assert(cl->peer_state != PEER_RDMA);
if (ringloop && !use_sync_send_recv)
if (cl->hs)
{
// Send handshake message
if (cl->hs->out_size())
{
uint8_t *out = cl->hs->get_out();
cl->send_list.push_back((iovec){ .iov_base = out, .iov_len = cl->hs->out_size() });
assert(!((size_t)out & 7));
cl->send_free_ops.push_back((osd_op_t*)((size_t)out | 1));
cl->hs->reset_out();
}
if (!cl->hs->out_size() && cl->hs->done())
{
delete cl->hs;
cl->hs = NULL;
goto copy_ops;
}
}
else
{
copy_ops:
copy_ops_to_with<get_op_writer_t>(cl, NULL, 0);
}
if (cl->io_error)
{
stop_client(cl->client_id);
return true;
}
if (!cl->send_list.size())
{
cl->write_state = 0;
return true;
}
if (!use_sync_send_recv)
{
auto iothread = iothreads.size() ? iothreads[cl->peer_fd % iothreads.size()] : NULL;
io_uring_sqe sqe_local;
@@ -158,21 +541,22 @@ bool osd_messenger_t::try_send(osd_client_t *cl)
sqe_local = { .user_data = (uint64_t)&data_local };
data_local = {};
}
if (!sqe)
return false;
assert(sqe);
cl->send_list_size = 0;
for (auto & iov: cl->send_list)
{
cl->send_list_size += iov.iov_len;
}
cl->write_msg.msg_iov = cl->send_list.data();
cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen = cl->send_list.size() < IOV_MAX ? cl->send_list.size() : IOV_MAX;
cl->refs++;
ring_data_t* data = ((ring_data_t*)sqe->user_data);
data->callback = [this, cl](ring_data_t *data) { handle_send(data->res, data->prev, data->more, cl); };
bool use_zc = has_sendmsg_zc && min_zerocopy_send_size >= 0;
if (use_zc && min_zerocopy_send_size > 0)
if (use_zc && min_zerocopy_send_size > 0 &&
cl->send_list_size/cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen < min_zerocopy_send_size)
{
size_t avg_size = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen; i++)
avg_size += cl->write_msg.msg_iov[i].iov_len;
if (avg_size/cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen < min_zerocopy_send_size)
use_zc = false;
use_zc = false;
}
if (use_zc)
{
@@ -203,6 +587,75 @@ bool osd_messenger_t::try_send(osd_client_t *cl)
return true;
}
size_t osd_messenger_t::copy_ops_to(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len)
{
if (cl->gcm_enabled)
{
if (cl->hs)
{
// Send handshake message
size_t n = 0;
if (cl->hs->out_size())
{
n = cl->hs->out_size() < dst_len ? cl->hs->out_size() : dst_len;
memcpy(dst, cl->hs->get_out(), n);
cl->hs->eat_out(n);
}
if (!cl->hs->out_size() && cl->hs->done())
{
delete cl->hs;
cl->hs = NULL;
n += copy_ops_to_with<gcm_op_writer_t>(cl, dst+n, dst_len-n);
}
return n;
}
return copy_ops_to_with<gcm_op_writer_t>(cl, dst, dst_len);
}
return copy_ops_to_with<copy_op_writer_t>(cl, dst, dst_len);
}
template<typename T>
size_t osd_messenger_t::copy_ops_to_with(osd_client_t *cl, uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len)
{
T wr(this, cl, dst, dst_len);
while (cl->write_op || cl->write_ops.size())
{
if (!cl->write_op)
{
wr.reset();
next_write_op(cl);
}
osd_op_t *op = cl->write_op;
if (!op_write_to(cl, wr))
{
if (cl->io_error)
return 0;
break;
}
if (!cl->write_op && op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN)
{
// this is a reply, free the op after sending it
cl->send_free_ops.push_back(op);
}
}
return wr.get_done();
}
void osd_messenger_t::next_write_op(osd_client_t *cl)
{
cl->write_op = cl->write_ops.front();
cl->write_ops.pop_front();
if (cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_FULL || cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_PAYLOAD)
{
if (!cl->write_csum_state)
cl->write_csum_state = XXH3_createState();
if (cl->my_key.size() == AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE + AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE + XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE)
XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret(cl->write_csum_state, cl->my_key.data() + AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE + AES_256_GCM_IV_SIZE, XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE);
else
XXH3_64bits_reset(cl->write_csum_state);
}
}
void osd_messenger_t::send_replies()
{
for (int i = 0; i < write_ready_clients.size(); i++)
@@ -223,6 +676,7 @@ void osd_messenger_t::handle_send(int result, bool prev, bool more, osd_client_t
if (!prev)
{
cl->write_msg.msg_iovlen = 0;
cl->send_list.clear();
}
if (!more)
{
@@ -250,62 +704,45 @@ void osd_messenger_t::handle_send(int result, bool prev, bool more, osd_client_t
// Second notification - only free a batch of postponed ops
int i = 0;
for (; i < cl->zc_free_list.size() && cl->zc_free_list[i]; i++)
delete cl->zc_free_list[i];
{
if (!((size_t)cl->zc_free_list[i] & 7))
delete cl->zc_free_list[i];
else
free((void*)((size_t)cl->zc_free_list[i] & ~(size_t)7));
}
if (i > 0)
cl->zc_free_list.erase(cl->zc_free_list.begin(), cl->zc_free_list.begin()+i+1);
return;
}
int done = 0;
while (result > 0 && done < cl->send_list.size())
if (cl->send_list_size > result)
{
iovec & iov = cl->send_list[done];
if (iov.iov_len <= result)
{
if (cl->outbox[done].flags & MSGR_SENDP_FREE)
{
// Reply fully sent
if (more)
cl->zc_free_list.push_back(cl->outbox[done].op);
else
delete cl->outbox[done].op;
}
result -= iov.iov_len;
done++;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Client %ju socket write error: expected to send "
"%zu bytes with MSG_WAITALL but sent %u. Disconnecting client\n", cl->client_id, cl->send_list_size, result);
stop_client(cl->client_id);
return;
}
for (auto op: cl->send_free_ops)
{
if (more)
cl->zc_free_list.push_back(op);
else if (!((size_t)op & 7))
delete op;
else
{
iov.iov_len -= result;
iov.iov_base = (uint8_t*)iov.iov_base + result;
break;
}
free((void*)((size_t)op & ~(size_t)7));
}
if (more)
{
int expected = cl->send_list.size() < IOV_MAX ? cl->send_list.size() : IOV_MAX;
if (done != expected)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Client %ju socket write error: expected to send "
"%d iovecs with MSG_WAITALL but sent %d. Disconnecting client\n", cl->client_id, expected, done);
stop_client(cl->client_id);
return;
}
cl->zc_free_list.push_back(NULL); // end marker
}
if (done > 0)
cl->send_free_ops.clear();
cl->write_state = 0;
if (cl->write_op || cl->write_ops.size())
cl->write_state = CL_WRITE_READY;
if ((cl->proto_csum_status & MSGR_CSUM_NEG) && !cl->write_op && !cl->write_ops.size())
{
cl->send_list.erase(cl->send_list.begin(), cl->send_list.begin()+done);
cl->outbox.erase(cl->outbox.begin(), cl->outbox.begin()+done);
// Checksums negotiated, enable
cl->proto_csum_status = cl->proto_csum_status & (~MSGR_CSUM_NEG);
}
if (cl->next_send_list.size())
{
cl->send_list.insert(cl->send_list.end(), cl->next_send_list.begin(), cl->next_send_list.end());
cl->outbox.insert(cl->outbox.end(), cl->next_outbox.begin(), cl->next_outbox.end());
cl->next_send_list.clear();
cl->next_outbox.clear();
}
cl->write_state = cl->outbox.size() > 0 ? CL_WRITE_READY : 0;
#ifdef WITH_RDMA
if (cl->rdma_conn && !cl->outbox.size() && cl->peer_state == PEER_RDMA_CONNECTING)
if (cl->rdma_conn && !cl->write_op && !cl->write_ops.size() && cl->peer_state == PEER_RDMA_CONNECTING)
{
// FIXME: Ignore pings during RDMA state transition
if (log_level > 0)
@@ -323,3 +760,100 @@ void osd_messenger_t::handle_send(int result, bool prev, bool more, osd_client_t
write_ready_clients.push_back(cl->client_id);
}
}
static inline bool op_has_data_for_ssl(osd_op_t *op)
{
return (op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN
? (op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_LIST ||
op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SHOW_CONFIG ||
op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_DESCRIBE)
: (op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_STABILIZE ||
op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_ROLLBACK ||
op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SHOW_CONFIG)) && op->iov.count > 0;
}
static inline bool op_has_data_for_nonssl(osd_op_t *op)
{
return (op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN
? (op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_READ ||
op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_READ)
: (op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_WRITE ||
op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_WRITE ||
op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_WRITE_STABLE)) && op->iov.count > 0;
}
bool osd_messenger_t::op_write_to(osd_client_t *cl, msgr_op_writer_t & wr)
{
osd_op_t *op = cl->write_op;
// Header
if (!wr.write((op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN ? op->reply.buf : op->req.buf), OSD_PACKET_SIZE,
WR_GCM | (cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_PAYLOAD ? WR_NO_CSUM : 0)))
{
return false;
}
// Bitmap
if (op->op_type == OSD_OP_IN)
{
if (op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_READ && op->reply.sec_rw.attr_len > 0)
{
if (!wr.write((uint8_t*)op->bitmap, op->reply.sec_rw.attr_len, WR_GCM))
return false;
}
else if (op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_READ_BMP && op->reply.hdr.retval > 0)
{
if (!wr.write((uint8_t*)op->buf, (size_t)op->reply.hdr.retval, WR_GCM))
return false;
}
else if (op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_READ && op->reply.rw.bitmap_len > 0)
{
if (!wr.write((uint8_t*)op->bitmap, op->reply.rw.bitmap_len, WR_GCM))
return false;
}
}
else if (op->op_type == OSD_OP_OUT)
{
if ((op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_WRITE || op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_WRITE_STABLE) &&
op->req.sec_rw.attr_len > 0)
{
if (!wr.write((uint8_t*)op->bitmap, op->req.sec_rw.attr_len, WR_GCM))
return false;
}
else if (op->req.hdr.opcode == OSD_OP_SEC_READ_BMP && op->req.sec_read_bmp.len > 0)
{
if (!wr.write((uint8_t*)op->buf, (size_t)op->req.sec_read_bmp.len, WR_GCM))
return false;
}
}
// Operation data
if (op_has_data_for_ssl(op))
{
for (int i = 0; i < cl->write_op->iov.count; i++)
{
auto & iov = cl->write_op->iov.buf[i];
if (!wr.write((uint8_t*)iov.iov_base, iov.iov_len, WR_GCM))
return false;
}
}
else if (op_has_data_for_nonssl(op))
{
for (int i = 0; i < cl->write_op->iov.count; i++)
{
auto & iov = cl->write_op->iov.buf[i];
if (!wr.write((uint8_t*)iov.iov_base, iov.iov_len, (op->enc ? WR_XTS : 0) | (cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_GCM ? WR_GCM : 0)))
return false;
}
}
if (cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_FULL ||
cl->proto_csum_status == MSGR_CSUM_PAYLOAD && cl->write_op_pos > OSD_PACKET_SIZE)
{
cl->write_op->csum = XXH3_64bits_digest(cl->write_csum_state);
if (!wr.write((uint8_t*)&cl->write_op->csum, 8, WR_GCM|WR_NO_CSUM))
return false;
}
if (!wr.finish())
return false;
op_encrypt_free(cl);
cl->write_op = NULL;
cl->write_op_pos = 0;
return true;
}
+71 -1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
#include <assert.h>
#include "messenger.h"
#include "../util/xxh_x86dispatch.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
void osd_client_t::cancel_ops()
{
@@ -76,6 +79,22 @@ void osd_messenger_t::stop_client(uint64_t client_id, bool force_delete)
fprintf(stderr, "[OSD %ju] Stopping client %ju (regular client)\n", osd_num, client_id);
}
}
if (cl->xts_enc_ctx)
{
if (encrypt_xts_pool.size() > max_cipher_pool_size)
destroy_aes_xts_encrypt(cl->xts_enc_ctx);
else
encrypt_xts_pool.push_back(cl->xts_enc_ctx);
cl->xts_enc_ctx = NULL;
}
if (cl->xts_dec_ctx)
{
if (decrypt_xts_pool.size() > max_cipher_pool_size)
destroy_aes_xts_decrypt(cl->xts_dec_ctx);
else
decrypt_xts_pool.push_back(cl->xts_dec_ctx);
cl->xts_dec_ctx = NULL;
}
// First set state to STOPPED so another stop_client() call doesn't try to free it again
cl->refs++;
int prev_state = cl->peer_state;
@@ -179,11 +198,62 @@ osd_client_t::~osd_client_t()
}
// Cancel outbound ops
cancel_ops();
for (osd_op_t *op: send_free_ops)
{
if (op)
{
if (!((size_t)op & 7))
delete op;
else
free((void*)((size_t)op & ~(size_t)7));
}
}
for (osd_op_t *op: zc_free_list)
{
if (op)
{
delete op;
if (!((size_t)op & 7))
delete op;
else
free((void*)((size_t)op & ~(size_t)7));
}
}
if (read_csum_state)
{
XXH3_freeState(read_csum_state);
read_csum_state = NULL;
}
if (write_csum_state)
{
XXH3_freeState(write_csum_state);
write_csum_state = NULL;
}
if (enc_ctx)
{
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
free(enc_ctx);
#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(enc_ctx);
#endif
enc_ctx = NULL;
}
if (dec_ctx)
{
#ifdef WITH_ISAL_CRYPTO
free(dec_ctx);
#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(dec_ctx);
#endif
dec_ctx = NULL;
}
if (hs)
{
delete hs;
hs = NULL;
}
if (hs_result.peer_cert)
{
X509_free(hs_result.peer_cert);
hs_result.peer_cert = NULL;
}
}
+17 -2
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#define OSD_OP_RECOVERY_RELATED (uint32_t)1
#define OSD_OP_IGNORE_PG_LOCK (uint32_t)2
#define OSD_OP_RETURN_CHAIN (uint32_t)4
// Memory alignment for direct I/O (usually 512 bytes)
#ifndef DIRECT_IO_ALIGNMENT
@@ -228,13 +229,27 @@ struct __attribute__((__packed__)) osd_op_rw_t
uint64_t offset;
// length. 0 means to read all bitmaps of the specified range, but no data.
uint32_t len;
// flags (for future)
// flags
// OSD_OP_RETURN_CHAIN for chained reads: return parent number in chain for each block
// read_chain size comes after bitmap, takes 0 bytes / 1 byte / 2 byte / 4 byte per each block,
// depending on the number of parent inodes (0 parents = 0 bytes, up to 255 parents = 1 byte, etc)
uint32_t flags;
// inode metadata revision
// inode metadata revision for chained reads
uint64_t meta_revision;
// object version for atomic "CAS" (compare-and-set) writes
// writes and deletes fail with -EINTR if object version differs from (version-1)
uint64_t version;
static inline size_t chain_info_bytes(size_t chain_size)
{
if (chain_size <= 1)
return 0;
if (chain_size <= 256)
return 1;
if (chain_size <= 65536)
return 2;
return 4;
}
};
struct __attribute__((__packed__)) osd_reply_rw_t
+25
View File
@@ -880,6 +880,25 @@ static int vitastor_refresh_limits(BlockDriverState *bs)
// return 0;
//}
// Move the running coroutine to the BlockDriverState's home AioContext.
//
// The block-coroutine-wrapper generator sets poll_state.ctx to
// qemu_get_current_aio_context() in the sync wrappers (bdrv_flush(),
// bdrv_pread() etc.). When bdrv_flush_all() runs under BQL from outside the
// bs's iothread (e.g. on the migration thread inside do_vm_stop()), that is
// the main AioContext, not the iothread that actually owns the bs. The
// coroutine then runs on the wrong context while completions are delivered on
// the iothread, and racing aio_co_schedule() vs. qemu_aio_coroutine_enter()
// on the same coroutine triggers "Co-routine was already scheduled in
// aio_co_schedule" and aborts the process (observed during live migration).
//
// aio_co_reschedule_self() is a no-op when we are already on the target ctx.
#if QEMU_VERSION_MAJOR > 5 || QEMU_VERSION_MAJOR == 5 && QEMU_VERSION_MINOR >= 2
#define vitastor_co_pin_to_bs_ctx(bs) aio_co_reschedule_self(bdrv_get_aio_context(bs))
#else
#define vitastor_co_pin_to_bs_ctx(bs) ((void)0)
#endif
static void vitastor_co_init_task(BlockDriverState *bs, VitastorRPC *task)
{
*task = (VitastorRPC) {
@@ -938,6 +957,7 @@ static int coroutine_fn vitastor_co_preadv(BlockDriverState *bs,
{
VitastorClient *client = bs->opaque;
VitastorRPC task;
vitastor_co_pin_to_bs_ctx(bs);
vitastor_co_init_task(bs, &task);
task.iov = iov;
@@ -966,6 +986,7 @@ static int coroutine_fn vitastor_co_pwritev(BlockDriverState *bs,
{
VitastorClient *client = bs->opaque;
VitastorRPC task;
vitastor_co_pin_to_bs_ctx(bs);
vitastor_co_init_task(bs, &task);
task.iov = iov;
@@ -1039,6 +1060,7 @@ static int coroutine_fn vitastor_co_block_status(BlockDriverState *bs,
#endif
VitastorRPC task;
VitastorClient *client = bs->opaque;
vitastor_co_pin_to_bs_ctx(bs);
uint64_t inode = client->watch ? vitastor_c_inode_get_num(client->watch) : client->inode;
uint8_t bit = 0;
if (client->last_bitmap && client->last_bitmap_inode == inode &&
@@ -1151,6 +1173,7 @@ static int coroutine_fn vitastor_co_flush(BlockDriverState *bs)
{
VitastorClient *client = bs->opaque;
VitastorRPC task;
vitastor_co_pin_to_bs_ctx(bs);
vitastor_co_init_task(bs, &task);
qemu_mutex_lock(&client->mutex);
@@ -1236,6 +1259,8 @@ static BlockDriver bdrv_vitastor = {
#endif
.bdrv_close = vitastor_close,
// Re-register fd handlers when the bs is moved to a different AioContext
// (live migration, drain, iothread reassignment).
.bdrv_detach_aio_context = vitastor_detach_aio_context,
.bdrv_attach_aio_context = vitastor_attach_aio_context,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ includedir=${prefix}/@CMAKE_INSTALL_INCLUDEDIR@
Name: Vitastor
Description: Vitastor client library
Version: 3.0.14
Version: 3.0.15
Libs: -L${libdir} -lvitastor_client
Cflags: -I${includedir}

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